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APOLLO SPACECRAFT 
The spacecraft (SIC) consists of a launch escape system (LES) assem­
bly. command module (C/!\t). ~ef\"ice module (S/M). and the spacecraftl 
lunar module adapter (SLA). The LES assembly provides the means for 
rapidly separating the C/M from the S/M during pad or suborbital aborts. 
Thl' ClM forms thl' spacl'craft control Cl'nter, contains nl'cessary auto­
matic and manual equipment to control and monitor the spacecraft 
systl'ms, and contains thl' required I'quipml'nt for safety and comfort of 
thl' crew. Thl' SIM is a cylindrical struClurl' locatl'd between thl' C/M 
and thl' SLA. It contains thl' propulsion systl'ms for attiludl' and veloc­
itv changl' maneuvers. Most of thl' consumabll's used in thl' mission are 
storl'd in thl' S/M. "fhl' SLA is a truncated conI' which connects thl' 
S/M 10 Ihl' launch I'l'hicll'. II also pro\"idl's thl' spacl' whl'rl'in the lunar 
module (LIM) is carril'd on lunar missions. 
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT 
Spacl'crafl 012 was undl'rgoing a "Plugs Out Intl'grated Test" at the 
titn!' of thl' accident on January 27,1967. Operational Chl'ckout Procl" 
durl'. dl'signall'd OCP .'O-K-002I·1 applied 10 this tl'SI. Within this 
rl'port this procedure is often rl'fl'Tfl'd to as OC P·0021. 
TESTS AND ANALYSES 
Results of tests and analyses not complete at the time of publication 
of this rl'porl will hi' containl'd.in Appendix G. Addenda and Corrigenda. 
CONVERSIOM OF TIME 
Throughout this report, time is stated in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). 
To convert GMT to Eastern Standard Time (EST). subtract 17 hoUTs. 
For example. 211:111 GMT converted-is 6:111 p.m. EST. 
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WITNESS STATEMENTS 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Witness Statements Panel, 12. The task assigned 
for accomplishment of Panel 12 was prescribed as follows: 
An orderly process to collect all data from witnesses (includes eye witnesses as well as con­
sole monitors). This includes a determination of who to interview, arranging for competent people 
to conduct the interviews, recording data, and collecting it into a form suitable for publication 
as an appendix to the formal report. Included also in this taks is an analysis of the pertinent se­
'quence of events as reported by the bulk of the witnesses together with a summary of that testi­
mony which is contradictory to the main data. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP 
The 	assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Witness Statements Panel: 
Mr. Norbert B. Vaughn, Manned Spacecraft Center, (MSC), NASA, Chairman 
Mr. J. J. O'Donnell, Kennedy Space Center, (KSC), NASA 
Mr. C. B. Netherton, Kennedy Space Center. (KSC), NASA 
Mr. H. F. Blackwood, Headquarters. NASA 
Lt. Col. J. W. Rawers. U. S. Air Force 
Mr. C. J. McNanara. North American Aviation, (NAA). Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER 
Colonel Charles F. Strang, U. S. Air Force, Board Member, was assigned to monitor the Witness 
Statements Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. OBJECTIVES 
a. To collect all data through written statements and taped interviews from: 
(1) Eye Witnesses 
(2) All other personnel who had access to Launch Complex (LC) 34 during the test 
(3) All monitoring personnel at: 
(a) The Launch Complex 34 Blockhouse 
(b) The Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) Control Rooms in the Manned Spacecraft 
Operations Building (MSOB) 
(c) All the other observation or recording stations where audio or television (TV) monitoring 
was available. 
(4) Other personnel as required by the Board 
(5) Volunteers of pertinent information that were not contacted in (1), (2), (3), or (4) above. 
b. To construct a sequence of events from the bulk of witness reports and to update this infor­
mation on a timely basis for use by the Review Board and other Panels. 
c. To identify the pertinent inconsistent or contradictory statements to the main data as presented 
in 5. Ojbective (b). 
d. To summarize the pertinent information for use by the Review Board and other Panels. 
e. To prepare the statements in proper form for publication as Appendix B to the Final Report. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
For use as general information and orientation are Enclosures 12·1 through 12-5, which are drawn 
approximately to scale. Enclosure 12·1 is a simulated. aerial view of Launch Complex (LC) 34. En­
closure 12-2 shows the Service Structure elevators and the Umbilical Tower elevator on LC 34. At 
the time of the incident, the Umbilical Tower elevator (450 feet per minute capability) was held at 
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the top of the tower in anticipation of the schedule "egress" exercise. The Service Structure elevators 
were programmed as follows for this test: 
No.1 (Northeast) - 200 feet per minute, capable of being stopped at every level 
No.2 (Northwest) - 100 feet per minute, capable of being stopped at every level 
No.3 (Southwest) - 200 feet per minute, capable of being stopped at every level 
No.4 (Southeast) - 450 feet per minute, capable of being stopped at every level 
The Pedestal elevator (65 fpm capability) is a hydraulic lift type platform that rises to the 27 foot 
level. Enclosure 12-3 is a plan view of adjustable level 8 (A-8) at LC 34. Enclosure 12-4 is a plan 
view of adjustable level 7 (A-7) at LC 34. The overlays in EncI()sures 12-3 and 12-4 show the position 
of the eye witnesses at the time of the incident. On the Enclosures 12-2, 12-3, and 12-4 are arrows 
indicating the direction North and an assumed North. The assumed North is a Kennedy Space Center 
common practice used for ease of locating items relative to the Service Structure axes. Witness state­
ments make use of this in describing their existing the Structure on elevators after the incident. En­
closure 12-5 is a sketch of the Command Module, White Room, Egress Access Arm, and Umbilical 
Tower elevator, showing the egress route of astronauts on LC 34. 
3. INVESTIGATION 
Investigation by the Witness Statement Panel was initiated January 31, 1967 when the Panel re­
ceived nine (9) miscellaneous written statements and twenty-six (26) "eye-witness" statements from the 
NASA-KSC Security Office. These were written or taped statements obtained the evening of the Apollo 
204 incident. At the same time, twenty-one (21) Pan American World Airwasy (PAA) employee wit­
ness statements were received from the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) Representative to the 
Board. 
4. OBJECTIVE A 
Panel objective a (Collection of Data) was accomplished by contacting the contractors and agencic::s 
involved in the test operations. Those contacted were either "eye-witnesses", or television (TV) or 
audio monitors of the incident. A total of eighteen (18) agencies or contractors were contacted (See 
General File for list). There were responses for 590 people with 572 written statements and forth (40) 
recorded statements. Since some witnesses submitted more than one written statement or were inter­
viewed twice, a total of 612 statements was obtained. 
5. OBJECTIVE B 
Panel 12 objective b (Sequence of Events) was accomplished as shown below, and by the Review 
Board Counsel as shown in Enclosure 12-6. Enclosure 12-6 is a detailed narrative description of the 
events. The sequence of events briefly listed herein was established from the bulk of the witness state­
ments. 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FROM WITNESS STATEMENTS 
Between time 6:31:00 p.m. EST to Events: 
6:31:15 p.m. EST 
The: Witnesses in· Launch Vehicle Felt two definite rocking or shaking movements of vehicle 
Aft Interstage, Level A-2: seconds prior to "Fire" report. Unlike vibrations exper­
ienced in past fron wind, engine gimballing or equipment 
input. 
Witnesses on Levels 	 Heard "Fire" and/or "Fire in Cockpit" transmissions 
A-7 & A-8: 	 Heard muffled explosion, ~hen two loud whooshes of es­
caping gas (or explosive releases). 
Observed flames jet from around edge of Command 
Module and under White Room. 
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TV Monitors: 	 Heard "Fire" and/or "Fire in Cockpit" transmlSSlons. 
Observed astronaut helmet, arm, and back movements; 
increase of light in Spacecraft window, and tongue-like 
flame pattern within Spacecraft. 
Observed flame progressing from lower left corner of 
window to upper right, then spreading flame filled win­
dow, burning around hatch openings, lower portion of 
Command Module, and cables. 
Between time 6:31: 15 p.m. EST to 
6:33 p.m. EST 
Witnesses on Levels A-7 Repeated attempts to penetrate White Room for egress 
& A-8: action. Fought fires on Command Module, Service Mod­
ule, and. in Wllite Room area. 
TV Monitors: 	 Observed smoke and fire on Level A-8. 
Progressive reduction of visibility of Spacecraft hatch on 
TV monitor due to increase of smoke. 
Between time 6:33 p.m. EST to Repeated attempts to remove hatch and reach crew. 
6:37 	p.m. EST Continued fire-fighting on Levels A-7 and A-8 in White 
Room. 
Spacecraft Boost Protective Cover (BPC) removed by 
NAA personnel J. D. Gleaves and D. O. Babbitt. 
Spacecraft outer (Ablative) hatch removed by NAA per­
sonnel J. W. Hawkins, L. D. Reece, and S. B. Clem­
mons. Spacecraft Inner hatch opened and pushed down 
inside by N AA personnel J. W. Hawkins, L. D. Reece, 
and S. B. Clemmons at approximately 6:36:30 p.m. 
EST. No visual inspection of Spacecraft interior possible 
due to heat and smoke. No signs of life. 
Between time 6:37 p.m. EST 	to Extinguish remains of fires. Fire and Medical support 
6:45 p.m. EST arrive. 
Fireman J. A. Burch, Jr. and NAA Technician W. M. 
Medcalf removed the Spacecraft Inner hatch from the 
Spacecraft. 
Examin..ation of crew and verification of condition. 
Between time 6:45 p.m. EST, Service Structure cleared. Photographs taken. Crew re­

January 27, 1967 to 2:00 a.m. EST, moved. 

January 28, 1967 Complex and area under secure conditions. Personnel 

from Washington and Houston arrive and assume con­
trol of situation. 
6. OBJECTIVE C 
Panel objective c (Contradictory Statements) was accomplished. The only significant deviation, which 
had no other substantiation, was the statement of Mr. Gary W. Propst, RCA Technician. The Witness 
was monitoring Operational Intercommunication System (OIS) channel Black 3 and observing the TV 
view of the SIC 012 hatch.· The call of "Fire" over the OIS and observation of a bright glow in the 
spacecraft occurred simultaneously. He stated there was a two to two and one-half minute time elapse 
from the call until flames increased and covered the hatch opening. At about three (3) minutes, Mr. 
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Propst stated. the flames from the outside bottom of the spacecraft began to eat through the area where 
the bottom lip of the White Room meets the Spacecraft. and the White Room began to fill with smoke. 
He also stated there was movement inside the Spacecraft lasting about two (2) minutes before the flames 
began to block the view, and no one entered the White Room until it had become smoke-filled some 
minutes later. Mr. Propst stated that he changed the electronic control knobs on the hatch 1V monitor 
while the incident was happening. This caused all the other 1V monitor screens as mentioned by some 
witnesses, to have a monetary (1 to 2 seconds) loss of picture, with either gray, black, or white-out, 
but most probably white appearance. As the camera built-in electronics and internal mechanisms were 
adjusting themselves, the hatch area could have appeared washed-out due to the Spacecraft interior 
brightness for approximately 2 seconds. 
7. OBJECTIVE D 
Panel objective d (Summary of Pertinent Information) was accomplished as shown herein. Section 
(a.) is a summary prepared from the statements of witnesses located primarily on adjustable levels 7 
and 8 of the Launch Complex 34 Service Structure. Section (b.) is a summary prepared from state­
ments of witnesses who had access to 1V monitors located at either the Launch Complex 34 Blockhouse 
or at the ACE Control Rooms. These summaries indicate only the initial observations of the witnesses. 
Subsequent observations and actions taken are contained in the witnesses entire statements found in Ap­
pendix B. 
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SUMMARY OF WITNESS OBSE.RVATIONS REGARDING FIRE 
a. Levels A-7, A·S and other Areas of Service Structure 
Name, Duty, Location 
Donald O. Babbitt 
NAA, Project Engineer 
Pad Leader; A·S Pad 
Leader Desk 
James D. Gleaves 
NAA, Mechanical Lead 
Technician; A·S Flyaway 
Umbilical 
L. D. Reece 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
A·S, Flyaway Umbilical 
Richard A. Hagar 
NAA, Electrical Systems 
Technician; A-S, -Y 
Area 
Richard L. Bachand 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
A·S, +Z +Y area 
Stephen B. Clemmons 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
A-S, Pad Leader Desk 
James E. Cromer 
PAA, Elevator Technician; 
Umbilical tower elevator 
looking at White Room 
Joseph H. Pleasant 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
A·S, near stairs to White 
Room 
Bruce, W. David 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
A-S, Flyaway umbilical 
Friend D. Hickenbottom 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
A·S, South of Tower 
Time Reference 
Immediately after OIS report 
Shortly after hearing OIS re­
port - believed to be Astro· 
naut Chaffee. 
Immediately after OIS 
report. 
Immediately after OIS 
report. 
Immediately after OIS 
report. 
Immediately after OIS 
report. 
Did not hear report . 
saw flash first. 
Someone called "There's a 
fire in spacecraft" . 
Immediately after 0 IS 
report. 
Immediately after OIS 
report. 
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Initial Observation 
Flame from under BPC near steam 
duct - followed by concussion. 
Heard loud shooooo - entered White 
Room, saw flash - followed by fire 
and debris covered right side of 
Spacecraft. 
Sheet of flame from Command Mod­
ule 12 access. 
Two loud pops - fire blew out of 
-Y and +Y access panels. 
Low burp, large whoosh, wall of 
flame . floor to ceiling. 
White glow around BPC, access pan­
ed between umbilical· and White 
Room. Loud venting of gases, then 
ignition like gas jet being ignited. 
No loud explosion. 
Flash of fire from White Room door­
side doors blew open. 
Heard someone call fire in Space­
craft - heard muffled explosion . fire 
around bottom of Command Mod­
ule - several places - smoke. 
Flames within open access panels near 
umbilical - followed by whoosh and 
flames shooting out of the panels. 
Spurt of flame under White Room 
. explosion - flames at all Command 
Module openings. 
Jerry W. Hawkins 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
A-B, Swing Arm 
W. Donald Brown 
NAA, Mechanical In­
spector; A-B, -Y Quality 
Control Desk 
Jessie L. Owens 

NAA, Systems Engineer; 

A-8, Pad Leader Desk, 

+Yarea 

Robert C. Hedlund 

NAA, Systems Technician; 

A-B, +Z +Y Area 

John E. Markovich 

NASA/KSC, Q. C. 

Inspector; A-B, + Z (NW) 

Joseph L. Stoeckl 

NASA/KSC, Q. C. 

Inspector; A-B, 

SW corner 

Henry H. Rogers, Jr. 

NASA/KSC, Q. C. In­

spector; A-B, on S.W. 

Elevator 

Creed A. Journey 

NAA, Electrical Lead-

man; A-8, +Z -Y axis Area 

William J. Schneider 

NAA, GSE Technician; 

A-7. with back to Service 

Module at + Y Area 

Dave E. Howard 

NAA, Systems Technician; 

A-7, near access to Service 

Module 

J. C. Scott 
NAA, Q. C. Inspector; 
A-7, under umbilical 
After hearing someone yell 
"Fire" . 
No time reference 
Immediately after OIS 
report. 
Immediately after OIS 
report. 
Heard explosion - first 
notice 
Hears explosion - first 
notice 
Very shortly after hearing 
report on PA 
Heard shout as entering level 
A-8 from A-7. Threw self to 
floor as fire burst out. 
Heard "Fire" either over 
squawk box or down from 
level A-B. 
After initial fire - no refer­
erence to OIS report. Heard 
Astronaut say, "Fire in 
cockpit" . 
Heard someone say, "Fire 
in cockpit" 
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Flame from Spacecraft to Pad Lead­
er desk. 
Command Module 012 access seem­
ed to ignite - minor explosion - 2 
loud whooshes - escaping gas 
Heard relief valve open - hi-velocity 
gas escaping, burst into flame. 
Hears whoosh - saw small flames 
from access hatches. 
Heard muffled explosion - saw huge 
flash fire - service port + Z axis. 
Mulled explosion - Command Mod­
engulfed in flame. 
Entered White Room - fire appear­
ed burning from inside Spacecraft 
out. 
Fire broke out of Command Module 
in high velocity streams, 6 to 7 feet 
long out of servicing ports in south­
east corner (-Y area). 
Felt heat on back at call "Fire". 
Went out to get on NE passenger 
elevator. Didn't get on. Saw fire 
inside Service Module. Got fire ex­
tinguisher and extinguished fire in 
Service Module. 
Saw fire dimish from first flame ­
loud swoosh ball of flame from bot­
tom of Command Module. 
Heard noise - then second noise ­
ball of fire fell from Command Mod­
to Service Module. 
Robert I. Bass 
NAA, Systems Technician; 
ACE Room 
John C. McConnell 
NAA, GSE Technician; 
Umbilical Tower level 
190 Ft~ 
Burt B. Belt 
NAA, GSE Leadman; 
On Service Structure 
express elevator, 
level 2 
George W. Rackleff 
NAA-Tulsa, Systems 
Technician; A-7, under 
White Room 
Samuel Williams 
NAA, GSE Technician; 
A-7, A14-019 Fly-Away 
umbilical connection 
Forrest R. Rooker 
NAA, GSE Technician; 
A-7, A14-019 Fly-Away 
umbilical connection 
William H. Wingfield 
NAA, GSE Electrical 
Technician; Level A-5 
Marvin L. Nelson 
NASA/KSC QC Inspector; 
A-7, N.E. side of Service 
Module 
Patrick. E. Mitchell 
NASA/KSC QC Inspector; 
A-7, A14-019 umbilical dis­

connect 

William C. Deaver 

NAA, Electronic Technic­

ian; A·7, A14-019 Fly-Away 

umbilical connection 

Willis M. Medcalf 

NAA, Mechanical Technic­

ian; Service Structure ele­

vator between levels 3 and 4 

Hears explosion - saw smoke 
heard shouts of "Fire". 
. Heard someone on A-S or 
else over OIS say "Fire in 
the Spacecraft". 
Heard people yelling "Fire 
in the Spacecraft" as eleva­
tor was going to level A·6. 
Heard report from spacecraft 
crew member 
Astronaut: "Fire in cockpit" 
over headset. 
Astronaut: "We have fire 
in cockpit" over headset. 
Heard Chaffee say "Fire" 
over OIS. 
Immediately after report 
from PIA 
Immediately after report 
Heard someone say, "Fire 
in Cockpit" 
Heard cry of "Fire" as ele­
vator passed levels 3 and 4 
Muffled explosion - smoke pouring 
out and around swing arm into 
White Room. 
At indication of "Fire" sound - level 
A-S all lit up when it exploded. 
Got fire extinguisher - and crossed 
over to A-6, grabbed 2 gas masks 
and went up to level A-S. 
Wanted elevator to go to A-S but 
stopped at A-6. Grabbed gas masks 
and took up to A -S. Started fighting 
fires coming from parts of Command 
Module with extinguishers. 
Large puff of smoke· and explosion ­
swing arm entry hatch. 
Heard explosion immediately follow­
by another, then fire down through 
A-7 at Swing Arm. 
Heard sni~1fexplosion then larger 
one - Flash of flame through open­
ing A-S and A-7 at umbilical swing 
arm. 
Smoke came down to area, saw 
paper on fire flying from A-S leveL 
Went up to A-S for few moments 
only and went down to ISS ft. level 
to open power supply breakers. 
Smoke began to fill the area. 
Level filled with smoke 
Heard 2 explosions - then fire be­
tween Command Module and Ser­
vice Module. 
Elevator stopped at level A-S Ran 
down a level or two and took gas 
masks to A-S. 
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Robert C. Foster 
NAA, QC Inspector; 
Complex 34 Fuel Area 
b. TV and Audio Monitors 
Name, Duty, Location 
Clarence A. Chauvin 
NASA/KSC Test Conductor; 
Test Conductors Console 
ACE Control Room 1, 
MSO Building 
William H. Schick 
NASA/KSC Assistant Test 
Supervisor; Test Supervisor's 
Console - Blockhouse Launch 
Complex 34 
Gary W. Propst 
RCA Technician; 
Operational TV Control 
Racks - Blockhouse Launch 
Complex 34 
Alan R. Caswell 
RCA-Communications 
Controller; Communication 
Control Racks - Blockhouse 
Launch Complex 34 
Donald K. Slayton 
NASA-MSC, Director of 
Flig~t Crew Operations; As­
tronaut Console Blockhouse 
Launch Complex 34 
Daryl O. Cain 
NAA, Spacecraft 017Test 
Conductor; ACE Control 
Room No.2, MSO Build­
ing 
Saw smoke 
Initial Notice 
"Fire" over Operational 
Intercommunications System 
(OIS). 
"Fire in Cockpit" over OIS 
"Fire in the cockpit" over 
OIS 
Technician Propst called 
attention to monitor - stat­
ing Fire in Spacecraft. 
Call of "Fire" on OIS 
Hatch Cameraseemed to 
blank out like someone had 
shined a very bright light 
into lens of camera. 
Looked upward and saw smoke. Car­
ried gas masks and frre extinguish. 
ers to SE elevator and took to level 
A-8. 
Observation 
Noticed flames in vicinity of apex 
cover at top of Command Module. 
Not aware fire was in Spacecraft 
until heard over headset shortly af· 
ter. 
Saw flames climbing about halfway 
up the side of the Spacecraft com­
ing from the interface between the 
Command Module and the Service 
Module. 
Observed hatch in TV monitor. Saw 
bright glow in Spacecraft. Observed 
Astronaut arm and leg movements 
lasting about 2 minutes until flames 
obscured vision. A split second later 
flames go past window. Fire in­
creased steadily. Flames from out­
side bottom of Spacecraft where it 
meets lip of White Room and from 
under hatch. 
Observed hatch on TV monitor. 
Flames flickered inside Spacecraft on 
left side of window and in 15-20 
seconds almost covered window. Saw 
center astronaut's helmet move duro 
ing first few seconds. 
Observed Spacecraft hatch on TV 
monitor. Flame around hatch. Smoke 
increased. Detected people trying to 
get to hatch door. Smoke obscured 
view from TV Camera. 
Picture was regained. Saw "Guttery" 
typeflames about 6 inches. high mostly 
on right hand side at base hatch. Im­
pression one of the quads had fired 
and fire was outside Spacecraft under· 
neath the Command Module. Ob­
served the fire fighting attempts and 
assumed Astronauts were safe and 
staying inside craft until fire exing­
uished and smoke cleared from area. 
Camera eventually turned off. Not 
aware of tragedy for couple of hours 
because principally engaged in mon­
itoring own test on spacecraft 017. 
Donald R. Jones Illumination within Space­ Noted tongue of flame between cen­
NASA/KSC - Chief, craft and call of "Fire" ter Astronaut's helmet and hatch 
Electrical Systems, Saturn over OIS window on hatch camera. Saw As· 
IV-B; VIP Room - Block­ tronaut's arms move toward hatch. 
house Launch Complex 34 At this time interior of Spacecraft 
was illuminated to such brilliance 
picture blacked out. 
Albert E. Jorolan "Hey, there's a fire in here", Observed 2 distinct tongues of fire 
NASA/KSC - Launch Ve­ over Spacecraft communication positioned at 11 and 7 o'clock on 
hicle Measuring Instrumen­ channel. Identifies voice as TV monitor. Screen was dark, lo­
tation Engineer; Measuring Chaffee's. cation of fire not identifiable. Cam­
Station-Blockhouse Launch era and/or target was not identified 
Complex 34 in statement. 
8. 	APPENDIX B - WITNESS STATEMENTS 
The witness statements and releases for the statements contained in Appendix B are from: 
(1) Personnel on adj ustable levels 7, 8, and other areas of Launch Complex 34 Service Structure 
(34 total) • 
(2) Representative TV monitors (7) 
(3) Representative audio monitors (2) 
(4) Other Witnesses (3) 
The index of Appendix.B contains witnesses names, organization, position or duty, location at the time 
of the incident, and date(s) of statement(s). A page of common abbreviations and definitions is included 
in Appendix B. Only the witness statements containing testimony relevant to the investigation are in­
cluded in this Appendix. 
9. OTHER STATEMENTS 
The statements of witnesses (names listed in Appendix B), which do not provide relevant testimony, 
are retained in the Apollo 204 Review Board General File as a matter of record. These statements, 
not part of Appendix B, are arranged by order of primary importance within the categories: 
(1) TV monitors 
(2) Audio monitors 
(3) Related areas 
(4) Miscellaneous 
The relevancy of testimony has been reviewed by Counsel to the Board. The Board Administrative Pro­
cedure No. 16, titled "Coordination Policy for Interviewing Witnesses", was used when obtaining re­
corded witness statements. The General File also includes all original statements and/or tape recordings 
of all witnesses. . 
10. OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES 
A total of thirty (30) requirements for information were placed on the Panel. These requests varied 
from lists of witnesses to information in definite disciplines (Enclosure 12-7). The requirements came 
from the Board, the Board Panel Coordination Committee, other Panels, and NASA Headquarters. 
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11. WITNESS CATEGORIES 
Several categories of witnesses were established on the basis of information contained in their state­
ments. These were: gas or vapor odors during pre-ingress, astronaut ingress, eye-witnesses of the incident, 
TV monitors, audio monitors, and rescue, security and medical personnel. A tape recorded conference 
among members of Panel 7 (Test Procedures), Panel 8 (Materials Review), and witnesses who had ment­
ioned an unusual odor during ingress or cabin purge, was conducted February 9, 1967. The purpose 
of this conference was to ascertain the exact articles passed in and out of the Spacecraft hatch, the 
placement of articles in the Spacecraft, and a more detailed description of any odors noticed. The find­
ings obtained in this conference were forwarded to Panels 7 and 8. The minutes of the conference are 
contained in the Review Board General File. 
D. FINDING AND DETERMINATION 
FINDING 
A total of 612 witness statements were obtained by Panel 12. 
DETERMINATION 
The Witness Statements Panel 12 believes that all people with pertinent information regarding the 
Apollo 204 incident of January 27, 1967 have been contacted. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
Enclosure 
12-1 Aerial Drawing of Launch Complex 34 
12-2 Launch Complex 34 Elevators 
12-3 LC 34 Service Structure Adjustable Level 8 Platform 
12-4 LC 34 Service Structure Adjustable Level 7 Platform 
12-5 LC 34 Egress Route for Astronauts 
12-6 Detailed Narrative Description of the Sequence of Events 
12-7 Requirements placed on Panel 12. 
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PAD 
LEADER 
DESK 
o TECH 
LEADMAN 
DESK 
-LEJ 
DESK COOLER 
SPARE 
LC·34 SERVICE STRUCTURE ADJUSTABLE LEVELS PLATFORM 
.Y 
1. DONALD O. BABBITT, NAA 
2. JAMES D. GLEAVES, NAA 
4. L. D. REECE, NAA 
5. RICHARD A. HAGAR, NAA 
6. RICHARD L. BACHAND, NAA 
7. STEPHEN B. CLEMMONS, NAA 
9. JOSE PH H. PLEASANT, NAA 
10. BRUCE W. DAVIS, NAA 
QC 
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TABLE 
SWING ARM NO.4 
12. JERRY W. HAWKINS, NAA 
13. W. DONALD BROWN, NAA 
14. JESSIE l. OWENS, NAA 
o 
15. ROBERTC. HEDLUND, NAA 
16. JOHN E. MARKOVICH, NASA 
17. JOSEPH l. STOECKL, NASA 
18. HENRY H. ROGERS, JR., NASA 
11. FRIEND DALE HICKENBOTTOM, NAA 
19. CREED A. JOURNEY, NAA 
33. WILLIS M. MEDCALF, NAA 
261-1100-67-2 
ENCLOSURE 12-38 
0·12·17 
TECH 
LEADMAN 
DESK 
LC·34 SERVICE STRUCTURE ADJUSTABLE LEVEL 7 PLATFORM 
.y CABINETS 
RCS SIMULATOR 
LOAD BANKS 
ENCLOSURE 12-4A 
0-12-18 
+y 
LC·34 SERVICE STRUCTURE ADJUSTABLE LEVEL 7 PLATFORM 
-y CABINETS 
:;--"-­
I I 
I I 
• I 
• I 
20. WILLIAM J. SCHNEIDER, NAA 
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26. GEORGE W. RACKLEFF, HAA· TULSA 
27. SAMUEL WILLIAMS, HAA 
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DETAILED NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
The rollowing is a description of the events surrounding the Apollo 204 incident, as determined by 
the Apollo 204 Review Board Counsel. This narrative is based upon witness statements (Appendix B), 
a recording of the communications on the OIS channel Black 3, and re-interviews (non-recorded) of the 
principal participating witnesses. The re-interviews (March 28, 29, and 30, 1967) were done by the Re­
view Board Counsel with the Witness Statements Panel 12 chairman and one Panel 12 member present. 
The following was reviewed by the chairman of Panel 12 and in his opinion is a true representation 
of the facts. 
ENCLOSURE 12·6 
0-12·23 
DETAILED NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 

The following is a description of the events surrounding the Apollo 204 accident, as determined by 
the Apollo 204 Board Counsel. This narrative is based upon witness statements (Appendix B), a record­
ing of the communications on the OIS channel Black 3, and re-interviews (non-recorded) of the prin­
cipal participating witnesses. The re-interviews (March 28,29 and 30, 1967) were done by the Board 
Counsel with the Witness Statements Panel 12 Chairman and one Panel 12 member present. The fol­
lowing was reviewed by the Chairman of Panel 12 and in his opinion is a true representation of the 
facts. 
It should be recognized that during the attempt to remove the various hatches, visibility within 
the working areas was virtually non-existent. At the same time, some individuals were wearing gas 
masks making identification extremely difficult. it is possible that individuals have been improperly 
placed during the description of a particular sequence. Care has been taken to reconstruct the scene 
as accurately as human memory will allow. In an effort to identify the individuals involved during 
the various hatch removals, participants ran through an experiment on a mock-up spacecraft. The 
experiment tended to clarify the sequence of events and is relied upon in this narrative as being a 
reliable indication of the actions involved in the crew rescue attempt. 
Complex 34 consists of the Service Structure containing adjustable levels which completely surround 
the vehicle and the Command Module and an umbilical tower. Work on the vehicle during erection 
and preparation for launch, is carried out on the various enclosed adjustable levels. Prior to launch, 
the entire service tower is moved away from the erected vehicle. 
The umbilical tower is a fixed installation containing an elevator, umbilicals to the Launch Ve­
hicle, and an environmental control assembly (called a "white room"), at the end of a swinging access 
. arm. The "white room", which is relatively small, swings against, and surrounds the hatchway of the 
Command Module. It is separate from adjustable Level S which completely surrounds the Command 
Module, until the service tower is pulled away. When the service tower moves away, the "white room" 
stays in position, pressed against the Command Module hatch, until 30 minutes prior to launch. It is 
through the white room, the access arm and the elevator, that crewmen can escape from the Command 
Module in the event hazardous conditions are discovered. After the access arm and the white room 
swing away from the vehicle, escape from hazardous conditions on the pad would be via the Launch 
Escape Syst~m (LES). It contains a solid fueld rocket motor, capable of pulling the Command Module 
clear of the complex. Prior to the Plugs Out Test, the Launch Escape System, with its rocket motor, 
was erected on top of the Command Module. While the wires activating the LES were shorted, there 
nevertheless remained the possibility that if sufficient heat were generated, the solid fuel could explode 
or the motor ignite. This would cause wide spread destruction to the adjustable levels of the service 
tower and to the Launch Complex itself. 
The "white room" is completely separate from the service structure since it is an integral part 
of the umbilical tower. However, the "white room" and the access arm, swing into Level A-S where 
the Command Module is situated. In this configuration, the "white room", the access arm and the 
umbilical tower appear to be part of the service structure. 
The "white room" is attached to the Command Module by an hydraulically operated adapter boot. 
The boot fits against the Command Module, it's flexible material forming a seal around the Command 
Module hatch. From inside the rectangularly shaped "white room", the adapter boot presents a ramp­
like appearance to the Command Module hatch; the floor of the white room being elevated above 
the hatchway. A door opens from the access arm into the "white room". Another white room door 
directly opposite the access arm doorway leads into Level A-S. This second door was sealed shut at 
time of the accident. The door is sealed as a safety precaution to prevent use once the service structure 
is pulled away from the Command Module. Until that time, access into Level A-S is possible from 
the access arm itself. 
ENCLOSURE 12-6 
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Four corner elevators on the service structure serve the va~ .ous levels. 
The count on OCP-FO-K-0021, the Plugs Out Test, was at T-I0 minutes and holding. Ef 
were being made to correct communications difficulties which had existed throughout the test. h, 
ever, the communications difficulties, while still existing, were not deemed important enough to h" 
the test. The count was due to resume within minutes when the first report of fire was heard. 
The report from inside the Command Module is believed by the 'Vitnesses on Level A-S to have 
been made by the Pilot. Some heard the report over their headsets, others heard it over speakers 
installed on Level A·S. 
After the initial shock of the report of fire, followed within seconds by the rupturing of the Com­
mand Module with flames pouring out of the failed area of the Command Module, efforts were begun 
to remove thr three hatches of the Command Module. 
At the instant of the report of fire, J. D. Gleaves, standing on the access arm, immediately began 
moving toward the "white room". He heard pressure escaping from the cabin relief valve and recalls 
thinking at the time, that the Command Pilot had dumped the pressure of the Command Module in 
accordance with the fire emergency procedures. It was his feeling that since the cabin was being de­
pressurized he would have no difficulty in removing the inner hatch. As Gleaves started to step into 
the white room, he saw a very bright flash of light emanating through the porthole of the Command 
Module. He turned around. With him at this time was J. W. Hawkins. As they neared the door on 
the access arm, Gleaves recalls feeling a pressure and seeing tongues of flame escaping from the failed 
portion of the Command Module. The force of the pressure pushed him against Hawkins. With some 
difficulty they opened the door, which opened toward them. Their first thoughts after seeing the Com­
mand Module rupture and the flames spread across Level A·S, was that Pad Leader D. O. Babbitt 
and the others must have been killed. I t was only after Babbitt and others joined them on the swing 
arm, that they realized that no one on Level A-S had been seriously injured as a result of the rupture 
of the Command Module. Hawkins secured a fire extinguisher, entered the "white room" and put out 
two localized fires. Babbitt and Gleaves immediately returned to the white room area and began the 
job of removing the boost protective cover (BPC) hatch, which is the Command Module's outermost 
hatch. Though the BPC hatch had not been fully installed, that is, dogs which attach it to other 
portions of the boost protective cover surrounding the Command Module had not been engaged, it was 
necessary to insert a tool into te hatch in order to secure a hand hold. Babbitt and Gleaves report 
that the BPC hatch itself had been distorted, probably by the fire and rupturing of the Command 
Module. The hatch, which normally would have been easily removed, had to be forced. During this 
period of time, the "white room" continued to fill with smoke. 
While some individuals had working gas masks, others did not. Even when the gas masks, pri­
marily designed for use in toxic atmosphc;res, became operative, they were unable to work efficiently 
except for very short periods of time in the dense smoke-filled atmosphere of the white room. 
Visibility was virtually zero. The various crews working in relays had to proceed primarily by the 
sense of touch. 
After removal of the boost protective cover by Babbitt and Gleaves, they left the "white room". 
Gleaves had no gas mask and was obviously feeling the effects of the dense smoke. He was beginning 
to gag and choke, and yet, in spite of his physical condition, was able to complete, with Babbitt's 
assistance, the complete removal of the boost protective cover hatch. The tool used to remove this 
hatch is the same tool used to remove the ablative hatch and the inner hatch of the Command Mod­
ule. As Babbitt and Gleaves left the "white room", Gleaves recalls handing the tool to Hawkins. 
Hawkins does not recall who handed him the tool. He knows someone did. 
With Hawkins were S. B. Clemmons and L. D. Reece. During the ablative hatch removal, Babbitt 
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was also in the "white room". Within one minute and 30 seconds of the first report of fire, Babbitt 
had entered the "white room" at least once and perhaps twice. He had recovered his headset and was 
able to contact the blockhouse and describe the conditions as they were developing. 
The removal of the ablative hatch was relatively simple. After the tool was inserted, the hatch was 
lifted off and carried out of the white room by Reece who threw it on the floor of adjustable Level 8 
once he was clear of the "white room" . 
Hawkins remained· in the "white room" after the ablative hatch was removed. Continuing to use 
the removal tool, he began work on the inner hatch. With him were Clemmons and Reece, though 
the witnesses at this point, because of the dense smoke, do not recall seeing all others in the • 'white 
room" at the time. Hawkins and Clemmons were apparently nearest the hatch, Hawkins using the 
tool to unlock the hatch while Clemmons was attempting to secure a hand hold on it. 
There are two handles on the exterior of the inner hatch which, when installed, are wired down 
with safety wire. Whether or not Clemmons broke the safety wires holding the handles flush to the 
hatch, he does not recall. Once the hatch was unlocked, both men pushed it upward to relieve it from 
the dogs. Once the inner hatch was free, they attempted to drop it down onto the Command Module 
door. The hatch went only part way down. 
The pad crew realized that it was not necessary to completely remove the inner hatch in order 
to provide access to the interior of the Command Module. During the scheduled egress exercise the 
inner hatch would have been unlocked by the crew and placed on the floor of the Command Module. 
While a small portion of the hatch cover extends above the lower rim of the hatch, access to and 
from the Command Module is possible. 
When the inner hatch was unlocked, intense heat ans smoke came out of the open hatchway. No 
flames were visible on the inside. Two floodlights installed on the couches were barely visible through 
the smoke. 
Hawkins attempted to examine the interior of the Command Module. He called out to the crew­
men. He remembers there was an unusual silence from the Command Module interior. 
Babbitt too had examined the Command Module's interior. Concerned about reporting over the 
wide commurucations net that he was then using that the astronauts were dead, he simply advised the 
ground that he would not describe what he had seen. 
Babbitt and H. H. Rogers, Jr., returned to the "white room" after the inner hatch had been 
unlocked and partially lowered into the Command Module. During the efforts to lower the hatch, it 
dropped further down into the Command Module. Babbitt and Rogers then returned for fresh air to 
the swing arm. 
Shortly, thereafter, Babbitt, suffering from smoke inhalation in the efforts of the attempted rescue, 
was relieved as Pad Leader by L. Curatolo. 
Gleaves who had at various times been forced to the swing arm by the smoke, returned, saw that 
the hatch was part way down and gave it a kick. As a result of the kick, the hatch fell even further 
into the Command Module. Gleaves had secured a flashlight from his tool box during one of his entries 
into the white room and peered into the dark smoke and soot-covered interior of the Command Module. 
He could see nothing except the faint glow of the floodlights mounted near the couches. The lights were 
within inches of his position, but they appeared to be small candles very far away. 
W. M. Medcalf entered the "white room" and began his attempt to remove the inner hatch com­
pletely from the Command Module. 
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Members of the regular fire department began arrlvmg at Level A-8. The pad egress team, which 
had been standing by at the fire station, also responded to the call, but in much slower M113 Armor· 
ed Personnel Carriers. The team was scheduled to participate in the egress exercise, scheduled at. the 
end of the plugs out test. 
Fireman B. Dawes arrived at Level A-8 through a service elevator and went to the "white room". 
He recalls seeing the hatch laying inside the Command Module. Fireman J. A. Burch, Jr., upon his 
arrival at the "white room" saw people working around the hatch. He joined them and began to pull 
at the inner hatch in an effort to remove it completely from the Command Module. He began to feel 
the effects of the smoke and had to run out of the "white room" to the access arm. On the access 
arm he found a gas maks, donned it, and returned to the "white room" to continue in his attempt 
to remove the hatch from the Command Module. Once again he was not successfuL He was forced 
out of the "white room" by the smoke. He replaced his gas maks, and returned for a third attempt 
at the inner hatch removal. This time with the aid of Medcalf, he was successfuL With the exception 
of Assistant Chief J. C. Mooney, who was a member of the pad egress team, none of the firemen 
were familiar with the configuration of the Command Module. They had received no training in the 
removal of the various hatches, since it was felt that the pad egress team would be available to perfonn 
this function during hazardous tests or launches. The pad egress team did have knowledge of the Com· 
mand Module configuration and had appropriate tools to remove the three hatches. Chief Mooney 
arrived at "white room" after the inner hatch cover had been completely removed from the Command 
Module. 
After the hatch was removed, Burch leaned into the Command Module. Everything was black. 
He could not see any bodies. He secured a flashlight but even with its assistance he was unable to see 
anything. As he was crawling out of the open hatchway, he did notice one body. He attempted to pick 
it up, but he was unable to move it. He then left the Command Module. In the meantime, Fireman 
B. H. Batts with others was removing the panel that sealed the second door of the "white room", 
which led directly onto Level A-B. This was necessary in order to vent the "white room" and the 
Command Module. The use of fans to blow the smoke out of the Command Module was considered 
unwise, since the fans could possibly re-ignite substances within the Command Module. Chief Mooney. a 
member of the pad egress team which had planned to participate in the egress exercise scheduled for 
the end of the Plugs Out Test. also made an effort to remove crewmen from the Command Module. 
This activity was stopped, confirmed by physicians who had arrived at the Command Module. that 
all three astronauts were dead, and that an investigation of the Command Module as it was found after 
the hatches were open would be important in attempting to determine the cause of the fire. 
Photographs were then taken of the Command Module. of Level A-8. and other portions of the 
service structure. 
Witnesses reported seeing firemen on the complex without firefighting equipment. Since each level 
contains fire extinguishers as well as hose lines. it was not necessary for them to being equipment from 
the ground in order to fight fires. The hose lines were working and lines were charged, though not 
used. Fire extinguishers from Level A-8 and other levels of the service structure were used to control 
blazes outside the Command Module and at other locations on the service structure. 
Because of the proximity of fires, workers removed their nylon work smocks. Examination of the 
smocks after the incident showed that some of them had been burned, apparently from fire brands 
erupting onto Level A-8 when the Command Module ruptured. 
The access ann was the closest position to the "white room" in the Command Module where 
fresh air was available for the workers. While a few witnesses reported that their gas masks were oper­
ative, a majority indicated they were of little assistance during the rescue attempt, because of the den· 
sity of the smoke. 
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J. E. Cromer, on duty at the Umbilical Tower elevator, reported that the elevator was at Level 
200, which corresponds with Level A-8, at the time the fire began. While the elevator could be ! e­
motely controlled from the blockhouse, Cromer could also control it from his position on the umbilical 
tower. The elevator remained at Level 200 until Gleaves, choking and gagging from the smoke inhaled 
in his repeated entries in~o the "white room", had to be sent to the ground. Cromer reports that the 
first indication that he received of the fire was the sensation that there was an explosion on Level A-8. 
He also reports seeing a tongue of flame emanating from the "white room". Immediately after the 
explosion, personnel from the inside of Level A-8 came out on the access arm. After reporting there 
was a fire to his control point within the blockhouse, Cromer broke out a box containing gas masks. 
Cromer reports that personnel on the access arm immediately began re-entering the "white room" in 
their efforts to remove the hatches and effect crew rescue. 
Gary Propst, an RCA technician, stationed in the blockhouse and responsible for controlling remote 
television cameras installed on Level A-8 and in the "white room", first became aware of the fire 
through the report heard on his headset. He immediately looked at the "white room" monitor. He saw 
light in the Command Module emanating from a point on it's left side. At the same time he saw hands 
reach above the hatch. and movement of the crew inside of the Command Module. With the light in­
creasing in intensity inside of the Command Module, Propst immediately adjusted the camera to the 
light levels within the Command Module. This action may have caused television monitors to show 
what appeared to be an explosion of white light, but was in reality an adjustment of the camera's 
sensitivity to the light. 
Propst is convinced that the time of the accident, from the moment he first learned of the fire, 
until the "white room" filled with smoke, was much longer than data indicates. He recalled engaging 
in a conversation with others in the blockhouse as to when the crew would blow the hatches. Propst 
was not aware that the hatches on the Command Module could not be exploded off. He recalls, by 
viewing other monitors at Level A·B, that the "white room" did not fill with smoke until visibilitv was 
almost impossible on Level A-8 itself. As the fire progressed, smoke did fill the "white room" making 
detailed viewing through the TV camera impossible. However, Propst could tell that there was activity 
going on in the "white room" as individuals would stand in front of lights installed for the TV cam­
eras, thus varying the light intensity. While he could discern that something was going 011, he could 
not see in detail, what was happening. 
While arrangements can be made to video tape the television monitors, facilities for doing this are 
not located within the blockhouse. and a video tape does not exist of what the monitors showed during 
the fire period. 
Propst viewed a motion picture of a test fire in a boilerplate Command l\10dule taken in Houston, 
Texas, after the incident. He states that the film showing fire through the boilerp!ate hatches, at 16.4 
pounds per square inch pure oxygen, were very close to what he viewed through the monitor. At one 
point in the film, bright white flames sweep across the hatch. Propst does not believe that this hap­
pened the night of the fire, though the quality of flickering light was similar to what he observed. It 
should be noted that in the boilerplate fire test, thc vessel was vented at a different point than where 
rupture occurred on Spacecraft 012 during the night of the fire. 
The report of fire was radioed to the fire station by G. C. Meyer, Pad Safety Officer. As the 
fire trucks approached the complex in response to Meyer's call, firemen looked at the top of the launch 
complex and saw very little smoke. Thinking that the area would be relatively clear, they did not take 
air packs with them, which were available on the truck. Later, after the smoke conditions were dis­
covered by the firemen, the air packs were taken to the fire scene. 
The total elapsed time from the report of fire to the opening of the inner hatch into the Command 
Module could not have exceeded five minutes, 27 seconds. This is based upon a timing of the tapes 
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made of voice transmISSIOns during the incident. The timing is verified by a log matintained by W. H. 
Schick from within the Blockhouse. Schick's log is based upon reports he heard over the communica­
tions network. While the GMT timer he was using did not show "seconds" he was able to discern 
minutes and record them in his log. He shows the first report of fire as having been received at 6:31 
p.m. and the first report that the hatches were off at 6:36 p.m. Since he did not have a "seconds" 
display he was unable to record the exact second the fire report was heard, nor the exact time of the 
report that the hatches were off. 
None of the men working on the hatch removal believed the crew could have survived the fire. 
The heat was described as intense, the destruction considerable. Despite their belief that the crew was 
lost, and their knowledge of the hazard which existed because of the rocket motor above them on the 
Launch Escape System, they proceeded under almost impossible conditions to open the Command Mod­
ule in a desperate effort the save the crew. That the hazard was real in their minds, is shown by the 
statement of one witness, that he considered jumping from the tower immediately after the Command 
Module erupted. He felt that death was imminent in any event. He, nevertheless, stayed at Level A-8 
and worked in the "white room" to remove the hatches. 
Curatolo, who had relieved Babbitt, was relieved by J. Murphy at 8:00 p.m. By then, all of the 
fires had been exinguished for some time. 
Removal of the crew was to begin only after complete photographic coverage of the Command 
Module had been completed. The exact configuration of the Command Module, the position of its 
switches, and the evidence of what lights were burning, were considered to be important for further 
investigation. 
By 2:00 a.m. Saturday morning, the crew had been removed from the Command Module. 
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REQUIREMENTS PLACED ON PANEL 12 

From 
1. Dr. Floyd Thompson. Board Chairman 
:l. Col. Charles F. Strang. Board ~tember 
:i. ~lr. George C. White• .Ir.. Board ~Iember 
4. Hoard Panel Coordination Committee 
5. Board Panel Coordination Committee 
6. Board Pane: Coordination Committee 
7. Board and Panels 6. S, 11. 14. 17. 18. and 19 
8. Dr. George E. ~tueller, :\'ASA Headquarters 
9. Panel 1 
10. Panel 2 
11. Panel 3 
12. Panel 5 
13. Panel 7 
14. PanelS 
Subject 
Required memorandum regarding Haron and Parker 
reports. 
Requested information from witnesses on Levels .\./ 
and :\-8 on whether they touched or caused move· 
ment of the Command ~lodule or Service ~fod\ll(' 
in the five· minute interval immediately preccedim; 
the incident. 
Requested a statement from LeRoy G. West (:\,AA) 
regarding placement of gas chromatograph plu~. 
Requested copies of extracts of witness statement 
information be sent to the Committee members. 
Required Panel 12 to submit a status report to the 
Committee at the daily 5:00 p.m. meeting. 
Requested Interim Report on Panel activities. 
Required copies of all published witness statements 
and extracts. 
Requested number of people located on Levels A-7 
and A·S of the Service Structure and on the 
L'mbilical Tower at LC 34 at the time of the inci· 
dent. 
Requested statements from personnel involved in 
pre·crew ingress. crew ingress, cabin c1ose·out, and 
cabin purge. 
Requested a set of witness statements for temporary 
perusal. 
Requested copies of Bendix Gas Analyses. 
Required further statement from James F. Terry 
(N'ASA·KSC) regarding times in relation to indio 
cations of fire versus TV monitor image. 
Requested information on documents that went into 
and out of Spacecraft 012 prior to hatch closure. 
Required: 
(a) Information concerning astronaut placement of 
loose articles. 
(b) Interview of ingress and hatch close·out crew. 
(c) Interview of witnesses regarding knowledge of 
solvents used and/or strange odors detected. 
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15, Panel 10 
16. Panel 11 
17. Panel 13 
18. Panel 14 
19. Panel 16 
2(). Panel 17 
21. Panel 18 
(d) A list of personnel who visited Levels A-7 or A-8 
on LC 34 for the 24-hour period prior to the inci­
dent. 
(e) Certain witnesses to participate in sniff test. 
Requested statements regarding cabin relief valve 
operation, or times of explosive or popping noises 
during the first 15 to 20 seconds of the fire. 
Requested: 
(a) A PAA Dispensary listincludingmedicationgiven 
to personnel involved in the incident. 
(b) All information regarding astronaut body posi­
tions. 
Requested witness comments regarding emergency 
equipment. 
Required: 
(a) List of all personnel who were on LC 34 from 
5:30 p.m. EST to 7:30 p.m. EST onJanuary 27. 
1967, 
(b) Copies of statements made by Thomas R. Baron 
(self-employed). Donald O. Babbitt (:\".\.\), James 
D. Gleaves (:\".\:\). and Rocco A. Petrone (:\"AS:\­
KSC). 
(c) Copies of any statement that comments on security 
or lack of security. 
(d) Copy of :\rthur E. \'reeland (Federal Electric 
Corporation) statemcnt. 
Requested certain witnesses observe the TY simu­
.ation film to obtain witnesses reaction regarding 
clarity and detail of the simulation. 
Requested Panels :l, 1Land 12 prepare a final 
"Time Line" from onset of T-W minutes hold 
through medical determination of deaths. 
Requested: 
(a) Certain primary witnesses view the Panel 16 TY 
simulation film and note any changes in, or verify. 
the witness observations and time corrciations. 
(b) Interviews of Richard .\. Hagar (:,\:\A) and 
Richard L. Bachand (:'\.\.\) regarding movement 
of any article in the Spacecraft during crew re­
moval. 
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GROUND EMERGENCY PROVISIONS 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Ground Emergency Provisions Panel, 13. The task 
assigned for accomplishment by Panel 13 was prescribed as follows: 
This task involves an orderly review of planned ground emergency procedures relative to their 
adequacy, as well as a review to determine that emergency procedures, in fact, exist for all approp· 
riate activities. This review should concentrate on activity at the launch site, and should include 
recommendations to the Board for changes in existing procedures and for the creation of new emer· 
gency procedures if deemed necessary. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Ground Emergency Provisio 
Panel: 
Mr. G. F. Page, Chairman, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. L. A. Barnett, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. N. M. Carlson, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. J. H. Chappee, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. R. W. Cunningham, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. R. S. Sayers, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Col. H. G. Russell, U. S. Air Force, Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), NASA 
Mr. R. Rochester, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey, California 
Mr. G. F. Smith, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey, California 
Mr. K. C. Wishon, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey, California 
Mr. H. H. Luetjen, Consultant, McDonnell Company, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER 
Colonel Frank Borman, U. S. Air Force, Board Member, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA, 
was assigned to monitor the Ground Emergency Provisions Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. The Panel approached the assigned task in two phases. First, a review and evaluation of the emer· 
gency provisions at the time of the accident. This review included investigations of: 
a. The emergency procedures in the published documents; 
b. The emergency equipment internal and external to the spacecraft; 
c. The emergency training of the flight crew and checkout test team personnel. 
The second phase was a review of the existing methods used to identify hazards and insure adequate 
documentation of appropriate safety procedures and applicable emergency instructions in the operational 
test procedures. 
2. PUBLISHED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
a. The Apollo Crew Abbreviated Checklist (Reference 13-1) was prepared by the contractor under 
the direction of the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Flight Crew Support Division. The docu· 
ment includes flight crew emergency procedures for: 
(1) Fire or smoke in the cockpit in flight; and, 
(2) Pad egress from T-30 minutes to lift· off. 
The in-flight fire or smoke procedures considered in (1) above are not appropriate for the 
situation involving internal fire during ground operations. (Reference report by Panel 20.) The 
unaided Command Module (C/M) egress instructions provided in (2) above were applicable for 
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acti.ons required by the crew t.o effect egress fr.om the C/M f.or any reason. A min.or change t.o 
the unaided crew pr.ocedure was d.ocumented during the cpurse .of a briefing given t.o the AS-204 
Flight Crew by members .of the Apoll.o Emergency Egress W.orking Gr.oup (Enclosure 13-1) .on 
January 23, 1967. This change reflected an agreement t.o maintain suit .oxygen fl.oW and crew 
c.ommunicati.ons until the hatches were rem.oved. 
b. The Apoll.o Operati.ons Handbo.ok (AOH) (Reference 13-2) is prepared by the c.ontract.or under 
the directi.on .of MSC and c.ontains flight crew emergency pr.ocedures similar t.o th.ose described 
ab.ove in paragraph a. In practice, the emergency procedures devel.oped and d.ocumented in the 
abbreviated crew checklist are subsequently included in the AOH S.o that gr.ound c.ontr.oI personnel 
are made aware .of the crew acti.ons to be f.oll.owed in the event .of an emergency. 
c. The Apoll.o Flight Crew Hazardous Egress Pr.ocedures Manual (Reference 13·3) is prepared by 
the Emergency Egress W.orking Group .of the Apoll.o Launch Operations Committee (Enclosure 
13-2). This manual is the definitive document c.oncerning spacecraft and pad egress procedures 
and represents the combined eff.orts .of Kennedy Space Center (KSC), MSC, and the Air Force 
Eastern Test Range (AFETR). The sc.ope .of this document is limited t.o cover .only the terminal 
30 minutes .of a launch c.ountd.own .or c.ountdown dem.oIl$trati.on. The procedures defined c.oncern 
.only the acti.ons inv.olved in unaided, aided, .or incapacitated crew egress during that time peri.od. 
Acti.ons required t.o c.ope with the c.ontingencies which could require crew egress are specifically 
excluded. 
The pr.ocedures in this manual which define flight crew actlpns inv.olved in unaided egress 
agree with th.ose d.ocumented in the Crew Checklist and the AOH. The time line .on Page 25 
(Enclosure 13-3) of the egress manual indicates 60 sec.onds are required f.or the flight crew t.o .open 
the spacecraft hatches and egress .once the cabin pressure is vented. Practice runs under ideal con­
diti.ons inv.olving n.on-flight spacecraft configurati.ons indicate that estimate t.o be c.orrect. (A practice 
run inv.olving a fully suited flight crew, venting cabin pressure, rem.oving the three flight C.onfig­
urati.on hatches and egressing the spacecraft has never been perf.ormed.) Alth.ough there are n.o 
documented data available, the porti.on .of the unaided egress time (60 sec.onds) involved in hatch 
rem.oval by the flight crew is cpnsidered t.o be 40 t.o 50 seconds. 
Incapacitated flight crew egress procedures defined in the egress manual are intended f.or use 
by the trained members .of the Pad Egress Team. The time lines .on Pages 26 and 27 .of the manual 
(Enclosure 13-4) indicate 10 minutes is required fr.om initiation .of the .operati.on t.o c.ompleti.on of 
crew rem.oval. H.owever, the P.orti.on .of that time required t.o rem.ove all three hatches fr.om the 
.outside is 70 sec.onds, assuming cabin pressure is already vented. Numer.ous practice runs by Pad 
egress personnel have verified that time t.o be c.orrect under ideal c.onditi.ons. 
At the time .of the AS-204 accident, the trained Pad Egress Team was n.ot .on station at 
Launch C.omplex 34. Their presence during the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test had n.ot 
been required since the .operatipn was n.ot previ.ously identified as hazard.ous. Hpwever, the entire 
egress team was due .on stati.on foll.owing completi.on .of the test in support .of an unaided egress 
practice .operati.on. 
d. The spacecraft check.out procedure for the AS-204 Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test was 
OCP FO-K-0021-1 (Reference 13-4). This document, like all spacecraft test d.ocuments at KSC, 
was prepared by the contract.or and appr.oved by NASA-KSC-Spacecraft Operations (SCO). The 
d.ocument did n.ot c.ontain emergency procedures other than two pages .of instructi.ons f.or emergency 
shutd.own of spacecraft direct current (DC) and alternating current (AC) power. The safety re­
quirements included in the Operatipnal Check.out Procedure (OCP) d.o n.ot designate any P.ortion 
.of the test pr.ocedure as hazard.ous. (Enclosure 13-5). 
The test .objectives listed for the procedure include: 
(1) T.o verify overall Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle (SC/LV) c.ompatibility and dem.onstrate pr.oper 
function of Spacecraft (S/C) systems with all umbilicals and Ground SUPP.ort Equipment (GSE) 
disconnected. 
(2) To verify n.o electrical interference at time of umbilical disconnect. 
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(3) To verify astronaut emergency egress procedures (unaided egress). . 
Objective (3) required suited crew operations in a closed cabin with a pressurized 100 ,percent 
oxygen atmosphere. This was the first time this third objective was combined with a Space Ve­
hicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
e. The Launch Vehicle Checkout Procedure being used for the AS-204 Space Vehicle Plugs Out 
Integrated Test was I·20015-SA204 (Reference 13-5) prepared by Chrysler (CCSD) and approved 
by NASA·KSC·Launch Vehicle Operations (LVO). This document contains emergency procedures 
(Section AW) which provide instructions for recycling the Launch Vehicle following a cutoff or a 
hold at any point in the final 30 minutes of the count. No reference is made to any hazardous 
operations being involved in the LV portion of the test other than standard safety procedures 
for handling LV ordnance items. 
£. The only other published procedure involved in the AS·204 Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated 
Test was the Integrated Space Vehicle Procedure 1·41001-204 (Reference 13-6) prepared and ap­
proved by NASA-KSC-Launch Operations Directorate (DLO). This document was used by the 
NASA·KSC Test Supervisor to coordinate LV-to·S/C interface activities and all off-site real-time 
support functions. The procedure does not contain any emergency procedures. 
g. Published emergency procedures are of limited value to a flight crew in the presence of an 
extremely time critical emergency. In such instances, they must resort to those procedures com­
mitted to memory or instinctive action. Such procedures are developed by the crews as a result 
of intimate knowledge of the written procedures coupled with a real-time awareness of spacecraft 
configuration. 
For time critical egress from the CIM, the flight crew would have eliminated all unnecessary 
steps from the documented procedures. Reaction would have been by reflex to the following mini­
mum escape procedures: 
(1) Initiate cabin pressure dump 
(2) Unfasten restraint harnesses 
(3) Release inner hatch dogs 
(4) Wait for pressure decay 
(5) Remove inner hatch 
(6) Release and push out ablative hatch and boost protective cover 
(7) Disconnect umbilicals and cobra cables 
(8) Exit spacecraft 
Post· accident investigation (Reference Panel 11 report) indicates that the AS-204 flight crew 
accomplished very little, if any, of the above minimum procedures before being incapacitated by 
the fire. 
3. EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT INSIDE THE COMMAND MODULE 
a. Spacecraft Cabin Depressurization Equipment: 
As established in paragraph 2.g., the initial requirement for SIC egress is cabin depressuriza. 
tion. The Apollo Block I spacecraft incorporates no provisions for emergency cabin depressurization. 
Three depressurization methods are possible from within the cabin: 
(1) The normal and documented method of cabin depressurization requires activation of one of 
the cabin relief valves. It has an effective venting area of 1.5 square inches and would accomplish 
venting from 16.4 pounds per square inch absolute (psia) to 14.8 psia in approximately 18 seconds 
(Enclosure 13-6, Figure 4). 
(2) Activation of the post-landing cabin vent fans would also initiate cabin depressurization. 
This method, designed for use after water impact, opens two sliding valves in the tunnel area, each 
of which has an effective opening of 19.5 square inches. The specification limit for operation of 
these valves is 0.75 pounds per square inch differential (psid), although they have been demon­
strated to 5 psid. There are no available data to indicate time of venting through these valves 
into the dosed forward deck area (prelaunch configuration). Venting by this method was not in­
cluded in the documented emergency egress PI'?cedures. 
(3) As a last resort, emergency depressurization could be accomplished by breaking one of the 
cabin windows. This method has never been demonstrated and there are no data indicating the 
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venting time involved. 
There is no indication that the AS-204 flight crew was able to initiate cabin depressurization 
following the outbreak of the fire. In thejlre~ence of the rapidly increasing cabin pressure which re· 
suIted from the fire, activation of the normal vent would have had no noticable effect.: 
b. Quick Release Crew Restraint Harness: 
Each crewman is provided with an individual restraint harness. The harness assembly consists 
of two shoulder straps and one lap belt. The shoulder straps and lap belt are connected together 
by means of a three·point locking/release mechanism attached to one side of the lap belt. Release 
of both the shoulder straps and the lap belt is accomplished by pulling a release lever located on 
the top of the lap belt buckle. 
c: Internal Spacecraft Hatch Release Equipment: 
The main hatch assembly provides the .only means of crew egress on the pad. The hatch assem­
bly consists of three separate covers or hatches (Enclosure 13-1). The inner hatch serves as a space­
craft structural load carrying member and crew compartment pressure seal. It has an effective area 
of 1200 square inches. The ablative (middle) hatch provides thermal protection for entry. Over this 
fits the boost protective cover (outer) hatch. Removal of all three hatches was essential for crew 
egress. Removal of the inner hatch requires rotation of a wrench counter· clockwise through approxi­
mately 220 degrees to release six latch assemblies located on the bottom edge (outer side) of the 
hatch (Enclosure 13-8). A prerequisite to inner hatch removal is the lowering of cabin pressure to 
approximately ambient. A crewman may then lift the inner hatch (approximately 55 pounds) up 
and in for stowage in the spacecraft. 
The Boost Protective Cover (BPC) is released by the crewman striking a push-type plunger 
which extends through the middle hatch and is attached to the BPC. The middle hatch is then 
released by pulling on a cable arrangement. Both middle and outer hatches may then be pushed 
out of the egress path permitting crew egress. 
d. Flight Crew Protective Clothing: 
The protective clothing worn by the AS-204 crew at the time of the fire were Pressure Garment 
Assemblies (PGA) (P/N A 1936). They were essentially the same as the non-Extravehicular Ac­
tivity (EVA) suits used on Gemini missions. The suit is fabricated of an outer layer of HT-l nylon, 
a nylon webbing layer, a neoprene inner.pressure vessel, and a nylon comfort liner. Each crewman 
also wore a cotton constant wear garment(P/N A 1912-003) under the spacesuit. 
Tests conducted at MSC in late 1965 (Enclosure 13-9) using six-inch-square swatches of similar 
suit material indicate its fire protective qualities. The swatches were tested in a 100% oxygen, 14 
psia environment for high temperature flame impingement effect. 
Samples were exposed to the pure oxygen environment following two evacuation periods at a 
pressure of 5 millimeters of mercury (mmHg) to allow out-gassing. A 30-minute soak at 14 psia, 
100% oxygen was then made. At the end of this soak, a propane flame was ~ then brought into 
contact with the swatches. The results were: 
(1) No scorching occurred in three seconds. 
(2) Burning occurred after five seconds flame exposure. 
e. On-Board Communications: 
Reliable and clear communications are a significant requirement in support of any emergency 
operation. The status of the communications system therefore requires consideration. In addition to 
an on-board intercom system there are two Radio Frequency (RF) systems for voice transmission 
from crew-to-ground personnel during pad testing. These two systems are the Very High Frequency 
(VHF) and S-band. A single hardline communication line using the on-board intercom system is 
also available. Voice transmission by the crew-to-ground support and test personnel is controlled 
by the switch configuration on the three individual crew communications center panels, panel 20 
on the main display console, and the individual cobra cable switches. Voice distribution between 
the ground personnel and crew is controlled through the capsule communicator's console located 
in the Launch Complex 34 Blockhouse. 
0-13-6 

On the afternoon of the accident, the test had been plagued with communic~tion difficulties. 
Communications had been sometimes good, generally poor, and occasionally intennittent. At the 
time of the accident, the spacecraft test personnel thought that the communications problems had 
been "worked around", Voice quality was still poor, however, and it was subsequently discovered 
that the Command Pilot's communications were continuously keyed. Post-accident inspection dis­
closed discrepancies between all three communications panels with respect to positions of the VHF 
and intercom switches. 
£. On-Board Fire Fighting Equipment: 
There were no provisions for extinguishing a fire within the spacecraft at the time of the acci­
dent. This statement is based on the. on-board crew stowage list in effect for the AS-204 Space 
Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. No procedures existed at the time of the fire for on-board fire 
fighting by the crew. 
g. On-Board Fire Detection Equipment: 
The primary means of fire detection available to the crew were the physiological cues of smell, 
sight and touch. With helmet visors closed (as was the case) they were limited to sight and touch 
only. No instrumentation other than normal spacecraft systems instruments were available for fire 
warning. Depending upon the source of ignition, the normal spacecraft systems instrumentation could 
indicate a hazardous condition such as excessive electrical current flow. However, the nonnal in­
struments apparently did not provide any warning to the crew in the case of this accident. 
4. EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT EXTERNAL TO THE SPACECRAFT: 
a. Fixed Facility Fire Extinguishing Equipment: 
Launch Complex 34 is supplied by two separate water systems, Potable Water and Industrial 
Water. The potable water supplies the safety showers, eye baths, and two 11/4 inch diameter 50-foot 
reel hose lines on each of the spacecraft work levels. This system was operable during the emer­
gency. 
The Firex Water System (deluge) supplies industrial water to four spray nozzles on each space­
craft level. Local push-button controls are at all exits to the elevators. However, these controls 
were not operable during the time of the accident because the system was being modified and had 
not been functionally tested as a complete system. Had water deluge been necessary on the Com­
mand Module level, two valves on the Service Module level (A-7) would have had to be manually 
operated. There is no remote (from the blockhouse) activation capability for this system. 
On the Service Module (S/M), a Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2) Deluge System is used to inert the 
SIM in the event of Hydrogen leakage during or after Liquid Hydrogen (LH 2) servicing. The 
GN2' system was not active for the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test since LH2 servicing 
activities were not involved. 
b. Portable Fire Fighting Equipment at the SIC Work Levels: 
The Pan American Aviation (PAA) Fire Department inventory calls for two 50-pound wheel 
Carbon Dioxide (CO 2) units and tw.() 15-pound hand-held C02 units on each SIC work level. 
The latest Fire Department inspection of these units was not within the 30-day inspection sched­
ule. (Enclosure 13-10). Under full flow conditions (outlet valve wide open), all of the above units 
have a specification flow time of 10 to 35 seconds. 
An inventory following the accident shows that two 50-pound wheeled CO 2 units, sixteen 15­
pound CO 2 units and one 30-pound dry powder unit were expended on the CIM fire. Two 15­
pound CO 2 units were used on the Service Module. The additional units were carried to the SIC 
levels to aid in extinguishing the fire. 
c. Auxiliary Breathing Apparatus: 
There were 80 masks available at the SIC work levels at the time of the accident. The masks 
were packed in sealed boxes (20 masks to a box) located as follows: One box on the lower SIM 
work level (A-6); two boxes on the CIM work level (A-8); and one box on the SIM work level 
(A-7). Of the available masks, 76 were Mine Safety Appliance (MSA) Rocket Propellant Fuel 
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Handler's Gas Masks incorporating M-15Al type canisters. These canisters are designed for use 
in the presence of toxic vapors and are not suitable for use in high smoke density situations. The 
remaining lour masks were Wilson masks containing LG-6-RTGD canisters which include smoke 
filters as well as toxic vapor protection. 
Witness statements (Reference report by Panel 12) indicate that the dense smoke concentration 
in the White Room was a major deterrent to the rescue effort. Investigation indicates that 15 of 
the MSA masks and 3 of the Wilson masks had been used in the rescue attempt. 
d. Protective Clothing: 
The test in progress was not classified as hazardous; therefore, no special protective clothing 
was required to be available.. SIC technicians on station were clothed in the normal white cover­
alls or smocks over street clothes. 
e. External Hatch Removal Equipment: 
No special emergency provisions were available for rapid cabin depressurization and hatch re­
moval from the outside. Tools normally used for installing and removing the hatches were in the 
hatch close-out kit along with 34 other associated items. This kit was located in the White Room 
to the left of the access arm entry door. A special heavy duty hatch removal tool had been devel­
oped by the Emergency Egress Working Group for use by the Pad Egress Team. It is more rugged 
and easier to use than the standard tool and is normally available in the White Room only during 
launch countdown or countdown demonstration when the Pad Egress Team is on station; therefore, 
it was not there at the time of the AS-204 accident. 
Cabin depressurization, if required from outside the SIC, can be accomplished by removing 
the plug from the inner hatch purge fitting. Venting is then accomplished through an effective 
opening of 0.378 square inches. Figure 3 of Enclosure 13-6 indicates that 80 seconds would be 
required to vent by this method from 16.4 psia to a pressure that would allow inner-hatch re­
moval. An alternate venting method of breaking the inner-hatch window had been approved for 
use in Pad Egress Team operations, if required. 
£. Ventilation Equipment for Smoke Removal: 
There is no ventilation equipment in the White Room that would remove smoke. Filtered 
conditioned air is supplied to the White Room from the facility conditioning air plant. There are 
two exhaust ventilating fans on the C/M work level. These were operating during the time of 
the accident. Two exhaust fans were being installed on the lower S/M level, (A-6) but at the 
time of the accident, they were not operable. There are no exhaust fans on the upper S/M level 
(A-7) for the removal of smoke. 
g. Test Team Personnel Evacuation Equipment: 
There are two means of access or escape; elevators and stairs. There are five elevators and 
two stairways from ground level to Level 9 (one level above SIC level). The stairways are located 
on the outer structure, one on the North side and one on the South side. There is also one inner­
structure stairway from Level 9 to Level A-6 where it is possible to reach the South outer-structure 
stairway. On other SIC levels, there is not direct access to the outer-structure stairways. 
There are five doorways to the inner-structure on the C/M and S/M levels. All doors are 
equipped with inside panic bars and open out. For security reasons, all doors except one were 
locked from outside (could be opened from the inside but enot from outside). However, the only 
means of escape from any of the elevator bridges, if the elevator is not available, is to re-enter the 
inner-structures. A personnel hazard resulted during the subject accident when one member of the 
test team was locked out and reached a stairway by climbing out across structural members. The 
access arm door which must be used for ingress or egress to the umbilical tower is an inward 
(toward the White Room) swing door. It has a pull latch on the inside and a push button latch 
on the outside. 
h. Communication Equipment: 
Communications to the SIC levels are provided by four standard black phones, operational 
intercom (OIS), hard lines and the public address (PA) system. The OIS hard lines provide for 
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communications to the blockhouse, support building, necessary NAA and NASA trailers, control 
center, and crew members on board the spacecraft. 
The PA system is controlled from the blockhouse and any OIS station can be patched in for 
transmitting PA announcements. For this test, the Test Supervisor's console was the only trans­
mitting station patched in. 
i. Emergency Lighting: 
There are no fixed or portable emergency battery lights on the SIC work levels or in the 
White Room. The only auxiliary lighting available during the emergency was a limited number of 
personal flashlights. 
j. Stand-by Emergency Equipment at Launch Complex 34: 
Due to the non-hazardous classification of the SIC test operation, there were no medical or fire 
equipment or personnel on standby at the Launch Complex in support of the operation. AFETR 
disaster team and fire fighting equipment arrived at the Launch Complex within five minutes of 
the first indication of the emergency. The first firemen to arrive at the spacecraft were not equipped 
with self-contained breathing apparatus. One fireman had to return to the bottom of the gantry 
to obtain suitable equipment. 
k. Complex 34 Egress Facilities: 
The facilities for flight crew egress at Complex 34 include the Apollo Access Arm and Enviro­
mental Enclosure (White Room) as depicted on Enclosure 13-11. During post-accident investigation, 
the following undeSirable features of these facilities were noted: 
(1) The fiberglass ledge at opening between the White Room (W IR) and SIC makes egress 
difficult. 
(2) A low step in the W /R leading to the SIC entry hatch is a tripping hazard. 
(3) The combination hinged and sliding door normal exit from the WI R is very difficult to 
operate. 
(4) Two steps along the access arm (one at the pivot point and one at the WI R entrance 
door) could cause a fully suited crewman to trip. 
(5) The access arm entry door at the juncture of the work level is hinged inward and incorpora­
tes no means for emergency escape. 
5. FLIGHT CREW EMERGENCY TRAINING: 
a. AS-204 primary crew spacecraft egress training was conducted in the mockup building at NAA­
Downey, utilizing Block 2 mockup on July 13, 1966. The mockUp was equipped with flight 
type couches, restraint system, and pressure and ablative hatches. A White Room adapter mockup 
similar to the one on Launch Complex 34 was used. The training included a 30-minute lecture 
on procedures and equipment and an examination of the hatches and latching mechanisms. Fol­
lowing crew ingress, the hatches were installed and a total of four practice egress runs were per­
formed in street clothes. Several improvements to the egress procedures were made as a result 
of this session. 
b. Further crew training specifically for purposes of effecting spacecraft egress was conducted at the 
Manned Spacecraft Center and in the Gulf of Mexico as a part of water egress training. A total 
of four egress exercises were conducted as a part of this training. Pressure Garment Assemblies were 
worn by the crew in all of the egress runs. The boilerplate vehicle used was in a near-flight con­
figuration with all significant geometry, couches, and pressure and ablative hatches installed. The 
boost protective cover was not used. Its use would be inappropriate for water egress. 
c. On January 24, 1967, the Emergency Egress Working Group of the Apollo Launch Operations 
Committee briefed the AS-204 flight crew for approximately two hours. As a result of this briefing, 
several minor changes were made to the procedures in order to make them more compatible with 
pad egress requirements (Reference Paragraph C.2.a.). 
The egress exercise to be conducted at the end of the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated 
Test on January 27, 1967, was to be the most valid run-through of the procedure up to that 
time. It was to be the first egress demonstration with the actual spacecraft in prelaunch configura­
tion and with full flight equipment utilized by the crew. 
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6. CHECKOUT TEST TEAM EMERGENCY TRAINING: 

a. The spacecraft test team personnel moSt closely associated with emergency operations involved 
in the AS-204 accident were the technicians at the spacecraft. They were responsible for external 
removal of the spacecraft hatches under normal circumstances. The NAA personnel primarily as· 
gned this function were the Pad Leader (who has the responsibility for all technicians working 
on or around the spacecraft), the mechanical engineer, and his two assigned mechanical techni· 
cians. None of the NAA personnel on duty at the time of the accident had ever been given training 
in hatch removal operations under emergency conditions. Hatch technicians on station at the time 
of the accident had all performed hatch installation and removal operations under normal condi­
tions on numerous occasions and were familiar with the procedures involved. 
b. The NASA-KSC Test Supervisor stationed in the firing room of the blockhouse has overall test 
team responsibility during test operations on Launch Complex 34. Detailed spacecraft test functions 
are delegated by the Test Supervisor to the SIC Test Conductor also stationed in the firing room. 
The Test supervisor and SIC Test Conductor on duty at the time of the AS-204 accident were 
both experienced in hazardous egress practice operations. They had both participated in similar 
egress operations on numerous manned Gemini and Mercury operations. The Test Supervisor had 
conducted the only previous Launch Complex 34 hazardous egress exercise on Apollo which was 
performed during the AS-202 Countdown Demonstration Test.in August 1966. 
c. There is no record of any type of emergency training exercises pertinent to general launch pad 
hazardous operations having been conducted on Launch Complex 34. Personnel assigned to pyro­
technic, hypergolic, and cryogenic handling operations do receive specific training in the hazards 
involved in those activities. However, there are no regular emergency drills to insure that all pad 
personnel are familiar with the location and use of the available emergency equipment. 
7. INVESTIGATION OF THE METHODS PRESENTLY USED TO IDENTIFY HAZARDS AND DOCUMENT 
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES: 
a. Spacecraft ground test operations at KSC are primarily documented in Operational Checkout 
Procedures (OCP) prepared by the contractor and approved by NASA-KSC-SCO personnel. Spe­
cial non-repetitive type test operations are documented on Test Preparation Sheets (TPS) which 
are originated by contractor system engineers and also approved by KSC-SCO. The process by 
which test requirements from MSC are transferred into specific OCP's is defined in detail in the 
Panel 7 report. The following discussions are confined to the hazard identification and emergency 
procedure provisions of that process. ' 
b. Primarily, the documented instructions for determining hazardous and emergency procedures for 
SIC test documents are contained in the Apollo Pre-Flight Operations Procedure (APOP). As 
defined in APOP G-100 (Enclosure 13-12), this document is the instrument by which joint contrac­
tor I NASA management directives are documented, approved and levied upon the SIC operations 
conducted at KSC. APOP 0-202 (Enclosure 13-13) is the pertinent directive concerning the genera­
tion of test procedures and the associated safety considerations. The KSC document defining the 
overall safety program at KSC is Kennedy Management Instruction (KMI) 1710.1 (Reference 
13-7) which includes general guidelines concerning the generation and approval of hazardous test 
documents. A third documented source of instructions concerning this subject is a NAA internal 
directive (Enclosure 13-14). . . 
c. Review of these three sources reveals a certain amount of specific instructions, but very little 
in the form of an overall plan for insuring adequate safety considerations and emergency procedures 
in the test documents. In actual practice, those features of the SIC OCP's are developed as defined 
in the following paragraphs. 
d. The Test Outline (Reference Panel 7 Report) for each spacecraft defines, in outline form, all 
of the tests planned for that vehicle at KSC. The Contractor Safety Office reviews the outline 
and establishes a list of the operations considered hazardous. The criteria for determination of the 
hazardous tests is based upon guidelines established in Reference 13-7. The list of hazardous OCP's 
and all of the test outlines are reviewed by the KSC and AFETR Safety Offices. They, in tum, 
release a letter establishing the official KSC and AFETR Safety Review Requirements List de­
signating the OCP's for that SIC which must be reviewed and approved by those offices. 
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e. OCP's are prepared by contractor operations support personnel in conjunction with contractor 

system engineers. The OCP writer, or originator, is responsible for including all references to safety, 

hazardous situations and emergency instructions. The instructions defining the scope of this re­

sponsibility are completely general and in many instances vague. As a result, the specific test pro­

cedures reflect a lack of definitive instructions in these areas. 

£. Copies of the draft release of procedures identified as hazardous are reviewed by the Contractor 

Safety Office and the systems engineers. Significant comments or inputs from the Contractor Safety 

Office are incorporated in the master-draft copy which is then approved by KSC-SCO, and pub­

lished as the released document. 

g. Copies of released test procedures are forwarded to the KSC Safety Office. Those procedures 

specified on the list created in paragraph 7.d require review and approval by KSC Safety. Pro­

cedures involving hazardous operations at AFETR are forwarded by KSC Safety to AFETR Safety 

for comments and approval. Approval by KSC Safety is made in writing to the contractor after 

AFETR Safety has signified their formal approval. Receipt of formal KSC Safety Office approval 

(after the procedure is released) is a constraint upon initiating the test operation involved. . 

h. Revisions to procedures originally reviewed by the KSC Safety Office require the same review 

and approval as the basic document. The AFETR Safety Office must also approve revisions to 

procedures which will be conducted under their jurisdiction. Real-time deviations required during 

the performance of a test procedure are orally approved by the responsible on-site Safety Supervisor 

to the NASA Test Conductor. 

i. There is no formal review requirement in the area of SIC safety or emergency procedures between 

KSC and MSC. As described in Panel 7's report, the existing procedure review system between 

the two Centers is loosely defined. There is no approval requirement from the MSC Flight Crew 

Operations Directorate on those procedures involving flight crew participation. 

j. TPS's as defined in paragraph 7.a do not presently require review or approval by either Con­

tractor or KSC Safety Offices. The TPS originator is responsible for determining safety or emer­

gency consideratiorls and for soliciting Safety Office review. 

D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING 
The applicable test documents and flight crew procedures for the AS-204 Space Vehicle Plugs 
Out Integrated Test did not include safety considerations, emergency procedures or emergency equip­
ment requirements relative to the possibility of an internal spacecraft fire during the operation. 
DETERMINATION 
The absence of any significant emergency preplanning indicates that the test configuration. (pressur­
ized 100 percent oxygen cabin atmosphere) was not classified as a potentially hazardous operation. 
2. FINDING 
There are no documented safety instructions or emergency procedures in existence which are appli­
cable to the possibility of a serious internal spacecraft fire. 
DETERMINATION 
The occurrence of an internal spacecraft fire of the magnitude and intensity experienced in this 
accident was not considered to be a significant possibility under any operational circumstances. 
3. FINDING 
The propagation rate of the fire involved in the AS-204 accident was extremely rapid (Reference 
report by Panel 5). Removal of the three spacecraft hatches to effect emergency egress from either the 
inside or outside involved a minimum of 40 and 70 seconds respectively under ideal conditions. 
DETERMINATION 
Considering the rapidity of propagation of the fire and the time constraints imposed by the existing 
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spacecraft hatch configuration, it is doubtful that any amount of emergency preparation would have 
precluded injury to the crew prior to crew egress. 
4. FINDING 
Procedures for unaided egress from the spacecraft were documented and available. The AS-204 
flight crew had participated in a total of eight egress exercises employing those procedures. 
DETERMINATION 
The AS-204 flight crew was familiar with and well trained in the documented emergency crew 
procedures for effecting unaided egress from the spacecraft. 
5. FINDING 
The Apollo Flight Crew Hazardous Egress Procedures Manual contains procedures relative to 
unaided, aided and incapacitated flight crew egress. By scope and definition, this document is con­
cerned only with evacuation of the flight crew from the spacecraft and. the pad under hazardous condi­
tions occurring primarily external to the spacecraft during a launch operation. 
DETERMINATION 
The Apollo Flight Crew Hazardous Egress Procedures Manual does not contain adequate emergency 
provisions for significant emergency conditions internal to the spacecraft any time the crew is on board. 
6. FINDING 
The spacecraft pad work team on duty at the time of the accident had not been given emergency 
training drills for combating fires in or around the spacecraft or for emergency crew egress. They 
were trained and equipped only for a normal hatch removal operation. 
DETERMINATION 
The spacecraft pad work team was not properly trained or equipped to effect an efficient rescue 
operation under the conditions resulting from the fire. 
7. 	FINDING 
There was no equipment on board the spacecraft designed to detect or extinguish a cabin fire. 
DETERMINATION 
The flight crew had to rely .upon physiological cues to detect the presence of a fire. When all 
face masks were closed, the cues were limited to sight and touch. Once detected, there were no means 
by which the fire could have been contained or extinguished. 
8. FINDING 
Frequent interruptions and failures had been experienced in the overall communications system 
during the operations preceding the accident. At the time the accident occurred, the status of the system 
was still under assessment. 
DETERMINATION 
The status of the overall communication system was marginal for the support of a normal opera­
tion. It cannot be assessed as adequate in the presence· of an emergency condition. 
9. FINDING 
Emergency equipment provided at the spacecraft work levels consisted of portable C02 fire ex­
tinguishers, Rocket Propellant Fuel Handler's Gas Masks and 1-1/4-inch diameter fire hoses. 
DETERMINATION 
The existing emergency equipment was not adequate to cope with the conditions of the fire. Suit­
able breathing apparatus, additional portable C02 fire extinguishers, direct personnel evacuation routes 
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and smoke removal ventilation are significant items which would have improved the reaction capability 
of the personnel involved. 
10. FINDING 
There are steps and doorways on the Launch Complex 34 Apollo Access Arm and in the environ­
mental enclosure (White Room) which consitute safety hazards, particularly under emergency conditions. 
DETERMINATION 
The present configuration of the access arm and White Room is not compatible with emergency 
personnel evacuation requirements or with fast, safe flight crew egress. 
11. FINDING 
During the preparation of SIC test procedures at KSC, safety considerations for hazardou~' epera­
tions and documentation of applicable emergency procedures are limited in most cases to routine safety 
reference notations and emergency power-down instructions. 
DETERMINATION 
Insufficient emphasis is applied by the test procedure originator upon documenting emergency pro­
cedures and identifying specific hazards and applicable safety requirements. 
12. FINDING 
Under the existing method of test procedure processing at KSC, the cognizant Safety Offices review 
only those procedures which are noted in the OCP outline as involving hazards. Official approval by 
KSC and AFETR Safety is accomplished after the procedure is published and released. 
DETERMINATION 
The scope of contractor and KSC Safety Office partICipation in test procedure development is 
loosely defined and poorly documented. Post-procedure-release approval by the KSC Safety Office does 
not insure positive and timely CQOrdination of all safety considerations. 
13. 	FINDING 
Criteria for defining hazardous test operations are not complete. 
DETERMINATION 
A positive method does not exist for insuring identification and documentation of all possible hazards 
involved in test operations. 
14. FINDING 
Requirements for the review and concurrence of KSC SIC test procedures by MSC are not well 
defined. 
DETERMINATION 
The present review system does not insure that MSC concurs with released KSC test procedures. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
Enclosure 
13-1 Memo dated Nov. 19, 1965, contammg minutes of the First Apollo Emergency Egress 
Working Group Meeting and a copy of the Charter of that group. 
13-2 KSC KMI 1150.8 dated Oct. 11, 1966, defining the Charter of the Apollo Launch 
Operations Committee. 
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13-3 Time line for unaided flight 
Egress Procedures Manua1. 
crew egress. Page 25 of the Apollo Flight Crew Hazardous 
13-4 Time line for aided and incapacitated flight crew 
Flight Crew Hazardous Egress Procedures Manual. 
egress. Pages 26 and 27 of the Apollo 
13-5 Page 0-8 of OCP FO-K-0021-1 showing documented safety instructions for the AS-204 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test. 
13-6 BELLCOM, INC. report concerning CIM depressurization during terminal countdown. 
Case 330, dated Jan. 20, 1967. 
13-7 Figure 1-4 of Apollo Operations Handbook (AOH) showing spacecraft hatch arrangement 
viewed from the outside. 
13-8 Drawing of spacecraft inner hatch showing emergency handle, viewed from inside. 
13-9 MSC memo dated Jan. 26, 1965, concerning the results of Gemini suit flammability test. 
13-10 Memo dated Mar. 8, 1967, 
time of the AS-204 incident. 
concerning inspection of the fire extinguishers used at the 
13-11 Drawing of Apollo Access Arm and environmental 
Flight Crew Hazardous Egress Procedures Manual. 
chamber. Page B-10 of the Apollo 
13-12 Definition of the Apollo Preflight Operations Procedures APOP G-100, dated Nov. 4,1966. 
13-13 Instructions for processing test procedures APOP 0-202, dated May 13, 1966. 
13-14 NAA Florida Facility Implementing Instruction, II 12-5, dated Jan. 27, 1966, titled, 
Safety Criteria for Apollo CIM and SIM and S II Operations. 
13-15 List of reference documents 
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SUBJECT: 
'. 
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GSA G&N, ••• fitO. rt 
L'NITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
Memorandum 
Distribution DATI:: November 19, 1965 
Memo No. SC033-65-2l4 
Chairman, Apollo Emergency Egress Working Group 
Minutes of the First Apollo Emergency Egress Working Group Meeting 
1. The first meeting of the Apollo Emergency Egress Working Group 

was held at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on 18 November 1965. The 

charter was read and approved and a copy has been enclos~d. Fer 

Section 3 of the charter, each member organization is requested to 

furnish the chairman the names of a primary member and an alternate. 

2. The following action items were given to the Working Group and 

were discussed: 

a. A discussion was centered on the access arm and environment 

room mock-up procurement, and the design of a mock"up with flight 

weight equipment. It was decided that a suited-astronaut-run with 

flight type equipment would be mandatory to obtain ad~quat~ time 

motion studies to develop the operational procedurt'os. An &,:tion item 

was placed on the Apollo Launch Operations Fanel (AtOP) Emergency 

Egress Sub-panel through Frank W. Horn to have a suitable mock-up 

review as soon as possible for both the Block I and Block II versions. 

b. It was also decided that air packs are needed in the environment 
controlled room on the access arm for each crew member and should be 
in place for launch. Safety showers are needed at level A on the LUT 
(Complex 39); a survey will be made by Norris Gray of S02-22 to determine 
the need for additional showers. 
c. ALOF asked this Working Group to decide on placement of the 
pyro bus arm switch, elevator control, and access arm controls. To 
properly place the switches and controls it will b~ necessary to define 
the relationship between the Launch Director, Test Supervisor, and 
Test Conductor. The KSC Test Conductor OHl.ce has been assigned this as 
an action item to report on by December 15, 1965. 
d. The manning of the emergency armc.,red vehicles was discus!'3d 

with the three (3) M1l3's each being manned by a Fan American Airways 

Fad Safety Supervisor, two (2) FAA firemen, and two (2) DOD medical 

technicians. The M59 armored fire fighting vehicle manning will be 

determined by Norris Gray and the rescue personnel. 

Buy U.S. Savings &nds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan 
ENCLOSURE 13-1 
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3. Cleanliness requirement was discussed by L. Miller of Bellcom 
and an air lock or other cleanliness requirement changes to the 
access arm ~ay be made. Any changes to the access arm will be reviewed 
by this group to determine the emergency egress impact. 
4. There is a need to define what criteria is to be used for determining 
hazardous and emergency conditions. This will be discussed at the next 
meeting. 
5. The next meeting will be held after the mock-up review discussed 
above. 
/1' ,11:,'",: ".t!#., .-(f. . j 
S. T. Beddingf'~d
Chairman 
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L 
APOIlJJ EMERGENCY EGRESS WORKING GROUP 
Purpose. 
The Apollo Emergency Egress world.ng group is established by the Apollo 
Launch Operations Camnittee to devel.op and integrate spacecraf't crewman 
-:gress ~ocedures for the pad areas of the saturn Apollo Operations. 
2. Function. 
The Working Group Will be the direct link between the Apollo Launch 
Operations Panel. and the various organizations performing special. activities 
in the egress-rescue area. . 
The Working Group Will recognize existing organizations, prOVide 
guidel.ines 1 make recCllllllendations, and tormul.e.te procedures as necessary to 
coordinate and integrate all el.ements of the egress operation. 
3. The formal. membership of the Working Group consists of the tollowing: 
NASA KSC-SCO Ch.a.i.r.man 

NASA MBC - APO 

NASA - MBC - FCSD 

NASA - NBC Landing Recovery Division 
NAA - BAA-2l. 
NASA - mc LVO 

AFETR - ETORS-l. - PAFB 

PAA - Pad Safety 

NASA - lIBF/MAS (BEIr.UXHl) 

NASA - !SEED 
NASA - LVO 
One permanent member and one al.ternate member Will be deSignated by 
each member organization and Will represent their organization in all Working 
Group functions. 
4. Meetings Will be hel.d as necessary to accomplish the function of the 
Working Group. Authority for cal.ling meetings rest With the chairman. 
Reports :M1nutes of all warld.ng Group Meetings Will be prOVided by 
chairman for distribution to, members and the chairman of the Apollo Launch 
Operations Caam.1ttee. 
\..- .~ ~ 
·'~.... ,)IV.I~ 
P. C. Donnel.J¥ 
0-13-19 

This page left blank intentionally. 
TRAHSMITT AL SHEET 
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MATERIAL TRANSMITTED 
KMI 1150.8, "Apollo Launch Operations Committee" 

This is a new Instruction. 

FILING INSTRUCTIONS 
File in a standard 3-ring binder in numerical sequence, in accordance 
with the alphabetic prefix which identifies the type of issuance. 
ENCLOSURE 13-2 

0-13-21 

TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
TO, 
ttH'" 1October 11. • r I.;J ti ~I 
MATeRIAL TRAN51111TTeD 
KMI 1150.8, "Apollo Launch Operations Committee" 
This is a new Instruction. 
FILING I..STRUCTIONS 
File in a standard 3-ring binder in numerical sequence, in accordance 
with the alphabetic prefix which identifies the type of issuance. 
ENCLOSURE 13-2 
0-13-21 
KMI 1150,8 
October 11, 1965 
JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA 
MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTION 
SUBJECT : APOLLO LAUNCH OPERATIONS COMMITTEE 
1. PURPOSE 
This Instruction incorporates into the KSC Issuance System 
as Attachment A the charter establishing the Apollo Launch 
Operations Committee. 
Attachment: 
/ ';( ~Jf',, ~ 
imon J. urttschell 
Chief, Administrative Services Office 
A. Charter--Apollo Launch Operations Committee 
Distribution "H" 
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KMI 1150.8 
CHARTER 
APOLLO LAUNCH OPERATIONS COMMITTEE 
1. PURPOSE 
This charter establishes an Apollo Launch Operations Committee 
at KSC and assigns certain responsibilities and authorities to it. The 
ALOC is a NASA-Contractor Management Team responsible to the 
Director, Launch Operations. 
2. OBJECTIVES & RESPONSIBILITIES 
The objective of the Apollo Launch Operations Committee (ALOC) 
is to provide the KSC, Launch Operations Directorate, a management 
tool for assuring coordination of Apollo prelaunch/launch interorganiza­
tiona1 operational activities at the Kennedy Space Center. The primary 
responsibilities of the ALOC are to: 
a. 	 Serve as a point of input into the Launch Operations 
Directorate for Apollo prelaunch/launch operational 
problems which affect the working interfaces between 
the various elements in the total launch team, 
b. 	 Develop problem definitions, propose solutions. and 
forward to the cognizant KSC organizations .for decision 
and/or action, 
c. 	 Receive reports, status information, and recommended 
solutions on problem areas from supporting working 
groups and operational organizations, 
d. 	 Serve as a policy reviewing group; providing guidance 
and policy advice for assuring coordination and effective 
solution to problem areas. 
e. 	 Serve as a mechanism for the Director of Launch Operations 
to imp1ement management policy that has been established 
by the Center Director of a prelaunch/launch operational 
nature, and 
f. 	 Provide input te, the Space Vehicle Plannin~ & Supervision 
Office such that Launch Operation Plans, SpacE' Vehicle 
Test Sequences. and Space Vehicle Test Cataloh'Ues may hE" 
developed in compliance with the test requirements. 
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3. CHAIRMAN 
The Chairman of the Apollo Launch Operations Committee will 
be the Director, Launch Operations or his designated representative. 
4. ORGANIZATION 
The Apollo Launch Operations Con.mittee will be supported by 
two n",anagement subcon"' mittees, Saturn IB and Saturn V. 
5. MEMBERSHIP 
Men". bership on the Apollo Launch Operations Con mittee will 
consist of representatives from appropriate n anagen".ent elements 
of K3C, other NASA elen-ents and interfaCing organizations. A 
list of n en", bers of the Apollo Launch Operations Con mittee and 
the industry representatives of the Saturn IB and Saturn V sub­
committee is as follows: 
APOLLO LAUNCH "')PERATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP 
Chairman Director, Launch Operations 
Space Vehicle Test Supervisor 
.:)aturn IB Operations lVanager 
3aturn V Operations Manager 
Technical Planning & Scheduling Office 
Apollo 3pacecraft Operations IVanager 
LEM Spacecraft Operations Manager 
Chief Spacecraft Test Conductor 
Representative, Assistant Director for Inforn~ation Systen~s, KSC 
Representative, Assistant Director for 3upport Operations, K3C 
Representative, Director, Plans, Programs, & Resources, K3C 
Representative, Apollo 3pacecraft Progran", Office, l'v.SC 
Representative, Saturn Industrial Operations, MSFC 
Representative, Assistant Director for Flight Operations, MSC 
Representative, Assistant Director for Flight Crew 
Operations, IV SC 
Representative, NASA Hdqts. Apollo Flight Operations 
Representative, Apollo Support Planning Office, DOD 
Representative, Assistant Director for Adn!inistration 
Recorder 
SATURN IB SUBCOMMITTEE Ii\DUSTRY REPRZSEi\TATIVES 
Representative - Chrysler 

Representative - Douglas 
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Representative ­ North American (Spacecraft) 
Representative - Grumman 
Representative - IBM (IU) 
SATURN V SUBCOMMITTEE INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES 
Representative ­ Douglas 
Representative - North American (Spacecraft) 
Representative - Grumman 
Representative - Boeing 
Representative - North American (Launch Vehicle) 
Representative - IBM (IU) 
Representative - Bendix 
Attendance at the subcommittee meetings will be based on the 
agenda of each meeting and could possibly include, in addition 
to the attendance of appropriate members of the ALOC, and 
the above assigned industry representatives, additional repre­
sentatives from industry and the government at the discretion 
and invitation of the subcommittee chairman. 
6. MEETINGS 
The Apollo Launch Operations Committee will have periodic 
meetings which will be called by the Chairman as necessary. 
Normally, meetings will be held on a bi-weekly basis. 
a. Agenda 
Agendas will be provided to all members of Apollo Launch 
Operations Committee by the Chairman prior to each 
meeting. 
.. 
b. Minutes 
Minutes ·of Apollo Launch Operations Committee meetings 
will be taken by an Apollo Launch Operations Committee 
recorder provided by the Chairman. Minutes of Apollo 
Launch Operations Committee meetings will be made 
available to all members. 
7. RELA TIONSHIP TO KSC ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS 
The creation of the Apollo Launch Operations Committee does not 
change in any respect the responsibilities of KSC organizational 
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elements as currently assigned. The Committee Chairman, 
therefore, shall assure that the Committee conducts its 
activities with full regard for the assigned functions of other 
elements of the Kennedy Space Center. 
The Apollo Launch Operations Committee will consider items 
assigned by the Director of Launch Operations and report itS 
findings to him. 
APPROVED: ( dA ,CLe. 'IF' • '. 
Kurt H. Debus 
Director, Launch Operations 
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5.0 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
5.1 SUPERVISION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING COMPLIANCE WITH ALL 
NASAINAA APPLICABLE SAFETY RULES AND REGULATIONS. 
5.2 THE TEST CONDUCTOR SHALL COORDINATE DEVIATIONS FROM ACCEPT­
ED SAFETY STANDARDS, WITH NAA AND NASA SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES. 
5.3 	 ALL PERSONNEL WILL BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS: 
A. AFETRM 127-1 RANGE SAFETY MANUAL 
B. APPLICABLE SAFETY STANDARD AND SAFETY SUPPORT PLAN. 
C. AFETR PAD SAFETY PLAN FOR LC3.4 
D. SOP FOR LC3.4 
E. KSC GENERAL SAFETY PLAN KMI-1710.1 ATTACHMENT-A 
5.4 	 ALL PERSONNEL WILL BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN 
PROCEDURE. 
5.5 	 THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE SHALL BE UNFOLDED AND REMAIN VISIBLE 

THROUGHOUT THE TEST. 

5.6 	 PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN TES1'ING WILL BE INFORMED OF THE SPECIFIC 

HAZARDS OF EACH TEST. 

5.7 	 INSTALLED PYROS SHORTED PER OCP'S K-2016 AND 4617• 
ENCLOSURE 13-5 
0-13-31 
I. 
This page left blank intentionally. 
0·13-32 

BELLCOMM, INC. 
SUBJeCT, 	 Final Report: Command Module DATe: January 20, 1967 
Depressurization During Terminal 
FROM: 	 L. G. MillerCountdown - Case 330 
ABSTRACT 
For some time, there has been concern about the time required to effect on-pad depres­
surization of the CM sufficient to permit hatch opening. Because of their specific interest in 
astronaut pad egress under hazardous conditions, the Emergency Egress Working Group of 
ALOC had instituted an action item to define the scope of the problem. In connection with 
this effort, a previous memorandum recommended that the times associated with cabin venting 
under various conditions be determined experimentally. Such a test was recently performed 
.. and is reported herein . 
To verify experimental findings, an analytical solution was attempted. A computer pro­
gram was developed which simulates CM depressurization both in flight and on the ground. 
The program is described and compared with one being prepared by NAA. Results are pre­
sented in a form which should aid preplanlling for on-pad contingencies, and future application 
of the program is briefly described. 
The combination of experimental and analytical findings was sufficient to close the action 
item. 
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE 
I~TRODUCTlON 
In a previous memorandum' it was concluded that the times associated with cabin vent­
ing under variolls conditions should be \'nified experimentally in order to facilitate planning 
for on-pad contingencies during final countdown. I£ the experiments had shown that excessive 
time was required to vent the cabin using the cabin pressure relief valve, it was proposed that 
specific methods of improving performance be explored. These consisted of (1) using the post 
landing ventilation system, (2) using the purge fitting on the side pressure hatch, and (3) de­
termining the time required to open the side pressure hatch under a number of overpressure 
conditions. 
A cabin venting fest was subsequently performed at MSC and is described herein. Although 
little data was obtained, it was sufficient to establish the order of magnitude of the time re­
quired to vent the C~I cabin. To extend this knowledge, attention was focused on the mathe­
matical basis for predicting depressurization times. In order to make use of this theory, it 
was necessary to employ a digital computer. Therefore, a FORTRAN IV computer program 
which theoretically calculates CM depressurization times under various conditions was de­
veloped by the writer and Miss P. A. Cavedo of Department 2013. The program, named DEPRES, 
is described and compared with a similar program prepared at North American Aviation. 
1"Command \lodule Pressurization During Terminal C~untdown - Current Status," Case 330, by 
L. G. \1i1Ier. Bellcomm \lemorandum for File, dated October 14, 1966. 
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DEPRESSURIZA TION TEST ON SIC 008 
A test, in which the CM cabin was partially depressurized via the cabin pressure relief 
valve, was performed in conjunction with the SIC 008 Thermal Vacuum (TIV) Test #3 at MSC. 
At an initial cabin pressure of 5 psig (vacuum chamber pressure Opsig), a valve which sim­
ulates a ~ inch diameter micrometeoroid puncture was opened. Cabin pressure decreased to 
3 psig in 80 seconds at which time the micrometeoroid valve was closed. The cabin pressure 
relief valve was then placed in its "manual dump" position, and the cabin pressure fell from 
3 psig to 0 psig in 20 seconds. Pressure was reported to have been measured with a large 
diameter (approximately 25-30 inches) pressure gage having a scale of from zero to 15 psig. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF TEST RESULTS 
Flight crew hazardous egress procedures require that the CM cabin be vented as soon as 
the egress decision has been announced. Since(l) NAA has indicated that it is quite unlikely 
that the CM cabin pressure will be in excess of 2 psig after CM closeout and (2) it takes ap­
proximately 40 seconds for the CM Access Arm to extend and attach to the LES tower, the 
time reported in the T IV test is considered to be compatible wi th egress requirements for aid­
ed and unaided egress during the period following spacecraft closeout. This leaves two 
cases unresolved. 
The first case is for "Incapacitated Flight Crew." In order for difficulties to arise, all 
three crewmen would have to be incapacitated2 . In this unlikely case, any cabin overpressure 
would have to be vented through a purge fitting on the inner side crew hatch (i.e. the side 
pressure hatch). 
The second case, which could occur prior to spacecraft closeout, is the possibility of a 
hazardous condition during the CM cabin leak check. Cabin pressure could be as high as 6.2 
psig, and depressurization times using either the cabin pressure relief valve or the purge 
fitting would be of interest. 
The lack of data for the two cases cited above prompted an investigation of the theoreti­
cal basis for predicting depressurization times. If the available data could be duplicated, 
. the formula would then be used to predict depressurization times for the remaining cases. 
The iterative nature of the calculation called for the use of a digital computer in performing 
the work. Hence, DEPRES came into being. The mathematical theory behind this FORTRAN 
IV program and the program itself are described in Appendix A. 
USE OF mE DEPRES PROGRAM 
An early version of DEPRES3 was used to simulate CM depressurization on the launch 
pad from overpressures of 3.00 and 6.20 psig. The results, plotted in terms of absolute pres­
sure, are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for three different values of orifice coefficient. Since 
2ordinarily, the crewman in the left hand couch would open the cabin pressure relief valve. 
It is possible, though. that the other crewmen could reach over or crawl over and perform the 
task. 
3See Appendix B. 
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the area is a constant in the iteration formula. varying K corresponds with varying the effec­
tive are of the orifice used for depressurization (d. Appendix A where effective area is de­
fined as the' product KA). Figure 1 shows the data point obtained during the #3 T IV test., 
Both figures show the value predicted by a conservative method of calculation contained in 
a Bellcomm Memorandum for File4 by T. A. Bottomley. 
Information obtained from NAA specifies an effective area for the cabin pressure relief 
valve of 1.5 sq. in. in the manual dump mode. Hence. for the cases shown in Figure I. the 
data point should fall between the curves for K :: .7 and K:: .8. Considering the asymptotic 
nature of the curves, agreement is quite good. If we extend this level of confidence to the 
curves of Figure 2. it can be seen that depressurization from an overpressure of 6.2 psia 
should take about 28 seconds, a time which is quite reasonable with respect to egress require 
ments. 
A round of discussions followed which probed the need for a computer program with 
broader capabilities. Interest was expressed in acquiring the in-house (i.e. Bellcomm) capa­
bility for calculating depressurization times in flight; this called for a program which could 
duplicate the response of the Environmental Control System (ECS) to both intentional and 
unintentional cabin depressurizations. A number of other refinements were also considered. 
The subsequent changes are described in Appendix A, and the program itself will be found 
. in Appendix C. 
This refined version of DEPRES, without the ECS option, was used to compute on·pad 
depressurization times with an area corresponding to that of the purge fitting on the inner 
side crew hatch. Overpressures ranging from 6.2 to 0.3 psi were used, the results being 
shown in Figure 3. The curve represents time required to depressurize to 0.1 psig from 
various values of cabin overpressure. The data is most useful for planning purposes when 
presented in this form. A companion curve, representing depressurization through the cabin 
pressure relief valve. is shown in Figure 4. 
COMPARISON WIlli NAA PROGRAM 
Having developed what appeared to be a useful tool for studying depressurization prob· 
lems, a number of telephone contacts were made at both MSC and NAA in order to determine 
if the DEPRES program could be profitably applied by those organizations. Some encourage­
ment was offered by ECS personnel from both groups, and a conference was arranged. Thus, 
the writer had the opportunity to examine and discuss an NAA computer program which, it 
was learned, has been developed during the past year or so. It differs from DEPRES in two 
major respects. First, it simulates repressurization of the CM and pressurization of the LM 
as well as CM depressurization. Secondly. the effects of upstream pressures and tempera­
tures are considered in determining ECS flow rates. This latter difference gives a slightly 
conservative flavor to DEPRES results when the ECS is used to maintain cabin pressures. 
Although a direct comparison of results was not possible, one set of data was examined 
which seemed to be quite close to the conditions used for a DEPRES run. For a final pres· 
4"CSM Depressurization Considerations for Astronaut Pad Abort," Case 330. by T. A. 
Bottomley, Jr•• Bellcomm Memorandum for File. dated March 29, 1966. 
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sure of 0.1 psia, DEPRES predicted a depressurization time of 1864 seconds with the ECS 
on whereas the NAA program predicted 1780 seconds. Results for an intentional cabin de­
pressurization, with no attempt to maintain cabin pressure through the use of the ECS, showed 
very close agreement. The times required to reach 0.1 psia differed by no more than a few 
seconds. 
The two advantages that DEPRES possesses are its clarity and the ease with which 
changes can be accomplished. The NAA program has been developed and modified by sev­
eral different engineers and is not yet officially documented. This, when added to the multiple­
purpose nature of the NAA program, makes it somewhat more difficult to see what is going on. 
The fault could be remedied, just as DEPRES could be changed to give it a repressurization 
capability. 
It seems unlikely, though, that NAA will make use of the DEPRES format since it lacks 
the degree of sophistication which their program contains. Given a continuing need for the 
calculations, it seems more probable that they will devote some effort toward improving their 
own program. 
It is of interest to note that NAA also has a boost and reentry program for CM pressure. 
A brief look indicated that it has the same advantages and disadvantages as the pressurization­
depressurization program. That is, it is available, fairly sophisticated, but hard to follow. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Study of on-pad depressurization times for the CM came about as an adjunct to the writer's 
activities with the Emergency Egress Working Group of the Apollo Launch Operations Com­
mittee. As a result of the MSC data and subsequent work with the DEPRES program, it was 
recommended that an EEWG action item on the subject be closed. This memorandum will serve, 
in part, as a final report to the Chairman of the EEWG in support of the closure. In addition, 
Figures 3 and 4 should serve as an adequate planning tool for determining depressurization 
times under various, non-standard conditions. For a given cabin pressure, they will yield a 
good estimate of the time required to open the side pressure hatch using either the cabin 
pressure relief val ve or the purge fitting on the hatch. 
Further work with DEPRES is planned in support of an investigation of ECS capabilities. 
Depressurization times will be developed as a function of micrometeoroid puncture size. and 
impacts on emergency in-flight procedures will be sought. 
2032-LGM-gmp lSI L. G. Miller 
Attachments 

Appendixes A-D 

Copy to Messrs. F. B. Benjamin - NASA/MM C. Bidgood 
C. H. Bolender - NASA/MO-I D. R. Hagner 
L. E. Day - NASA/MAT J. J. Hibbert 
J. K. Holcomb - NASA/MAO W. C. Hittinger 
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T. A. Keegan - NASA/MA-2 
S. T. Beddingfield - KSC/KB·4 
F. W. Horn - KSC/DK 
C. A. Turner - KSC/HC/GE 
J. C. Wootton - KSC/DB 
R. J. Gillen - MSC/EC9 
C. M. Jones - MSC/FL 
R. D. Langley - MSC/ES 
J. P. Loftus - MSC/PM5 
F. H. Samonski, Jr. - MSC/EC9 
R. S. Sayers - MSC/CF-24 
C. C. Williams - MSC/CB-7 
APPENDIX A 
THEORY OF DEPRESSURIZATION CALCULATIONS 
B. T. Howard 
P. R. Knaff 
J. Z. Menard 
I. D. Nehama 
T. L. Powers 
I. ~1. Ross 
T. H. Thompson 
G. B. Troussoff 
R. L. Wagner 
Department 1023 
Department 2032 
Central Files 
Library 
The mass flow of a compressible fluid through an outlet from a reservoir is given by 
where 
K 
A 
orifice coefficient 
area of the outlet 
acceleration of gravity 
pressure of the fluid in the reservoir 
density of the fluid in the reservoir 
pressure of fluid outside the reservoir 
ratio of specific heats of fluid 
Putting 
f: = 
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and 
m = , exp (+J - , exp [ Y: IJ 
we have 
Q = KAC ~ P1 P1 m 
and the ratio ( determines the character of the flow. If 
( < =(. (_2]exp [-YJ 
y+l y-l 
the velocity of the fluid through the orifice is equal to the velocity of sound, and m 
is constant and equal to 
(. exp fll exp Y+yI ]2y ][ ( 
Then, the mass flow depends only upon the parameters of the fluid and of the reservoir. 
(Dimensional units for this Appendix will be found in Appendix D.) 
THE DE PRES PROGRAM 
An early version of the DEPRES program is contained in Appendix B. Basically, the 
program assumes that an outlet of area A is opened at time equal to zero. The CM cabin has 
a volume of V and is initially at pressure P and temperature T. A 100% oxygen atmosphere 
is assumed, whence the values for R and GAM (Le. y). PO is the pressure of the fluid out· 
side the cabin, and G is the acceleration of gravity. A final value for density of the fluid 
in the cabin (RHOF), corresponding to a cabin pressure of 14.8 psia for the present case, 
is used to determine when the calculation should end. 
When the computer is instructed to execute the program, an initial value of fluid density 
in the cabin (RHO) is calculated. If RHO is less than or equal to RHOF, the value of N (i.e. 
elapsed time in tenths of a second), RHO and P are printed. If not, a mass flow rate (QN) 
through the outlet is computed, and a new vahle of RHO is obtained, assuming that the flow 
rate holds constant for a time interval (DL T) of .1 secondS. RHO is then tested again 
and iterations continue until the termination criteria is met. N, RHO and P are printed every 
second. 
SUse of a .01 second time interval did not affect results significantly. 
0·13·38 
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Appendix C contains a more recent version of DEPRES. While the basic iterative process 
is the same, a number of refinements have been added. These are listed as follows: 
I. The constant orifice coefficient was replaced by K =.85 - .22 E P SLON (i.e•.22t"), 
this being a linear approximation of Shapiro's curve"" for the variation of orifice coefficient 
with pressure ratio. 
2. A program path was created which approximates the behavior of t he Environmental 
Control System. It includes a cabin pressure regulator with a flow rate (CPREG) which in­
creases, linearly, from zero to full flow between pressures P1 and P2 and is turned off at P S' 
An emergency inflow regulator. with flow rate EIREG, opens in asimiIar fashion between P 3 
and P 4 and stays on until pressure P 6 is reached. The Environmental Control System can 
be shutoff at any pressure by setting a variable named PSTOP. TOTAL is the maximum 
flow rate from the Service Module Regulator. It is used to replenish the amount of oxygen 
(OTANK) in the surge tank when EIREG is on. If the quantity OTANK falls below a certain 
amount (EMPTY), then the total flow from the Environmental Control System (QP) equals 
TOTAL, assuming that the system has not previously been shut off. Losses due to normal 
cabin leakage (QLEAK) and metabolic usage (QMETA) are also considered. 
3.. A test was included to see if the value of EPSLON is such that sonic flow exists in 
the orifice. If sonic flow exists. m (i.e. M in the program) assumes a constant value. corre­
sponding to m~ in the calculation of QN. 
4. A variable (IECS) was included to specify whether the Environmental Control System 
is turned on (=1) or off (=0). When IECS I, values for QP. OTANK and QN are printed at 
time intervals of one second. 
The net result of these refinements is to give DEPRES the capability of simulating con­
ditions not only on the launch pad but in outer space as well. There is a large amount of 
flexibility built into the program. The values of both constants and variables can be changed 
quickly and easily. 
6Ascher H. Shapiro, "The Dynamics and Thermodynamics of Compressible Fluid Flow," 
Volume I. The Ronald Press Company, New York. 1953. page 100. 
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INNER HATCH COVER 
LATCH (6 PLACES) 
OUTER HATCH COVER 
TYPICAL LATCH 
(21 PLACES) -----1---~~p"-\ 
VIEW A 
OUTER HATCH COVER 
EMERGENCY EXTERNAL RELEASE 
(VIEW ROTATED 180 DEG) 
LATCH DRIVE ROD 
BOOST HATCH 
COVER WI NDOW 
TYPICAL LATCH 
AND ?HAINER 
(22 PLACES) 
BELlCItANK 
(TYPICAl) 
VIEW B 
CREW ACCESS HATCH 
(LOOKING IN80ARD) 
LANYARD HANDLE 
(I NTERNAL QUICK RELEASE) 
LA TCH DRIVE SHAFT 
(OUTn DRIVE COVERED 8Y 
ABLAnVE PLUG) 
BOOST HATCH COVER 
COMMAND MODULE MECHANICAL CONTROLS 
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UNITED STATES GOYERNMENT 
Memorandum 

TO GA/Gemini Program Office DATE: Jan. 26, 1965 
In reply refer to:FROM CA 'Assistant Director for Flight Crew CF23-5M-5 
SUBJECT: Ejection seat catapult rocket fire flash effects on Gemini suit material 
Before a full scale 100 percent 02' 14 psi "off_pad" abort test is con­
ducted on the tower at China Lake, it was decided to conduct a series of 
pilot tests in one of the small chambers at MSC. Five 6-inch by 6-inch 
swatches were made using the materials in the Gemini thermo integrated 
space suit (outer layer HT-.1 nylon, 7 layers of mylar and interpressure 
vessel). One 6-inch by 6-inch swatch of the outer parachute pack and a 
miniature parachute pack were tested in the same manner. 
The 7 swatches of materials, 5 similar to the Gemini space suit, 1 simi­
lar to the parachute pack, and 1 the outer parachute pack covering, were 
tested in a 100 percent 02, 14 psi environment for high temperature flame 
effect. Each swatch was tested separately in a small chamber. The swatches 
were placed in the chamber and the chamber was evacuated to 5 mm Hg and 
left for 5 minutes to in:::;ure complete out-gassing of the swatches. The 
chamber was brought to ambient with 100 percent 02 and the swatches were 
soaked for Fi minutes. At thE' end of the 5-minute soak, the chamber was 
again evacuated to 5 mm Hg for 5 minutes. The chamber was brought to 
14 psi with 100 percent 02 and the swatches soaked for 30 minutes. At the 
end of 30 minutes, a propane flame with a flame temperature above 1. 8000 F 
was brought into contact with the swatches. Each of the 5 suit swatches 
were brought into contact with the flame for 0.5 second, 1 second, 2 
seconds, 3 seconds, and 5 seconds respectively. The parachute pack outer 
material was in the flame for 7 seconds and the simulated parachute pack­
age for 2 seconds. 
The results were: 
a. No scorching occurred before 3 seconds in the flame. 
b. Burning occurred after 5 seconds for the suit material. 
c. Smoldering occurred after 7 seconds for the parachute outer 
pack material. 
d. No effect was noted to either the parachute canopy or the pack 
during a 2-second flame contact duration. 
Buy U.s. Savings Bonds Regularly on lhe Payroll Savings Plan 
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The attached photographs show the results of the above test. All the 
materials were in contact with the flame considerably longer than the 
suit or parachute would be during an "off-pad" ejection. The maximum 
duration that the man is partially engulfed in the flame in an "off-pad" 
abort will be 0.01 second (10 milliseconds). 
The results of these tests indicate that during an ejection, the fire 
flash of the ejection seat catapult is not of sufficient duration to 
cause the space suit to burn. Therefore. the test recommended in para­
graph 1 is no longer considered mandatory and a decision to run the test 
must be based on program considerations. 
I s I. D. K. Slayton 
Donald K. Slayton 
Enclosures 2 
cc: 
AMID. O. Coons 
AM2/G. F. Kelly 
CB/A. B. Shepard 
A. L. Bean 
CF2:~/J. C .•}oerns 
EC/R. S. Johnston 
EC4/F. S. Dawn 
EC8/E. M. Tucker 
CF23 :CDWheelwright:hsf 1/22/65 
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VNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
Memorandum 
TO DATE:Mr. S. Beddingfield, KB-4 March 8, 1967 
FROM KSC Fire Protection Officer, RF-I 
SUBJECT: Fire Extinguishers used on 204 incident. 
1. Attached is a copy listing the conditions found on each extinguisher 
used on the 204 incident. 
2. All extinguishers were out of date in accordance with the last 
date of inspection according to AFM 92-1 dated 15 January 1964, 
Section D, Paragraph 6-16 (1), Page 6-6, which states all exting­
uishers should be inspected monthly. 
3. We are holding these extinguishers under bond until notified in 
writing by proper authority to release them. 
4. Some of the discrepancies noted might have occurred during or 
after their use, (i. e. pins bent or missing, defective plunger, etc.).J 
Bt')' U.S. Sal'ingJ Bonds Regularly on the Pa.yroll Satlings Plan 
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Pirr 202 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
B. 
9. 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/2B/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Tag No. 93 1S lb. CO2 Used 
Factory stamp number 15-2060378 
Hydrostatic 10/h5 
Stencil Inspection date 9i U/66 
Last Inspection date 12/1/66 
Empty weight 27-1/4lbs. 
Full weight 44-5/81bs. 
Weighed at KSC 31 Ius. 
Discrepancies Out of date. 
Useable remaining CO2 Ernpty (18 seconds gas only) 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pin 203 Tag. No. 93 15 lb. C02 Used 
1. Factory Stamp number 15-224028 
2. Hydrostatic 1/65 
3. Stencil Inspection date 8/1/66 
4. Last Inspection date No tag 
5. Empty weight 27-1/2Ibs. 
6. Full weight 44-7/8 lbs. 
7. Weighed at KSC 30 lbs. 
8. Discrepancies Out of date 
9. Useable remaining C02 Totally empty 
10. Recharged discharge time 28 seconds, good C02 
0-13-53 

~---------------------------------------------------------~ 
Pirr 204 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
LC- 34 - - 2,0·} 
Bonded Extingui ·"hf' r., 
Examined by KSC Fi! '.' Suvice 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber a.,,; ()I~;son 
Conditions .FOUi \i 
Tag No. 93 .; Ib, (~02 
Factory stamp number 
Hydrostatic ~ I'.") 
Stencil Inspection date 
Last Inspection date 
Empty weight 
Full weight ~'. i bs. 
Weighed at KSC . . . .~ l b s. 
Discrepancies (Jdte 
Used 
Useable remaining CO2 '. '. 14 seconds, gas only) 
~-----------------------------------.------------------------~ 
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LC-34 - - 204 

Bonded Extinguishers 

Examined by KSC Fire Service 

2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr 205 Tag No. 93 
l. Factory stamp number 
2. Hydrostatic 
3. Stencil Inspection date 
4. Last Inspection date 
5. Empty weight 
6. Full weight 
7. Weighed at KSC 
8. Discrepancies 
9. Useable remaining CO2 
15 lb. CO2 Used 
15-220110 
12/64 
12/22/66 
12/1/66 
27-1/41bs. 
44-5/81bs. 
31 1bs. 
Out of date, horn split badly 
Empty (12 seconds, gas only) 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Fo und 
Pirr 206 Tag No. 
l. Factory stamp number 
2. Hydrostatic 
3. Stencil Inspection date 
4. Last Inspection date 
5. Empty weight 
6. Full weight 
7. Weighed at KSC 
8. Discrepancies 
'1. Useable remaining CO2 
15 lb. CO2 Used 
HH 26~40 
11/62 
8/22/66 
12/1/66 
Not legible 
Not legible 
32 Ibs. 
Out of date, defective trigger 
plunger 
Empty (20 seconds, gas only) 
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Pirr 207 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Tag No. ';13 
Factory stamp number 
Hydrostatic 
Stencil Inspection date 
Last Inspection date 
Empty weight 
Full weight 
Weighed at KSC 
Dis c repancie s 
Useable remaining CO2 
15 lb. CO2 Used 
USA-16535BN 
1/64 
9/66 
12/1/66 
25 Ibs. 
40 Ibs. 
39-1/21bs. 
Out of date, defective trigger 
plunger 
21 seconds, good CO2 
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Pirr 20B 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
B. 
9. 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Tag No. 94 15 lb. CO2 Used 
Factory stamp number 15-224214 
Hydrostatic 1/66 
Stencil Inspection date B/l/66 
Last Inspection date 12/1/66 
Empty weight 2.7 Ibs. 
Full weight 44-3/41bs. 
Weighed at KSC 29-1/2 Ibs. 
Disc repancies Out of date, band broken 
Useable remaining CO2 Empty 
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Pirr 209 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Log No. '14 15 lb. CO2 Used 
Factory stamp number 15-39-926 
Hydrostatic 8/63 
Stencil Inspection date 8/9/66 
Last Inspection date 9/30/66 - on tag 
Empty weight 23-3/4Ibs. 
Full weight 38-3/4Ibs. 
Weighed at KSC 35-1/21bs. 
Discrepancies Out of date 
Useable remaining CO2 19 seconds, good CO2 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr 210 Log No. 94 	 50 lb. CO2 Used 
1. Factory stamp number 	 TC-2807 
2. Hydrostatic 	 10/59 
3. Stencil Inspection date 	 )2/1/66 
4. Last Inspection date 	 12/1/66 - Wood 
5. Empty weight 	 137 lbs. (cyL) - with cart 160 lbs. 
6. Full weight 	 187 lbs. (cyL) 
7. Neighed at KSC 	 205 Ibs (cy!. a.nd cart) 
8. 	 Discrepancies Out of date, discharge lock pin 
missing 
9. Useable remaining C02 	 Empty (1 min. 42 sec. gas only) 
1. Actual empty weight at KSC 	 104-1/2lbs. (cy!.) 
2. Actual empty weight at KSC 	 45.5 Ibs. (cart) 
3. Actual empty weight at KSC 	 150 Ibs. (cyl., cart and hose) 
10. Recharged discharge time 1 min. 46 sec., good CO2 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr 211 Log No. 94 	 30 lb. Dry Chern. Used 
Ansul, Met-X 
1. Factory stamp number 	 None 
2. Hydrostatic 	 5/64 
3. Stencil Inspection date 	 8/10/66 
4. Last Inspection date 	 12/1/66 
5. Empty weight 	 Not marked 
6. Full weight 	 Not marked 
7. Weighed at KSC 	 42 Ibs. 
8. 	 Discrepancies Cartridge punct'ured, Cylinder 
marked by stencil "ABC Dry 
Chemical" 
9. 	 Useable remaining Dry Chern. Visual inspection - approximately 
2/3rds full of agent 
D-13-61 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr 212 
1. Factory stamp number 
2. Hydrostatic 
3. Stencil Inspection date 
4. Last Inspection date 
5. Empty weight 
6. Full weight 
7. Weighed at KSC 
8. Discrepancies 
9. Useable remaining C02 
10. Recharged discharge time 
15 lb. C02 Used 
15-223723 
10/60 
8/1 /66 
12/1/66 
27-3/4 Ibs. 
45-1/81bs. 
31 Ibs. 
Out of date, no band or horn clamp 
Empty (6 seconds gas only) 
29 seconds, good CO2 
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Pirr 213 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Log No. 94 15 lb. CO2 Used 
Factory stamp number 15-223653 
Hydrostatic 1/65 
Stencil Inspection date 8/1/66 
Last Inspection date No tag 
Empty weight 27-5/8 lbs. 
Full weight 45 Ibs. 
Weighted at KSC 31-1/2 lbs. 
Discrepancies Out of date 
Useable remaining CO2 Empty (21 seconds gas only) 
D-13-63 
Pirr 214 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Log No. 95 15 lb. CO2 Used 
Factory stamp number HSC-27898F 
Hydrostatic 6/63 
Stencil Inspection date 11/3/66 
Last Inspection date No tag 
Empty weight Not legible 
Full weight 46 Ibs. 
Weighed at KSC 31-1/2 Ibs. 
Discrepancies Out of date 
Useable remaining CO2 Empty 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr 215 Log No. 95 
1. Factory stamp number 
2. Hydrostatic 
3. Stencil Inspection date 
4. Last Inspection date 
5. Empty weight 
6. Full weight 
7. Weighed at KSC 
8. Discrepancies 
9. Useable remaining C02 
1. Actual empty weight at KSC 
2. Actual empty weight at KSC 
50 lb. C02 Used 
TT 7128 
1/57 
8/1/66 
12/1/66 
Cyl. - not legible, 
1831bs. (Cyl.) 
194-1/2 lbs. (Cyl. 
with cart 148-1/2 lb. 
and cart) 
Out of date, Hose pitted near 

connection to bottle, defective 

trigger pin 

Empty (1 min. 56 seconds, gas only) 

98 lbs. (Cyl.) 

143-1/2 Ibs (Cyl., cart and hose) 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr Tag No. 95 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Factory stamp number 
Hydrostatic 
Stencil Inspection date 
Last Inspection date 
Empty weight 
Full weight 
'II eighed at KSC 
Discrepancies 
Useable remaining CO2 
15 lb. CO2 
USA-61538BL 
11/64 
12/1/66 
12/1/66 
26 lbs. 
41 Ibs. 
27-1/2 lbs. 
Out of date 
Empty ( 10 seconds 
Used 
gas only) 
D-13-66 
LC-H - - 204 
B9nded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr 218 Tag No. 96 15 lb. C02 Used 
1. Factory stamp number 223584 
2. Hydrostatic 1/65 
3. Stencil Inspection date 12/1/66 
4. Last Inspection date 12/1/66 
5. Empty weight 281bs. 
6. Full weight 45-3/41bs. 
7. Weighed at KSC 32-1/2 Ibs. 
8. Discrepancies Out of date 
9. Useable remaining C02 Empty (16 seconds gas only) 
10. Recharged discharge time 35 seconds, good C02 
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Pin 219 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Tag No. 96 15 lb. CO2 Used 
Factory stamp number F-458277 
Hydrostatic 8/60 
Stencil Inspection date 7/26/66 
Last Inspection date 12/1/66 
Empty weight Not legible 
Full weight 52 lbs. 
Weighed at KSC 38 Ibs. 
Discrepancies Out of date 
Useable remaining CO2 Empty 
(Sheet 18 of 20) 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr Tag No. 227 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Factory stamp number 
Hydrostatic 
Stencil Inspection date 
Last Inspection date 
Empty weight 
Full weight 
Weighed at KSC 
Disc repancies 
Useable remaining CO2 
15 lb. CO2 
15-176031 
2/65 
7/1/66 
2/1/66 
30-3/4lbs. 
45-5/8 Ibs. 
33-1/21bs. 
Out of date, 
Empty 
Used 
pin bent in head 
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LC-34 - - 204 
Bonded Extinguishers 
Examined by KSC Fire Service 
2/28/67 by Inspectors Weber and Olsson 
Conditions Found 
Pirr Tag No. 228 
1. Factory stamp number 
2. Hydrostatic 
3. Stencil Inspection date 
4. Last Inspection date. 
5. Empty weight 
6. Full weight 
7. Weighed at KSC 
8. Discrepancies 
9. Useable remaining CO2 
10. Recharged discharge time 
15 lb. CO2 Used 
15-210863 
12/64 
8/1/66 
12/1/66 
27-5/8 Ibs. 
45 Ibs. 
H-l/21bs. 
Out of date 
25 seconds good CO2 
31 seconds good CO2 
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S.I~ 
:':R~~~ -'-R-O-C-E-D-U-R-E.....~LORIOA 
'RE.FLlGHT 
NO. G-1OO 
DATE: November 4, 1966 
TITLE: Originating and Changing Apollo Pre-Flight Operations Procedures 
1. RlRFOSE 
This procedure establishes the method of initiating, coordinating, publishing, 
and distributing new and revised Apollo Pre-Flight Operations Procedures (APOP's). 
2. ~ 
... Apollo Manual Change Request (AMCR, KSC Form 4-33NS - 7/66) 
3. DEFINITIONS 
Apollo Pre-Flight Operations Procedure: A basic procedure necessary to _nage 
the technical operations performed at the Kennedy Space Center which requires 
joint and/or concurrent action by NASA and NAA/S&ID. "Joint and concurrent 
action" as delineated herein refers to: direct participation by NASA and NAA 
in signature,approval or acceptance stamping of a disposition, operation, or 
document. Examples that do not constitute joint and concurrent action are: 
(a> independent review and evaluation of prior actions, (b) receipt of documents, 
and (c) need~to-know without direct participation. 
4. RESPONSIBILITY AND HANDLING 
4.1 	 Cognizant NASA/NAA employees may propose a new procedure or a revision to 
an existing one. Proposals will be transmitted by preparing an !MeR in 
triplicate. NASA initiated AMCR's will be signed by the o~iginator and 
approved by his supervisor. NAA initiated AMCR's will be signed by the 
originator and approved by his manager. One copy will be retained on file 
and two copies will accompany the procedure and 'be forwarded to 'NASA 
Spacecraft Operations Procedures Control Office or the BAA Procedures 
Representative as applicable. A clearly stated reason for the proposal 
will be included on the AMCR. 
4.1.1 	 Proposed new procedures or revisions will be reviewed by NASA 
Spacecraft Operations Procedures Control, or the NAA Procedures 
Representative, to determine if they (1) contain joint or concurrent 
action as outlined in paragraph 3 above, (2) duplicate or conflict 
with existing procedures, (3) conform to established format. Pro­
posals that are not valid will be returned to the originator with 
reasons for the rejection stated on the AMCR•. 
Revision: 	 Remove and destroy APOP G-1OO, dated December 13. 1965, and replace with 
this issue. ¢ indicates revisions. Retain Appendix "A" dated December 13, 1965. 
Revised to update signature requirements, organizational titles and provide 
for the use of Addendums. 
ENCLOSURE 13-12 
0-13-73 
•• t...,,,Subj: Originatir,g and C!1anginL: Apollc P,'e-FligY.~ G-1OO 
Operations P:'ocedLres Page 2 
Date: November 4, 196c 
4.1.2 ",IASA Spacecraft Operations Procedl.<!'es CO:ltrol will forward 
coordination copies of ~PBA originated proced~es to the 
NAA Procedures Unit and applicable NASA coordinacion points 
req'c:esting comments be returned cn the due date specified. 
NAA Procedures Unit will for"ara copi"s to applica~le NAA 
coordination points. 
4.1. 3 '1':1<' NPJ;. Procedures t'!1it will forwa2'd coordinat ion copies of 
NAA originated procedures to the KA;)A Ouerations P:'ocedures 
Control Office, and applicabh: ;SM coordination points re­
questi:-!g COIT'Jllents be returned Oil t'~1e due date specified. 
4.1.4 C0rrune"ts submitted vJill :::e clea: ly stated, referencing specific 
paragraphs , giving reasons, e.r:C: offering altermlte instructior..s 
whe!'e possible. 
4.1.5 Corrunents 
comm"mts 
assumed. 
to the draft must 
are not returr:ed, 
be returned by the due date. If 
conCl:l'renCe with proposals will be 
4.1.6 vlhen the coordination period ;11l.S expired, the comments received 
will be reviewed and coordinated with the affected groups. 
Those deemed applicable will ~'e incorporated into the procedure. 
An atteMpt will be made to resolve conflicting comments by 
means of telephone calls, meetings, etc. If conflicting 
corrunents cannot be resolved, they will be brought to the 
atter,tion of NASA/NAA managereer.t for decision. 
¢ 4.1. 7 rN!le~1 coo:-dination is complete and conflicts resolved or 
management decision made, the procedure will be typed by NAA 
for publication, signed by the NASA Spacecraft Operations 
Procedure Control and the NAil. Procedures Representative, and 
forwarded to the NASA ~~nager, Test and Operations Management 
Office and the NAP. Director of Apollo C:SM Operations for approval 
signatures. 
4.2 M:'nor R2visior.s 
¢ 
Minor reV1Slons (i. e., grammatical corrections, format corrections, and 
word changes that have only a minor effect on the intent of the procedure), 
may be issued as pen and ink changes upon approval of the NASA Spacecraft 
Procedures Control and the NAil. Procedures Representative. 
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Subj: Originating and Changing Apollo Pre-Flight 
ions Procedures 
Date: 
4.3 Interim Procedures 
4.4 
4.3.1 APOP's may be published on an interim Lasis upon approval by 
NASA/NAA Management. Requests ~ill te fo~arded on an AMCR 
to the NASA Spacecraft Procedures Control or NAA Procedures 
Representative as applicable; however, action may be initiated 
by a verbal request and confirmed in ~riting on an AMCR prior 
to publication. NAA originated AMCR's for interim publication 
must be signed by a NAA/FF manager or above. 
4.3.2 NASA Spacecraft Procedures Control and NAA Procedures Repre­
sentative will obtain preliminary approvals of interim pro­
cedures by the most rapid means available. 
4.3.3 When preliminary approvals are obtained, the procedure ~ill 
be distributed as an interim procedure ~lth a life span of 
30 to 60 days. The expiration date ~ill be noted on the first 
page under the publication date. Approval signatures will be 
the same as for a regular procedure or revision. 
4.3.4 The life span ~ill serve as the coordination period. At the 
end of this interim period, the procedure ~ill be issued as a 
regular procedure incorporating changes or published as is, 
if no comments are received. If an interim procedure is un­
resolved, conflicting points will be referred to NASA/NAA 
management for decision. 
Addendums 
4.4.1 Certain key procedures require frequent rev~nons to accurately 
reflect the latest change in the NASA/NAA operations. These 
"revisions include both minor and major changes in procedur~ 
an~ depending upon the circumstances, may need to be issued on 
an emergency basis. To expedite this kind of procedural updating 
and to avoid the frequent and time consuming retype and reissue 
of lengthy procedures, such revisions may be published as 
addendums. However, addendums ~ill be used only as a last resort 
and under emergency conditions when time will not permit a 
normal revision or interim publication. 
4.4.2 The addendum ~ill normally be a one or two page statement of the 
changes being adopted, The paragraphs affected will be clearly 
referenced and the new or revised information ~ill be clearly 
stated. 
4.4.3 Requests for publication of revisions as addendums will be pro­
cessed in the same manner as other proposed revisions (see 
paragraph 4.1). Ho~ever, action may be initiated by a verbal 
request and confirmed later in writing on an AMCR. 
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4.4.4 	 EASA 8,acecraft Pt'ocedures Control and the NAA Procedures 
Re,,'esen:ative will coordinate the proposed addendum and obtain 
nE:cessa ry approvals. ~:(,!'mally addendum changes will receive 
;'e,;;c;lar coo..'~Unbtion. :iowever, when operational requirements 
dictate imrr,ediate put lication, coordination similar to that 
fo" im.e"im procedures will be used. (Reference paragraph 
L • ..;,,2). 
4.4.5 	 When ap:?~'ovals a,'e c"tained, the addendum will be typed on 
m~ltilith mats and signed by NASA lIJanager, Test and Operations 
:.lanagement Office and the NAA Director of Apollo CSl'o1 Operations. 
4.4.6 	 Followin~ the publication of an addendum, t~e procedure 
affected will be revised as soon as practical, incorporating 
the revisions outlined in the adc.endum. 
4.5 	 Distribution and Control 
4.5.1 	 Request to be placed on discrLbution for the APOP's will be 
made by memorandQm and submitted to the NASA Spacecraft 
Procejures Control or the I~Afl. aocedures Representative, as 
ap,licable. 
4.5.2 	 Tte NAA P,'ocedures Unit will maintain complete history files 
of all APOP's and will be responsible for the publication and 
distribution. 
4.6 	 ~ 
4.6.1 	 vfuen preparing a draft for a proposed procedure, the originator 
should organize the material into a format as shown in Appendix 
"An. Paragraphs should be numbered using the decimal system, 
and when possible, four decimal places should not be exceeded. 
Inforn~tion su~~ as lengthy Forms Guide Instructions, Flow Charts, 
List of Names, Categories, etc., should be omitted from the 
basic instructions and included as an Appendix. 
CoordinatedCoordin,"d by'k~#
FrocedurestJni 
NAA/S&ID Florida Facility 
• L. Pearce, Director 
pollo CSM Operations 
AA/S&ID F'lorida Facility 
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PRE-FLIGHT :':R~~~ -P-R-O-C-ED-U-R-E--.I~LOR,oA 
NO. 0-202 
DATE: May 13, 1966 
TITLE: Operational Checkout Procedure 
1. PURPOSE 
This procedure esta.blishes the lId,hons for the prepara.tion, processi ng, release, 
and use of Operational Checkout Proc«lul'e£. 
2 • REFERENCE DOCti'MENTS 
4. 
2.1 Apollo Pre-Flight Operatiols Prccccure T-501, "Work Authorization - TPS" 
2.2 Apollo DocUl1lentation Proce'.ure No.2 
2.3 Apollo GSE Plan S&ID 62-14',0 
2.4 APGP 0-201, "Access Contro of Test and Work Areas" 
FORMS 
3.1 Operational Checkout Proce(ure (ocr, Form KSC 11-16A) 
3.2 Parts Installation and Rem(.val Record (NAA Form FLA-62) 
3.3 Apollo Launch Operations Tr'st Summary Sheet (KSC Form OT-l(9) 
DEFINITIONS 
4.1 OPERATIONAL CHECKOUT PROCETIURE (OCP) - An engineering docUl1lent which 
provides detailed instructjon~to personnel for operational checkout and 
verification of equipment curing site activation, pre-launch, launch, or 
post-launch operations. 
4.2 OPERATIONAL CHECKOUT PROCETIURE CHECKLISTS - A checklist especially designed 
to supply the necessary information to accomplish routine tasks in a 
particular order, prepared pn an 11 x 17 sheet and providing for inspection 
buy-off. 
4.3 INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL CHECK,)UT PROCEDURES - An OCP which unites 'two or 
more Apollo Command and Selvice Module (CSM) systems or unites CSM systems 
with the booster. 
4.4 DEVIATIONS - A change to a published OCP, such as changes in equipment 
lists, test parameters, se(,\~ences added or deleted or modified by order of 
occurrence or content to p{rmit accomplishment of the test. Obvious errors, 
such as typographical error3, wrong page nUl1lbers, etc., are not considered 
deviations. 
Revision: -Remove ind destroy APOP-(,::2oi; dated February-4: 196'6; and replace With­ - - -
this issue. ¢ denotes revisions. I:etain Appendix A and B, dated February 4, 1966. 
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D-13-77 
Operational Checkout Procedure No. 0-202 

M~ 13, 1966 Page 2 

4.5 	 REVISION - Technical changes including permanent deviations published 
in page form for insertion into a published OCP. 
4.6 	 RE-ISSUE - A complete re-writc of an OGP pUblished to supersede a 
previously released OCP. 
4.7 	 APOLLO OCP CONTROL GROUP - A joint NASA/NAA Management Committee 
responsible to assure timely and techn~cally adequate OCP's and to 
establish policy concerning ~AA Florida Facility (FF)/Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) OCP's. 
5. 	 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
5.1 	 OCP's are based on NAA Proce35 Specifications. Those applicable should 
be referenced in the OCP by ·jocument number. 
5.2 	 A series of OCp's for each Vehicle will be prepared and released at 
the Florida Facility in accordance with OCP requirements as speci£ied 
in this and referenced docum'mts. 
5.3 	 OCp's will (1) provide detailed step-by-step delineation of required 
personnel activity for the operation, assembly, handling, or tes~ of the 
equipment and for system(s) involved, (2) provide for insertion of 
program requirement record d~ta, (3) provide NASA/NAA Engineering and 
Inspection acceptance, (4) provide for safety of personnel and equipment. 
5.4 	 Ground Support Equipment (GSE) nomenclature will be standardized in 
accordance with Reference 2.3. The GSE ~odel number and title will be 
listed in the special equipm"nt section. In the procedure section, the 
model number and abbreviated title will be used. 
5.5 	 All OCp's will include the f:>llowing statement: "NAA supervlslon and the 
responsible NAA test engineer are directly responsible for the safety 
of all NAA personnel, safe w:lrldng conditions, and implementing all 
safety requirements". 
5.6 	 All safety requirements will be considered in the preparation of OCP's, 
and the OCP originator will :oordinate the procedure with the NAA/KSC 
Safety Offices and affix his signature to the FF "safety Office Sign­
off Statement" (file card) prior to publication. 
5.7 	 Any OCP which involves any of the critical operations described in 
Reference 2.4 will be designated on the front page as follows: "This 
Test Procedure Is a Critical Operation" 
5.8 	 Emergency shutdown procedures (sequentially if necessary) will be 
included for all equipment. 
.. 
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5.9 Applicable KSC/NAA r.al "ty Directlves will be referenced and complied 
with or waivers willI f: obtained, prior to commencing the tent to 
ensure safe operatior.f . 
5.10 Notes, Cautions and Wi ming::; will not be numbered within the OC?, but 
will be set apart fror. the text hy placing them in the center of t.he pa.ge 
above the procedura] :!.ep an shown below: 
i:OTE 
An operation or ::pecial requirements, etc., in which no 
danger exists bl,1, which, if not accomplished, may cause 
inconvenience, oelay, or invalidation of test. 
CAUTION 
Operational ster practice, etc., which, if not str1ct:.v 
adhered to or ol~~rved, could result in damage of equipme:1t. 
WARNING 
Operational steT' practice, etc., which, if not strictly 
adhered to or obr.erved, could result in personal injury. 
5.11 Illustrations will be I[sed only t.o aid in the overall cla.rity of the 
text when necessary ar:'l will bi;; referenced in the text, but in no ca.::;e 
will they be used as (Jirectives for accomplishing work. 
6, RESPONSIBILITIES AND HANDr.U'; 
6.1 Preparation, Processir·· and Release 
6.1.1 OCP's to accoml1 is,h work tasks are developed to support a 
specific Floriila Operations Flow Plan. Titles and number:; are 
provided for tr.e OCP Control Group for review and appl'oval. 
6.1.2 OCP outlines are prepared by the NAA Systems Engineer, reviewed by 
the NASA Enginf'f!rs, and submitted to the OCP Control Group for 
review and. apprc..val. 
6.1.3 Rough drafts for each individual OCP are prepared with text ar,d 
illustrations e:; outlined in Reference 2.2. 
6.1.4 Rough drafts are forwarded through the NASA to Electronic Da:ta 
Processing (EDI) for processing in flimsy print-out form. 
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6.1.5 	 Flimsies are forward'~fl to the NAA Documentation Support Group, 
who send copies to S:n;tems Engi neering, NAA QuaEty Engi neeri ng, 
NAA Safety, Downey,£ngineerinr" and NASA Technical Library 
for diStribution to {fiC Engineer lng, NASA Q.C, Safety, and 
Manned Spacecraft Ce1ter (MSC) Houston. 
6.1.6 	 Review comments from those agencies listed in 6.1.5 are returned 
to the responsible N~ Systems Engineer. The responsib:e Systems 
Engineer then develo~s a master review copy which is reviewed 
and signed by the ir.~ut ·agenci~s. On integrated procedures, a 
formal review is heli for final comments and sign-off. 
6.1.7 	 NAA Documentation Support Group attaches a cover sheet and 
releasing Field Engineering Order (FEO) - see Appendix A - to 
the signed master flimsy, and obtains appropriate NAA signatures. 
Following NAA sign-c·rf, the signed FEO is released by NAA 
Configuration Control, and a copy of the rel.eased FEO is provided 
for Documentation Support at the time of release. The master 
flimsy and cover sheet are then given to the NASA for procurement 
of appropriate signatures as directed by the NASA/NAA OCP Control 
Group. The released FEO is maintained by Documentation Support 
until the OCP is submitted to Technical Services (TS) for 
publication. 
6.1.8 	 When all signatures are affixed to the cover sheet, and the 
package is returned to NAA Documentation Support, the master 
flimsy is forwarded through the NASA to EDP for processing of 
final offset masterr for printing. 
6.1.9 	 The finalized offset masters, the signed-off cover sheet, and the 
released FEO are prcvided to TS for publication and distribution 
30 days prior to tert. 
6.1.10 	TS is responsible fer OCP distribution directed by the NASA/NAA 
OCP Control Group; in addition, three (3) published copies will be 
forwarded to each Tfst Site OCP Coordinator. 
6.2 DeViations to OCp's 
6.2.1 	 All deviations will be recorded on pre-printed deviation sheets 
and will become an {.fficial part of the record copy OCP. Pretest 
deviations will be written by the Systems Engineers; the de­
viatiun :.lit,·, :,i:wjJl h:·p~;r.j!/Jll·1 (J 'l"'\I:;Il~iQrl'numbel' (UJl'~ J.11I111 e:r 
pel:' item'); and a copy will be given to Inspection prior ·to 
starting the test. 
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6.2.2 	 Deviations tha'. OCCU1' during the test will be recQrried 'oy tl-.e 
Systems Enf':ine'~r:; or NAA OCP writer if or.<~ il: a.~::;igneli tv the 
test (integrat"! ter.t:; only). When the req'..lirmnent5 for z" 
deviation becc))!'" «nowr" t 11e Sy:::tems Engineel' w~':"l he r.oLLc·;. 
The Systems En!; i neer or writer wi 11 assign r. dev~,... i or. r.\,;Jl',b~r &or.; 
inspection wi.l reeord tre number in the recorli copy OCr. If 
no writer is Ii :ijJned, tr.e Systems Engineer will red ':"ine r,';'z 
OCP, issue dev :,tiOI n:;mt ers, and notify Inspection who w::'11 
record the nll..'Tl:,pr at :;tll.te.l al)()ve. At no time will a test be ne':"<i 
up to record d"viation'.o, en an official deviation sr.eet. 7hi.:; 
can be done HI" .~( ,r:,!,: ('i i on of the test. 
6.2.3 	 Upon complet lO', -;-,f 1 ! 1'", 1.f.:1t ull deviation sheets will 'De co:·~.:): €:tt:.i 
and signed 0," I in i;'uragrapil 6.2.5 und turned 0ver tc 
f •Inspection to ; • 1 ' ~ in the record copy OCP. Deviation s;"eetc~ 1 
are self-reIch .' ~ ~ ~I I ie ,lot require an FEO.
'.'" 
6.2.4 	 It is tl:le re.il',,',!;ihilily of the Systems Engineer to assure that 
properly appro .>.J (it'viat. i on sheets ate supplied to Inspection 
and to NAA Doc1 nent.a,tion Support following complet ion of the 
test. No OCP l'ill be bo\.Oght by Inspection u..ntil off~cia':" 
deviations are provj ded 'ry engiJ'),eering for ALL deviations noted 
during perform:ce of the OCP. 
6.2.5 	 Approval signa'llret. for deviation sheets will be as foi10w;:;: 
for Systems t.e: t of sped fic systems sections of integr:,ced 
OCP's - NAA an' NAZA System Engineers; for control sections of 
integrated OCP-;; - NAA Test Project Engineer (TPE) and :lASA 
Spacecraft Te31 Conductor (STC); for electrical and mechanical 
check lists - IAA ar.d NASA system engineers. 
6.2.6 	 Deviations tha' shou] d be incorporated in like OCP's for fLl~,·.ire 
CSM should be rarked PERMlINENT and later incorporated by 'i.AJ, 
Documentation Cupport into the applicable OCP and released in 
accordance witl Pa.ragraph::: 6.1.6 through 6.1.9. Deviations that 
are "one time (nly" items are recorded on the de'liat ion sheet 
as Temporary Dtviations. No further action is required on 
Temporary Devif.,tions. 
6.3 Open Item Review 
6.3.1 	 NAA service ell{ ineering will maintain current TAIR Book status 
and will publi: h a daily status report (" fink sheet"). Only 
TPS ' s, DR' Ii ane: DRSS' s will be statused. 
6.3.2 	 Completed OCP'! that are still open will be reviewed for cor,­
straints. Special attention will be given to the open, non­
transferred IDJ's. 
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6.3.3 Review of open PIRH' and TIR'!, and shortage sheets will be 
accomplish~(l by the ::M [;ystem:, Englr.eer prior to the Open 
Item Review. Any co ,traini nr. "hortares, PIRR' s, or 7IR'::: will 
be listed by the S;/f. !'ms Engilwer ann submitted to the 7e:;;t 
Project Engineer (TP :)/SpacecrLft Tefit Conductor (STC) at the 
Open Item Review. 
6.3.4 The open items revi(": will bf' ('01. ,.ACted from the statu::; repert, 
and constraining i tellS wil] : C l; "ted on a. separate sc,eet, or 
the status report Ina:' be 'mnrr:en up accordingly. Tne determir.ed 
constraints will be j steci, :;ip,(,fj by the 7PE and STC, and pub­
lished to insure thn co~.('pn1,r"tej effort is applied to those 
items. 
0.3.5 NAA and NASA engin.cp , nl~ '"r,ll: :igr. the cover of the reviewed 
status report alon., :, th 1 Le Tl'E and STC. The signed copy of the 
status report will 11 ' f~ l£:d wi l.h the record copy of the OCP 
upon completion of t Ie te[;t. 
¢ 6.3.6 NAA Project Engine':!r t\g ann I;A~;A Engineering must approve the 
Open Item Review She ·t by signature, prior to beginning the 
test. The original ,;lgned C(}p~' of the review sheet will be 
filed with the recor I copy of the OCP upon completion of the test. 
6.3.7 NAA Technicians will work 
Inspection Acceptanc '!. 
requ; rE'1 constraillc'; {UI' i!f,~:f./~,M'. 
6.4 All tests will be conducteclr,y the HAJ\ TPE and NASA STC. 
may delegate their duties Il; necesshr;-. 
The TPE and S'::'C 
6.5 Quality Control ResponsibilLties during Test. 
6.5.1 Quality Control resplllsibilitics after satisfactory completion 
of an OCP step or op'!ration ar'! a.s follows: 
6.5.1.1 NAA Inspectlon wi]: enter acceptance stamp impressior. and 
date after !::tch oppra-;ion requiring verification on ea.ch 
horizontal Ltne dl!Gigne.ted for NAA inspector and at the 
bottom of e'lch comple'.ed page of the OCP. 
6.5.1.2 NASA Inspec~ion wi11 ~onformance stamp each line item 
requiring N\SA insp~ct,ion verification during al~ CSv. 
testing and on GSE te;;ting designated as NASA Mandatory 
Inspection Points (MIP). 
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6.5.1.3 When NASA n?'" ',av~ .10t been entered in the NASA block for 
a GSE OCP, ':AA Q;lilLt,f Control will double stamp, dat.e ar.a. 
enter N/R i', each NASA Q.uality Control Block aft.er stt\lr.P:;';-'13 
the NAA Inr.p<~ctor blo'=k. 
6.5.1.4 When an in"p<!ction st,J.mP entry is required for verif.c;.:lor. 
or witnessi '{j of an onC"d,tion occurring a.t a. remot.e area., 
which is r€ lIoved f:-Qrr. the location of the Quali r.y Control 
buy-off COl>; of the OCP, the inspector will verify oVer 
the Operatj .'J! Intercom System (OIS) the sat.isfactory corr.p';"eLor. 
of' an opere;: ion, and 'lIil'i affix a functional tes-: ir,spec;:'::'.:)!": 
stamp impr(~sion to tne verified step in the OCP. 7he 
NAA final a :'ceptancc stamp will not be used for verificatlor, 
over the on . 
6.5.1. 5 Recycles, ['mtdowns at the end of shift or st..bse«uen t. re­
starting of test at tile beginning of· the next test s!1ift 
do not requ ire deviations since these situations do 1107, 
exceed nor :hange tile scope' of the test as specified by ":C?, 
e.g., CSM p:,.,er may be removed at the end of a .:;hif1:­ to 
secure from the test 'clntH the next shift starts. At th.=.. 
tinfe CSM pc",er may be reapplied and the test resurr.ed where 
it was terrrinated. No deviation is required for either 
the power d)wn or pow'r up. However, the point and tirr.<: of 
events will be recorded in the record copy and will be not.en 
in the OCP rest Summary Sheets. 
6.5.1.6 The following time entries will be required on cert.ain 0CP's 
as specifiei. During the test, the NAA Inspector wl';"l 
record the tlme, using the 24-hour clOCk system, 'l.n tr.e:'~? 
as follows: (a) in the time column adjacent to the first 
sub-sequenc", el'ltry on each page, (b) at stop a.r.d resta.rt 3 
due to test "holds. If (In addition, a referencE to tr.e 
problem causing the hold will be ooted; IDR Number, Dena: ,(;fI 
Number, etc.), (c) at the start and completion of SeG.c:.e,.cec­
(d) at inteFvals of 5 minutes as an object.ive, but not 
more than 15 minutes between SUb-sequences. (:if the d~n,t:i.l'\r. 
of a sub-s~~uence does not exceed 5 minut.es, t.he time nee~ 
only be recorded once for that particular sub-se~ue~ce_ 
The date is not required for this item). 
NOTE: (1) Additional time recording may be necessary f,)r 
critical points in the OCP. The above ,:;~;n,: re:­
quirements are to be considered as minimwr•• 
- ­ - ­ -.­ - - - ­ - - - ­ - - - ­ - - - - - - - ­ - - ­ - - - ­ - ­ - - - ­
Revision: Remove and destroy P&[pS 7 and B ONLY of APOP 0-202, dated May 13, l~GG 
and replace with this page. Revised to incorporate the Functiona';" 
Inspection Stamp. ¢ denotes changes. 
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(:?) 	 I'll, '1·3.1.10 will be inc:;'wicG. w~ \;t; \:'i:.,' 
fi rGt. and last time entry durir.r, cucn 
24-hollr period and at t,he cnri c' n.t: Oi~P. 
6.5.2 	 All neviation cl,~ric~ on r.he QuaEty Control buy-o:':~ r0,):, c,:' .;,., 
OCP will be verU'C;!d by t.he re~pol~sible NAA in:::pccto;' r.rr:x~;,L. 
the double stamp and dat.,' :vi,'u(Cent t,o the ent,ry. 
6.5.3 	 If an DCP is to I,' reru:'." a 'l"w'oPY of the DC? wE: 'V; "'':;'.:<1. 
"Inspection Copy" will ep i:li1:Cred on the front (cOVCl' 0:' t,i •. 
OCP along with t.!, not,at.ior "Rut. Number 2" and autl~orHy. 
6.5.3.1 	 Sequenc. renms will be indicated'by the l,otat.10r. 
Run #? ,r R1ln #~, etc. as applicable, entcrr.d on :; ,,_ 
upper r', 'ht pon i.e n of the page. 
6.5.3.2 	 As deem',' practi'''_.ble, use one of the followir.c ~~";t.:-",,,~ 
for doc' ,·n('nt.at., ion of sec;,uencc rerun::; and fof' ,.n·, ";;':. 
time Lrl" Ived: (a) File duplicate DCP pau::s ir. .)C'? 
indicat·, reruI: aG in paragraph 6.5.3.1, and proccr:n ;:. 
the norn"l m!.l.1,n,'r: (b) File a rerun timE r'2'~Or(j 
adjacen' to t,he DCP pa.e;e being rerun, indicate rtI.. :, 
as in P:tr~raph h.5.3.1, and log time as indicat,'.; 
on the :"'run tin',: record. (Indicate accep'La;,ce 0;' 
each re"\ln sAquence on t,he OCP page). 
6.5.4 	 When an OCP is dscontinued before completion th~ NAA 
Inspector will 
6.5.4.1 	 Enter" I i scontinlil~d" and reason for di [icontinuaL'~C' 
after tlr: last em',ry, and double stamp and ciatc l)c;w&.t.i; 
the entry. 
6.5.4.2 	 When a' liscontilluI'd test is resumed, the NAA 7PE cU,,; 
NASA ST(~ will he :responsible for determinin,; ii" ':;'cp 
at whir, tcstinr; ::;hould resume; howcver, all In',cr~m 
Discrep; iCY Rerbrds and/or Discrepancy Record::; W.l~ ';, 
will rc nain open 'l{';ains t. the previous run arc va::' {I 
until c1 i ;;position'~d and satisfied. 
6.6 	 OCP Test Summary Sheet 
After each OCP Test, the NAA TPE or his designated 111ternate will })rcI' ,,'" 
a Test 	Summary Sheet (signed hy the NASA counterpart engineer) providi:".t: 
the information'listed below. 
.. 
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NOTE: 	 Test Summar i f'I; f<'!' illV' !"Ill/fl :;v;;1..'tn;l ,'::I,~;',; 11 I" !""';'Hrc<i ~'or 
individual sj'/;tems by fi,VstemG'c;nl~ill"'I'J"I~ :<1'" vlill ,.f [ipproved 
by the TPE 11.1 d STC. 
6.6.1 	 Summary of me,ior problem indicating: 
6.6.1.1 Corre~tive action 
6.6.1.2 TimE of occurrence 
6.6.1.3 Sequence 
6.6.1.4 App] j cable TPS "s and IDR I s 
6.6.2 	 Summary of rE'-runs necessary to accomplish a given seG,uence of 
test successfuUy. 
6.6.3 	 A listing of all IDR's that are transferred but not closed. 
6.6.4 	 Bar Chart to jlldicate the actual order in which testing was 
accomplished. includi tic; actual test time. 
6.7 OCP Acceptance Cri t(J' i.a 
Following the compl( j,ion of each OCP, NASA/NAA Inspection will close 
out the record copy OCP after all of the ~ollowing steps have been 
completed by stampil (; each :ium:nary Sheet and by signature on the 
last Summary Sheet. 
6.7.1 	 The checkllst PIRR forms have been recapped for subseG,uent tests 
or operationf'. 
6.7.2 	 Sequences in t.he OCP have been verified as complete. 
6.7.3 	 DeViations heve been recorded and approved per Paragraph 6.2. 
6.7.4 	 OCP Test Date Summary Sheets have been completed and signed by 
NASA/NAA. 
6.7.5 	 Test Summary Sheets have been completed and approved. 
6.7.6 	 The Bar Chart has been completed in accordance with Paragraph 
6.6.4 above. 
6.7.7 IDR's that hbve been assigned to CSM or GSE categories are 
either closed out or speci~ically dispositioned to: 
6.7.7.1 Elirrinate restraint on the next scheduled test. 
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RefleCT, tnE: sutsequern, test whicb w.dl be restrai!.ed. 
Retest reqHi '·':.",nts following any p;",nned r'",work to 
insure system re",diness. 
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NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. 
tll"ACK.md INfo'ORMATION SYSTEMR DIVIf;ION 
IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTION 
NO. 12-5 
OATil 27 	Jan1s.66THE FLORIDA 	 FACILITY 
(a) 	 Florida Facilit: Implerr,(·nt.ing Instruction 12-1, "Florid!.. Facility 
Safety Program" 
(b) 	 Operations Sy:;t"ms Sufet.y Notice 1-65. dated 21 July 1965 
~~~ Apollo Document t ion #2 (r:i\S/\ IMf,C) 
Operations Syst.·m Saret.', I:anobnc,k 

(e) 	 S&ID Policy E-4;'1, "CrC'w (U<11 ification and Environmental 
Readiness for C 'i t.le·a: 'J',,~·t,," 
(f) 	 S&rD Policy E-4'" "Empl ",\ eE' QUI~l i fication/Certification 
for Cri tical Joi As!,j I'llm'?nts" 
SUBJECT: 	 Safety Criteria for i.polle, Command & Service Module and Saturn S-II 
Operations. 
1. PURPOSE 
This procedure identifies cel'Lain opu'ational areas that shall be conSluerea 
hU:'.ardous or criticaL It e:;tablishes requirements to insure that all such 
administrative procedures, t"st procedures, work processes, methods, wor~ 
authorizations and correctiv' action dc,curnents are reviewed to insure the 
inclusion of the necessary sl.fety cri tE·ria. 
2. ~ 
The requirements establi shed in thi s procedure are appli cable to all prograrr,s 
at the S&ID Florida Facility ·J.nd will be implemented as appropriate by ali 
operational activities. 
3. GENERAL 
3.1 	 The following categoric; c.f Apol1c Command & Service Module and SatuT[. 
S-11 operations are des' I;nated critical. These operations wiLL rcc;.u:ru 
specific safety reviews1.nd mun include certain specific requiremer,ts 
in preparation of proce1mres and related documents. 
3.1.] 	 Ordnnnce S"y'st'>Jn;- any operation involving the handling, tral~cpc,rt.. 
i 1);;l,a llat i ('II an, checkout of live ordnance devices. Also ar.y 
op<'l'at ion or (~h" ·ckout of an ordnance system after live ordnance 
items have bC"fl install€'d. 
3.1.2 	 Propellants - ;,IIY operation involving the loading, downloading, 
or system activ:.t.ion wi th .operat.ing propellants. 
3.1.3 	 Cyrogenics - an: operation involving the loading an~/or down­
loading of the ·st. vehir.le and system activation with cyrc'i'/'r.ics. 
3.1.4 	 Environmental 7- - any envir0nmenta:i. tests conduct.ed in un 
enviroOlT,ental c; ',.;r,'?r combustible Gases or fl uids ",re be): .. , 
utilized in tl1f' 'cst vf"'lit;le, or when an altitude chamber is at 
altitude with p. ,'S0lln{'j ll. the chamber or vehicJ.c. 
'New 'Procedure - - - - - - - - - ­
I . I '" PonD 	 IJN-B-t New '-63 
ENCLOSURE 13-14 
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3.1.5 	 Hi-Energy Potential Sys1',ms - operations desir;nated by the 
Systems Sarety Engineer involvine the operations of pressure 
systems or operation of gaseous systems utilizing tanks or 
reservoirs. 
3.1.6 	 Handlin,,; Operations - ary operatic.n involving the liftine, 
hoist i nl?, loading or trl' nsportillf', of an pnd item flight vehicle 
and such ,L;]('r itmes as may be specificially designated by 
the Syst'~mf; S"fety Enr,il ,'er. 
3.2 	 All safety requirements will be considered in 1,;"IP preparation of all 
test procedures and work author: :'.'ltion d(;clunents: Operational Checkout 
Procedures (OCp) , Detailed Opera I ; 11/\ Prorf'dures (DOP) , Detailed 
Installation Procedures (DIP), General Or"ratinr, Procedures (GOP), 
General Work Orders (GWO), Test 1 " I' r:ltjr," Sh",pj,S{TPS}, and Discrepancy 
Records (DR). Safety require'llch:,,, wj 11 a .lilt> be (,onsidered in revis),ons 
to OCP's, DOP's, DIP's, and GOP';" 'l'h,' ('no;lnaLc,r will coordini1le test 
l'rl'cedures (OCP's, DIP's, DO]" GOP':;) ',:;lh lhe Floridr.. FacilityIIld 
Safety Office and affix his si;,,:,',ll'( 1" UP Florid, Facility "Safety 
Office Sign-off S~," ',ement" (fH, :ard) I'rlor to publication. 
3.3 	 The responsible s:;(;1.cms engineel 'Alll c0oI"(linatr: with the Florida 
Facility Safet;: Of~'lce for all ".;:" procedures (OCP's, DOP's, DIP's, 
and GOP's) for operations that lave beer. desir;nated as critical. 
3.4 	 Safety, cnecklists will be used ; II Ihe preparation of test procedures 
(OCP's, DIP's, DOP's, GOP's) an(' '.•(,rk authorization documents (TPS's, 
DR's and CiWO's). Safety checld ,;;L:; will also be used in conducting 
the pre-operation review descrit e,i .in l':"I'U ~raph 4.1, These checkl:sts 
will be developed by the Florid" Facil i 1.:i S:.fc'.y Office in coordination 
wi th representatives from Operat ions, Quali t,'f Assurance, Project Engin­
eering and KSC Safety. 
3.5 	 The Florida Facility Safety Offjce will submit safety reports in accor­
dance with Reference (a). 
It is the responsibility of supfrV1Slon to ensure that all personnel 
are certifie~ or qualified to perform assigned tasks in accor.dance with 
References {e} and (f). 
4. INSTRUCTIONS 
4.1 	 Any test procedure which involvm any of tit.' critical conditions describea 
in paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.() will be desir;nated on the front page us 
follows: "This test procedure jr. a critical operation". 
4.2 	 When a test procedure has been d(,signated as "critical", cautions and 
warninGS "imll be used as necessary and precede critical steps. This will 
ensure t'lflt the instruction is received prior to actual need. The words 
CAUTION U/)(i WARNING shall be centered on the page. 
0-13-88 

Subj: Safety Criteria for Apo]l) CSM & Srl;llrli :;-[1 Operations f~G, ~,~:-') 

Date: 27 January 1966 P:"'i~C 3 

4.2.1 	 CAtrrION: Used ,lrior to un,/ operation that could result in 
damage to equlp:1ent if not followed. 
Example: 	 CAtrrION 
If CII-075 r,a.ge PG12 exceeds 170 PSIG 
repor'; condi tioll to test conductor. 
4.2.2 	 WARNING: Used lrior to any operation that could result in 
in,jury or death '0 personllel if not followed. 
Example: 	 WARNING 
HiC;h pres:;ure gas will now be in 
line~ GJ)I017793 and G14-17798. 
4.3 	 The Operations Departme .t will l'E respon:;ible for informing the Safety 
Office of any simulta~(' JUS openltjoll t,) he performed in the same area 
as a critical operati.)I1, 
4.4 	 Emergency shutdown pr0C ':lures for all equipment will be inclulled in 
all test procedures. 
4.5 	 Applicable KSC and riM ::, fcty d1 rt'ctives will be referenced <lod complied 
with or waivers obtai~el prior to commencing the test to ensure .:;afe 
operations. 
4.6 	 It is the responsibil i t,' of tJj(' T"st Project Engi neer to brief all per­
sonnel involved in the ,I st, }'r~0)' to partiCipation, on all cautions anrl 
warni ngs contai ned wi th ,:, th,' p)"'cedure. 
4.7 	 Before each test desigtllted a;; ,'~'tical, the responsibl, :,:rL"m;:; or 
test engineer will coorj wt a ;,:,fc1.y review of the 0pccrltLi,." './: l.h a'i i 
test team members. Thow present to include not only p"rl;)unl~c:, actual!:r 
engaged in the operatio) but alno rlny others that may be required, 
depending upon the natu'" of the operation (Project Engineer, Safety, 
Quality Assurance, NASA Repn~sentatives, etc.). The review shall consis;; 
of a "talk through" of ,.he operation, a "walk through" inspection of the 
area, and a dry run of ;he operation by the personnel involved. 
For the 	General Manager 
Assistant General Manager 
Florida Facility 
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LIST OF REFERENCES 
The following documents, referenced in the Ground Emergency Provisions Panel Report, are con· 
tained in the AS - 204 Review Board permanent fi Ie: 
REFERENCE 
13- 1 	 The Apollo Crew Abbreviated Checklist SM 2A.03.SCOl21CL, dated 23 
January 1967. 
13· 2 	 The Apollo Operations Handbook, SM 2A·03.SC012, dated 12 November 1966, 
revi sed 30 November 1966. 
13· 3 	 The Apollo Flight Crew Hazardous Egress Procedures Manual, dated 1 
November 1966, revised 7 November 1966. 
13· 4 	 Operational Checkout Procedure, OCP FO-K·021.S/COl2114, dated 13 
December 1966, revised 24 January 1967. 
13- 5 	 Launch Vehicle Test Procedure 1·20015·SA 204, dated 18 January 1967, 
revised 23 January·1967. 
13·6 	 Space Vehicle Test Procedure '.41001-204, dated 12 January 1967, 
revi sed 23 January 1967. 
13· 7 	 KSC Management Instruction, KMI 1710.1, dated October 4, 1966, defining 

KSC Safety Program. 

ENCLOSURE 13-15 

D·13-91 

This page left blank intentionally. 
0-13-92 
REPORT OF PANEL 14 
SECURITY OF OPERATIONS 

APPENDIX D-14 

TO FINAL REPORT OF 

APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

D- 14 - 1 


SECURITY OF OPERATIONS 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Security of Operations Panel, 14. The task assigll­
ment by Panel 14 was preScribed as follows: 
This group shall review existing security practices for adequacy. This includes such things as 
access control, personnel sign-in requirements, buddy systems, background investigation require­
ments, etc. They shall also make responsible recommendations to the Board on changes to existing 
practices. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Security of Operations Panel: 
Mr. Charles L. Buckley, Jr., Chairman, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA• 
Mr. WilliamJ. Horner, Jr., Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA " 
Mr. Charles A. Buckel, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. Howard G. Maines, Headquarters, NASA 
Mr. S. Drake Ellis, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), NASA 
Mr. Robert W. Gaines, Lewis Research Center (LeRC), NASA 
Lt. Co!. William Dugan, U. S. Air Force 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Colonel Charles F. Strang, U. S. Air Force, Board Member, was assigned to monitor the Security 
of Operations Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. In response to the Board directive of February 1, 1967, the Panels' task was outlined in detail, as 
follows: 
a. Conduct review of physical security practices at Kennedy Space Center and other appropriate 
locations supporting the mission. This review would include, but would not be limited to, the 
following: 
(1) Launch Complex, including blockhouse, pad, and white room, access control system before 
and during the accident. 
(2) Sign·in procedures which were in effect for persons having access to various critical loca­
tions during the pre-accident time period. 
(3) Escort requirements that were in effect at the Launch Complex. 
b. Examine the efforts of participating NASA management and security organizations aimed toward 
assuring the integrity and reliability of persons having critical access to key locations prior to and 
during the mission period. 
2. The Panel prepared a tentative detailed schedule/agenda and established milestones for the Security 
Panel's deliberations and activities. 
3. The Panel accumulated pertinent background data, such as guard orders, access lists, samples of 
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badges, back-ground documentation, etc., for use by the Panel upon its initial convening. 
4. Attended to necessary security administrative duties in support of the Board and other Panels. These 
reviews were conducted during the course of the Panel deliberations, reviews, analyses and interviews 
aimed toward determining whether a security-related factor caused or contributed to the accident. 
5. A concurrent and detailed analysis of the general security posture prior to and at the time of the 
accident was accomplished. The plans for subsequent operations and tests were also reviewed. 
6. The entire Panel visited Launch Complex 34 (LC 34) area for direct observation of security posts, 
including observation of the eighth adjustable level of the service structure, white room, and spacecraft. 
7. Interviews and discussions were conducted with representatives of supervisory and operational elements 
of the KSC Security Office and uniformed security (guard) forces to establish: 
a. The responsibility for (1) establishing security principles and guidelines and (2) monitoring im­
plementation. 
b. The responsibility for implementation of principles and guidelines. 
c. The effectiveness of the management, structural, and communications relationships between the 
KSC Security Office and the implementing organizations. 
8. An analysis was conducted of the various principles and guidelines designed to provide physical • 
security and personnel access control involved in Apollo missions and their implementation by the 
uniformed security forces. 
9. Reviewed and discussed the KSC and Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) regulations concerning 
the "controlled area" personnel access concept at Cape Kennedy Air Force Station. Analyzed and dis­
cussed the North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA) instruction concerning the "controlled area" concept . 
. 10. Interviewed the KSC Security Office representative concerning the concept and function of the access 
controls provided through use of the Apollo/Saturn Operations Area Permit and the mechanics of 
implementing the "controlled area" concept at LC 34. 
11. Reviewed security post requirements, post orders, badge and access control systems for the arrival 
and movement of flight hardware at Cape Kennedy and KSC; the KSC Industrial Area locations, the 
Astronaut Quarters and Suiting Room at KSC; the Astronaut Van; and LC locations such as the main 
gate, the blockhouse, and various work levels of the Space Vehicle at the pad. 
12. The NASA representative in charge of the Astronaut Support Office at KSC (Astronaut Quarters, 
Suiting Room, etc.) was interviewed concerning access controls; control of the Astronaut Van; purchase, 
handling and preparation of astronauts' food (non· flight); occupational health examinations of Support 
Office personnel (e .g. maids, cooks, stewards, etc.): kitchen and dining facilities; and the investigative 
program concerning the Support Office personnel and the information resulting therefrom. 
.. 
13. The Panel: 
a. Analyzed the NASA/NAA Apollo Prelaunch Operations Procedures concerning aecess control of 
test and work areas. 
b. Interviewed the NASA Apollo 204 Test Supervisor concerning physical security and personnel 
access controls at LC 34. 
c. Interviewed the NAA pad leaders concerning the NAA system of administrative access control 
of personnel to the service structure spacecraft work areas, including the white room and Command 
Modul~. 
d. Reviewed the Command Module Ingress/Egress Log maintained by NAA personnel. 
e. Interviews, analyses, and reviews conducted by the Panel (it should be noted that Panel 6 
is also conducting an inquiry in this area) reflected that: 
(1) In some cases, individuals over whom the contractor had not exercised access control gained 
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entry to the spacecraft areas on the fifth, sixth, and seventh adjustable levels; 
(2) No "off shift" log exists; 
(3) The Command Module Ingress/Egress Log in some cases failed to reflect: 
(a) the names of all individuals who entered the Command Module; 
(b) whether or not equipment or tools were taken into the Command Module; 
(c) that all equipment or tools were taken out or otherwise disposed of; 
(d) the time individuals ingressed and/or egressed the Command Module; 
(e) the authorization basis for individuals entering the Command Module; 
(f) sufficiently legible writing to determine the identity of individuals entering the spacecraft. 
14. An analysis was conducted of the investigative program which formed the basis for access to LC 34. 
A similar analysis was conducted of the system in effect at the Mission Control Center/Houston. An 
inquiry was conducted to verify the clearance and investigative status of a representative sampling of 
all persons who were at selected locations on the Launch Complex, in the Command Module, on the 
eighth adjustable work level of the service structure, etc., prior to the accident. The Panel analyzed 
the benefits which can reasonably be expected to result from measures suggested in a letter of Decem­
ber 30, 1966, from NASA Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) to selected Apollo contractors, 
emphasizing the need to be exceedingly selective in the placement of reliable and trustworthy persons 
at the launch facility during the critical period immediately prior to launch. The analyses reflected the 
degree to which a prior standard National Agency Check (NAC) investigation was a reasOnaole pre­
caution in controlling unescorted access to the Launch Complex. In most cases, the standard NAC 
relied upon was the one which had been conducted in the processing of the individual's industrial 
security clearance for access to classified information. In these cases, the results of the NAC were not 
furnished to NASA. The last Government-conducted NAC Investigation relied upon for access varied 
from being current to in excess of ten years old. A sampling of such NAC's on individuals at LC 34 
on the day of the accident established that a standard NAC is apparently not designed to include a 
check of pertinent files of all appropriate Federal agencies. These agency files contain information, some 
of which would be relevant in evaluating individual trustworthiness and reliability. 
15. Reviewed and analyzed the uniformed security force's General guard orders. 
16. Interviewed PAA Security policemen who performed security post duties at LC 34 to establish the 
individual officer's comprehension and understanding of his responsibilities, and the extent to which 
actual performance matched assigned duties. Interviewed supervisory and patrolmen personnel concern­
ing their actions on the day of the accident. 
17. Reviewed disciplinary action cases concerning uniformed security personnel resulting from minor 
instances of noncompliance with their security post responsibilities at LC 34 in order to establish the 
degree of discipline at the Launch Complex. 
18. Representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were interviewed concerning their prior in­
vestigations of various types of incidents (thefts, fraud, malicious damage to Government property) at 
Cape Kennedy and KSC with emphasis on LC 34. They were also interviewed regarding their par­
ticipation in the activities at LC 34 immediately following the accident. 
19. The Panel reviewed all statements taken by the Witness Panel for any items having a security 
implication. 
20. An analysis was conducted of pertinent incident reports and daily log sheets (prior to and at the 
time of the accident) maintained by the KSC Patrol and the PAA Security Police. 
21. Reviewed and discussed the NASA Headquarters Apollo Mission Failure Contingency Plan, and the 
KSC Apollo/Saturn 1B Failure Investigation Plan. 
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22. Discussed approaches to personnel security investigative program to be used in future Apollo missions. 
D. FINDING AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING 
a. The KSC Security Office: . 
(1) Developed security principles and guidelines, concept for badge, access control systems, and 
security post requirements, and furnished them to the uniformed security forces. 
(2) Provided technical direction to the· uniformed security forces and published physical and 
personnel security regulations, instructions, and notices. 
(3) Developed security procedures for each Apollo mission and issued a security plan setting 
forth prelaunch, 	test, and launch security requirements . 

. (4) Periodically inspected the uniformed security forces. 

(5) Frequently surveyed the field and security post operations of the uniformed security forces. 
b. By contract, the uniformed security forces (PAA Security Police at Cape Kennedy, and the KSC 
Patrol at Kennedy Space Center) were responsible for the implementation of established security 
principles and guidelines. 
DETERMINATION 
The KSC Security Office adequately established security principles and guidelines and effectively 
. monitored implementation of same. Uniformed security forces properly implement<:'tl these principles 
and guidelines. The KSC Security Office, in a timely fashion, effectively emphasized with the uniformed 
security forces, the importance of the forthcoming Apollo manned missions. 
2. FINDING 
Current written orders were in existence for all established security posts related to the AS-2M 
mission. The orders were furnished to uniformed security forces in a timely manner. The interviews 
and analysis of pertinent records revealed no significant instances reflecting a failure by uniformed 
security personnel to comply with their post orders. 
DETERMINATION 
Uniformed supervisory security personnel were knowledgeable concerning their responsibilities. Uni­
formed security policemen understood their duties and performed satisfactorily. Operational security 
requirements placed on PAA were timely and adequate. Security post orders were realistic and adequate. 
3. FINDING 
KSC Security personnel and/or uniformed security personnel were assigned to all locations reqUlrmg 
safeguarding measures, including Launch Vehicle stages and spacecraft from the time of arrival at KSC 
to time of the accident. 
DETERMINATION 
The number of KSC Security personnel and uniformed security personnel utilized was adequate. 
4. FINDING 
Apollo Preflight Operations Procedures (APOP) 0-201, dated October 17, 1966, and January 24, 
1967, concerning access control of test and work areas, required that: (1) access controls to spacecraft 
work areas be exercised by the contractor; (2) the contractor maintain a log of all personnel permitted 
access during "off-shift" /non-work periods; (3) the contractor control Command Module ingress-egress, 
and maintain a log concerning same. 
DETERMINATION 
The procedures established in the APOP were not followed in that: (1) the contractor failed to 
exercise adequate access controls on the fifth, sixth, and seventh spacecraft levels; (2) the contractor 
failed to maintain an "off-shift" log; (3) the Command Module ingress/egress log was inadequately 
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maintained. 
5. FINDING 
The investigative program, which was used as the basis for authorizing access to LC 34, consisted 
of a determination that a National Agency Check (NAC) investigation had been conducted on each Gov­
ernment or contractor employee. In the absence of a NAC, an escort was required. (Similar provisions 
existed at the Mission Control Center /Houston.) 
DETERMINATION 
This practice provides inadequate support for the objective of NASA management that great care be 
taken to assign reliable and trustworthy persons to perform critical work during mission periods. 
6. FINDING 
a. Access to the Astronaut Quarters and the Suiting Room was limited by an access list attached 
to the Security Post Orders, to those few people having an official reason to be there, i.e., astro­
nauts, biomedical people, suit technicians, etc. Compliance with this procedure was enforced by 
KSC uniformed security patrolmen. The Van used to transport the astronauts from their Quarters 
to the Launch Complex was inspected, driven, and remained under the control of KSC Security 
personnel when astronaut activity was involved. Uniformed security personnel escorted the Van when 
astronauts were being transported. 
b. The purchase, handling, and delivery of the astronauts' food (non-flight) served in their Quarters 
is processed through the contractor's routine channels. 
c. Only the results of an NAC are available to NASA management in their evaluation of the re­
liability and trustworthiness of support personnel in the Astronaut Quarters. 
DETERMINATION 
The personnel access controls for the Astronaut Quarters, the Suiting Room, and the Van were 
adequate. 
Inadequate safeguards are provided concerning the purchase, handling, and delivery of astronauts' 
food (non-flight), notwithstanding the fact that it is known by persons coming in contact with it that 
it is to be consumed by the astronauts. 
NASA management has insufficient knowledge to fully evaluate the reliability and trustworthiness 
of support personnel in the Astronaut Quarters. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
-- REFERENCES 
The following is an enumeration of referenced materials (which are not included as part of this 
report), copies of which have been submitted to the Board. 
14-1 Panel Preliminary Report Number 1, February 1, 1967 

14-2 Panel Preliminary Report Number 2, February 4, 1967 

14-3 Summary Panel Report, February 9, 1967 

14-4 Preliminary Panel Analysis Summary Report, February 16, 1967 

14-5 Summary of Panel Interview - Buckley 

14-6 Signed Statement - Buckley 

14-7 Summary of Panel Interview - Morford 

14-8 Statement of Chief Merrill 

14-9 Gemini 12 Security Plan, October 14, 1966 

14-10 AS-201 Security Plan, December 14, 1965 
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14·11 
14·12 
14·13 
14·14 
14·15 
14·16 
14·17 
14·18 
14·19 
14·20 
14·21 
14·22 
14·23 
14·24 
14·25 
14·26 
14·27 
14·28 
14·29 
14·30 
14·31 
14·32 
14-33 
14-34 
14-35 
14-36 
14-37 
14·38 
14·39 
14-40 
14·41 
14·42 
14·43 
14-44 
14·45 
14-46 
14-47 
14-48 
14-49 
14-50 
14·51 
14-52 
14-53 
14-54 
14·55 
14·56 
14-57 
14·58 
14·59 
14-60 
14-61 
14-62 
14·63 
14-64 
Apollo Launch Operations Committee Meeting Minutes, September 20, 1966 
Proposed AS-204 Complex 34 Security Controls 
Apollo Launch Operations Committee Meeting Minutes, November 1, 1966 
Proposed Security Controls for Complex 34 for AS·204 
Summary of Interview - Evans 
Summary of Interview· Matthews 
Summary of Interview - Tatham 
Written Statement - Tatham 
Air Force Eastern Test Range Regulation 125·10 
Air Force Eastern Test Range Regulation 125·15 
Summary of Interview - Morford (No.2) 
Summary of Interview· Horner 
KSC Patrol Synopsis of Events 
APOP Number 0·201, October 17, 1~66 
APOP Number 0·201, January 24, 1967 
Summary of Interview· Buckel 
Offke of Manned Space Flight letter to Apollo Contractors 
.11­
Sumlliiiry of Interview Page 
Summary of J nterview - Babbitt 
Summary of Interview· Curatolo 
Sample Pages from Command Module Ingress/Egress Log 
Summary of Interview. Furgason 
Summary of Interview· Smith 
Summary of Interview· Tully 
Summary of Interview - Graham 
Summary of Interview - Friedlander 
Security Post Orders - Altitude Chamber 
Security Post Orders· Astronaut Quarters 
Security Post Orders· Astronaut Suit Room 
Security Post Orders - Complex 34 Main Gate 
Security Post Orders Complex 34 Rear Gate 
Security Post Orders - Complex 34, 1st Floor Blockhouse 
Security Post Orders· Complex 34, Blockhouse Stairwell 
Security Post Orders ·.Complex 34, 4th Levelj"IU" 
Security Post Orders - Complex 34, Roving Guard, 4th- 11th Adjustable 
S(,(":l ity Post Orders - Complex 34, Roving Guard 27 foot level/ Adjustable 3 
Security Post Orders· Complex 34, Hypergolic Area 
Statement/PAA Policeman - Allen 
Statement! PAA Policeman Bilbrey 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Brewer 
Statement/PAA Policeman Darnell 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Dasse/Lane 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Hayes, O. B. 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Hayes, R. E. 
Statement/PAA Policeman - Hayes, R. E. (No.2) 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Hennigan 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Nicholson 
Statement/PAA Policeman Riddle 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Smith 
Statement/PAA Policeman· Thomas 
PAA Security Police Blotter, January 25, 1967 
PAA Security Police Blotter Log, January ZI, 1967 
Security Section Summary 
Security Police General Post Instructions 
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14·65 Memorandum for Record· Disciplinary Actions, February 14, 1967 
14·66 APOP G·lOO, November 4, 1966 
14·67 NAA Implementing Instruction 4-4, july 13, 1966 
14·68 NAA FRT letter (Moore), December 22, 1966 
14·69 NAA FRT letter (Haight), December 22, 1966 
14·70 NASA Headquarters Apollo Mission Failure Contingency Plan 
14·71 KSC Management Instruction 1610.3 "Personnel Circulation Control and Identification", 
November 10, 1966 
14·72 Summary of Interview· Turner 
14· 73 Statement . Turner 
• 
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BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Board Administrative Procedures Panel, Panel 15. 
The task assigned for accomplishment by Panel 15 was prescribed as follows: 
This group shall establish and document administrative procedures for the Board to use. This 
includes activity such as procedures for the control of spacecraft work, logging and filing of ex­
hibits, maintenance of log of Board activities, scheduling of meetings, preparation of agenda for 
Board meetings, arrangements for secretarial services, reproduction of material, etc. 
B. 	 PANE L ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Board Administrative Pro­
cedures Panel: 

Mr. A. G. Griffin, Jr., Chairman, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 

Mr. G. A. Huffines, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 

Mr. W. D. Moody, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 

Mr. P. C. Reed, North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA), Florida Office 

2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. E. Barton Geer, Langley Research Center (LaRC), Board Member, was assigned to monitor 
the Board Administrative Procedures Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. APPROACH 
To accomplish the basic task of providing Board Administrative Procedures the following approach 
was developed: 
a. IDENTIFICATION: Specific areas requiring rigid controls, definitive methods, or policy guide­
lines to be controlled by the Review Board were identified. 
b. ASSIGNMENT: The responsibility for each procedure was assigned to a member of the Panel 
who assembled the pertinent information, prepared a draft procedure, coordinated with affected 
elements, and provided a finished procedure ready for implementation. 
c. SUBMISSION: The finished procedure was submitted through the cognizant Board Member 
to the Board Chairman for his signature. 
d. COORDINATION: Publication and distribution were accomplished through the Administrative 
.. and Secretarial Support Office . 
e. REVISION: Existing procedures were revised as required through the same steps as outlined 
above. 
2. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY 
Panel 15 performed the task of providing Board administrative procedures and subsequent revlsiOns 
as required. In addition, several other tasks were assigned which were performed by the Panel over 
and above the work statement. Periodic reports of progress were made to the Review Board through 
the Panel Coordination Committee and the cognizant Board member. Panel activities are discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
a. Twenty-five (25) Board administrative procedures were issued to cover all phases of the Review 
Board's activities. They were developed and processed in accordance with the planned approach 
discussed in paragraph 1 above. Periodic lists of the procedure titles and the current revision status 
were issued and distributed. Board administrative procedures are contained in Enclosure 15·1. 
b. The Administrative and Secretarial Support Office was established by Panel 15 in accordance 
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with Administrative Procedure 4. This support was provided on a two-shift, 7-day per week basis, 
unless otherwise required, with some third shift support. The support included secretarial services, 
arrangements for office space, furniture, office supplies, reproduction and graphics, mail service, 
and messenger service. 
c. The Photographic Data Control Center was established by Panel 15. Included were the devel­
opment of a grid system to correlate photographs with spacecraft area, the handling and dis· 
tribution of photographs, and the maintenance of a film library. The latter two areas were cov­
ered by Administrative Procedure 8. The negative and a print of all photographs are included in 
the Board's General File. The total grid plan uses the North American Aviation top assembly 
drawing VI4-000003 as a spacecraft base for developing the grid system. A set of photograph 
books are provided for each major grid area of the spacecraft Command Module and the Service 
. Module. 	 The appropriate individual spacecraft area grid plan is provided in the front section of 
each photograph book. Following is a breakdown of the major spacecraft areas which have been 
gridded and book sets provided. 
(1) For the Command Module interior: 
(a) Left Hand Equipment Bay 
(b) Lower Equipment Bay 
(c) Right Hand Equipment Bay 
(d) Couches 
(e) Aft Bulkhead (Floor) 
(f) Upper Bulkhead (At head of couches) 
(g) Main Display Console 
(2) For the Command Modu~e exterior: 
(a) Aft Girth Ring Area (Frames 1 through 24) 
(b) Top Deck 
(3) For the Service Module interior: 

Sectors 1 through 4 

(4) For the Service Module exterior: 
(a) Top Deck 
(b) Reaction Control System Quad Panels 
(c) Aft Area (Service Propulsion System Engine) 
(5) It was the policy that when any particular functional unit was removed from the space­
craft for further study a separate photograph book was established on that particular unit if war­
ranted by the number of additional photographs. Following is a list of removed units for which 
separate photograph books have been established. 
(a) Batteries 
(b) Cobra Cables and Octopus Cable 
(c) C02 Absorbers 
(d) Inverters 
(e) Environmental Control Unit 
(f) Engines (Command Module) (Pitch, Roll, Yaw) 
(g) Control Panels (Oxygen, Water) 
(h) Controllers (Rotational and Translational) 
(i) Floodlights 
(j) Hatches 
(6) Additional books on special subjects are as follows: 
(a) Lab Tests (Non-metallic Materials and Flammability) 
(b) Special Tests (Suits-Static Discharge) 
(c) Crew Mobility Test in Mockup 2 
(d) Heat Shields Removals 
(e) Spacecraft 012 Movement to Pyrotechnic Installation Building 
(7) Other books available for reference include: 
(a) Spacecraft 012 before fire 
(b) Spacecraft 014 interior 
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(c) Mockups (No.2 and Non-metallic Materials) 
(d) Set of documentary photograph books 
(8) A major part of the functional arrangement of the library reference and control system is 
based on the proper identification of each photograph. Each photograph is captioned on the re­
verse side and includes the negative number, date and time picture was made, any applicable 
Spacecraft Test Preparation Sheet Number, and a brief subject description. All photographs are 
identified as Apollo 204 Review Board Material. 
(9) The two key parts of the captions are the negative number and subject description. 
(a) The negative number allows all negatives and one set of prints to be filed numeri­
cally by the roll and frame number included as the last two parts of the three part negative 
number. All negative frame numbers are accounted for, including blank frames. 
(b) The subject description allows one set of photographs to be inserted in the approp­
riate photograph books through use ·of the spacecraft area grid plan. Within any particular 
subject area of a photograph book the photos are arranged in order of date and time. This 
allows review of subject configuration at any time since January 27, 1967. 
(10) Some photograph captions include the word "Stereo." This indicated that a stereo slide 
is available for review. All stereo slides are arranged numerically by negative roll number and 
frame number in identified storage trays. 
(11) The original reel and any prints of required motion pictures are arranged in file by sub­
ject description. Most of the motion pictures were for documentary purposes. 
(12) For control purposes a log book for the Review Board and each Panel was maintained 
to provide records of all photographs distributed from the library. Each log book includes the 
photograph negative number, the number of prints, the data and name of the person receiving 
the photographs for the Review Board or Panel. 
d. Panel 15 processed letters, telegrams, and telephone messages offering assistance, recommen­

dations, and comments relative to the Apollo 204 accident. All such correspondence was logged 

in a master log, and the author's name was placed in an alphabetical file. Material received was 

reviewed, and, where appropriate, copies were forwarded to other Panels and Board Members 

for such consideration as they might require. Replies were prepared for the signature of the Board 

Chairman to all correspondence which had not been previously acknowledged or which required 

an additional acknowledgement. The log and file of all correspondence processed are included in 

the Board's General File. 

e. Support was provided to the Review Board by periodically issuing approved schedules of work 

being performed as a part of the Review Board investigation. Information was collected, coor­

dinated, displayed, and, after approval, published for distribution. 

£. The Audio Magnetic Tape Library was established by Panel 15 in accordance with Adminis­

trative Procedure 22. It provided control of \{-inch voice transmission tape recordings relative to 

Spacecraft 012 during the Space Vehicle Plugs-Out Integrated Test January 27. 1967_A storage and 

playback capability in a centralized area was also established. At the conclusion of Board use. these 

tapes were filed with other reference data relative to the Apollo 204 investigation. 

g. Numerous memoranda and telephone calls were provided by Panel 15 to clarify or interpret 

Review Board administrative matters where required. 

D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
Not applicable. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
Enclosure 

15-1 Board Administrative Procedures 

D-15-5 

This page left blank intentionally. 
0-15-6 

APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 

No.IA 
No.2A 
No.3B 
No.4A 
No. 5C 
No.6 
No.7A 
No. 8 
No. 9 
No. lOA 
No. 11 
No. 12 
No.13A 
No. 14 
No. 15 
No. 16 
No. 17 
No. 18C 
No. 19A 
No.20A 
No. 21 
Access to the Review Board Meeting Room 
Access to Complex 34 
Access Control to Pyrotechnic Installation Building 
Apollo 204 Review Board Secretariat & Administrative Support 
Material testing in support of Apollo 204 Review 
Establishment of the Advisory/Group to the Apollo 204 Review Board 
Handling of Sensitive Material under the jurisdiction of the Apollo 204 Review Board 
Photo Support Service for the Apollo 204 Review Board 
Transcribing Apollo 204 Review Board Proceedings 
Control of Data and D{)(;uments 
Categaization and Control of AS 204 Material Required to Support the AS 204 Review 
Board 
Access to Apollo 204 Review Board Office 
Preparation of Apollo 204 Review Board Meeting Agenda 
Access to Spacecraft 012 
Official File for Apollo 204 Review Board 
Coordination Policy for Interviewing Witnesses 
Response to Offers of Assistance or Recommendation 
Use and Control of Task Preparation Sheets (TPS) 
Establishment of the Panel Coordination Committee 
Establishment of Apollo 204 Review Board Panels 
Access Control to Service Module Disassembly Area 
ENCLOSURE 15-1 
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No. 22 Control of Audio Magnetic Tapes 
No. 23 Disposition and Storage of Physical Evidence 
No. 24 Environmental Control System 
(ECS) Investigation 
No. 25 Continuation of Testing in 
Support of Apollo 204 Review 
after recess of Hoard 
/S/ A. G. Griffin, Jr. 
Chairman, Task Panel No. 15 
• 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 4, 1967 

Administrative Procedure Number 1, Revision A 
TITLE: 	 Access to the Review Board Meeting Room 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers access to the Mission Briefing Room, MSO Building, KSC, which 
is herein designated the Apollo 204 Review Board Meeting Room for the period of time 
that the Board shall require its use. 
POLICY: 	 1. Access to the Review Board Meeting Room shall be limited to the following per­
sonnel: 
a. 	 Board members (see attached list). 
b. 	 Advisory Group members (per access list). 
c. 	 Designated key personnel (per access list), 
.. 
d. 	 Security, communications, and administrative personnel. 
e. 	 Other personnel summoned or approved by designated individuals (designating 
officials noted by asterisk on access list). 
2. 	 Access will be controlled on a full time basis (24 hours per day) by a security 
monitor. 
3. 	 A log of all personnel not on the access list that are permitted entry will be main­
tained by the security monitor. 
PROCEDURES: 	 l. Personnel will enter and leave the Meeting Room via the main door on the north­
south hallway just east of the cafeteria. 
2. Personnel will clear through the security monitor prior to entering the inner 
Meeting Room door. 
a. Personnel on the access list will be issued an Apollo 204 Review 
Board badge withgreen stripes and may enter and leave the Meeting Room as re­
quired. Acquired visitors will be issued a temporary badge with yellow stripes 
and will be logged in and out at the security desk. 
b. Personnel providing security, communications, and administrative support will 
be issued a temporary Apollo 204 Review Board badge with yellow stripes and will 
be logged in and out at the security desk. 
3. The access list will be changed only by Mr. E. B. Geer or his designated 
representatives. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd Thompson, Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 2, 1967 

Administrative Procedure Number 2. Revision A 
TITLE: 	 Access to Complex 34 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers access to certain Complex 34 areas for the period of time re­
quired by the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
POLICY: 	 Access to the Service Structure. Umbilical Tower, A(iCS Room. and pad areas adjacent 
to the structure will be controlled by special security proceilures. 
PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: 
I. The service structure, umbilical tower, AGCS room and pad areas adjacent to the 
structure will be subject to a special security control as delineated in the paragraphs 
below. Access to these areas will be subject to the approval of the test supervisor. 
who. through NASA Security, will provide instructions to the security guards concern­
ing logging procedures and escort requirements. Entry into areas other than the space­
craft levels of the service structure will be provided to those NASA and contractor per­
sonnel who have a need justified through channels to the test supervisor. 
Access to service structure levels A· 5, A- 6, A· 7, and A· 8 will be authorized only 
by a Board Member, a Panel Chairman, R. A. Petrone, P. C. Donnelly, or G. F. Page. 
Any work on or photographs of the spacecraft must be authorized by a Board Member or 
a Panel Chairman. 
I. Responsibilities of Board Members and Panel Chairmen: Authorize, in writing, 
access to the spacecraft areas of the service structure for purpose of photographing the 
spacecraft, or performing any.work on the spacecraft. 
a. Authorize access to the spacecraft areas of the service structure for the purpose 
of photography or work only after revit'wing written authorization signed by a Board 
Member. 
b. Authorize access to the spacecraft areas of the service structure for normal main­
tenance or safety functions except for work of this nature on the spacecraft or its 
GSE. 
c. Authorize access to the other portions of the complex under special security con· 
troIs for wcrk of an essential nature. 
d. Provide the necessary instructions to the security guards so that all personnel 
admitted are propft'ly logged. 
e. Maintains a detailed log of all complex activities and personnel movements within 
the areas under special security control. 
f. Briefs personnel who have a need and authorization to enter the restricted areas 
as to hazards, restrictions and personal conduct. 
D-15-10 
4. Responsibilities of NAA Pad Leader: 
Maintains a control position on platform A· 8 of the service structure for the purpose 
of coordination of all activities on platforms A· 5, A· 6, A· 7, and A. 8 of the service 
structure. Also, he will maintain a log of these activities. He is advised by the Test 
Supervisor as to the mission of all visitors to these platforms 
5. Responsibilities of NASA Security and P AA Security: 
a. NASA Security is provide a Security Specialist to serve as an escort for photo· 
graphers and other visitors to serve as requirf'd. Another security specialist is 
provided to coordinate overall security matters. 
b. PAA will furnish seven (7) patrolemen to be stationed as follows: 
Post 1 S. E. Barricade 

Post 2 West Barricade 

Post 3 East Barricade 

Post 4 AGCS Room 

Pad Roving Patrol 

S. E. Base Leg 

Platform A· 8 

PAA will also furnish one patrol supervisor to inspect all posts and coordinate 
required changes to procedures. 
/S/ 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 6, 1967 
Administrative Procedure No.3, Revision A 
TITLE: 	 Access Control to Pyrotechnic Installation Building 
SCOPE: 	 This proce-dure covers access control to the bonded area ana Rilll 100 of the Pyrotech­
nic Installation Building, herein after abbreviated PIB, for span craft work during the 
period of time required by the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
POLICY: 1. Access to the PIB bonded area shall be hmited to the folluwing personnel: 
a, ~femlJers of Task Panel No.4, Disasse-mbly Panel (per acccs~ list). 
b. Board Members and designated key personnel (per aaess list). 
.. 
c. Other personnel requested and approved by designated individuals (designating 
officials noted by asterisk on access list). 
2. Access to the PIB bonded area will be controlled on a full time basis (24 hours per 
day) by a security monitor. 
3. A log of all personne-l not on the access list that are permitted entry into the PIB 
bonded area will be maintained by the security monitor. 
4. Access to PIB Room No. 106 shall be limited to the following personnel: 
a. Dr. G. Kelly 
b. Other personnel requested and approved by Dr. G. Kelly. 
5. Access to PIB Room No. 106 will be controlled at all times by Dr. G. Kelly who is 
sole custodian of the key. Full time security monitor is provided. 
PROCEDURES: 	1. Personnel will clear through the security monitor prior to entering the PIB bonded 
area. 
a. Personne-l on the access list will be issued a serialized PIB badge with 
blue stripes and may enter and leave the- PIB bonded area as required. 
b. Oth('r personnel requested and approved by the asterisked individuals on the 
list will be issued a temporary serialized PIB badge with black stripes 
and will be logged in and out by the security monitor. Such personnel will be 
escorted except for Government and North American Aviation personnel. 
2. Personnel will enter and leave the PIB bonded area via the outside door of room 103 
(see attached sketch). All other doors to the bonded area will be maintained in a locked 
condition except as required for equipment handling covered in paragraph 3. 
3. Equipment will be moved in and out of the PIB under the control of personnel on the 
list via the equipment door and located inside the PIB bonded area. 
D-15-14 
4. Personnel will not be permitted to enter PIB Room No. 106 except in the presence 
of and with the express permission of Dr. G. Kelly. 
5. Changes to the attached access list can be made only by ~fr. E. B. Geer or his 
designated representative. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Reviev' Hoard 
Attachments: Sketch of PIB 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

MARCH 8, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No.4, Revision A. 
TITLE: 	 Apollo 204 Review Board Secretarial and Administrative Support 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers the arrangements for providing secretarial and administrative 
support for the Apollo 204 Review Board and task panels. 
POLICY: 	 Secretarial support will be provided on a two-shift, sixteen hour per day basis (0800 to 
to midnight) near the Apollo 204 Review Board Meeting Room. (This support will be 
decreased to a one shift basis (0800 to 1630) when the workload is consistent with this 
period.) 
PROCEDURES: 1. Apollo 204 Review Board Members and members of the Board Advisory Group 
• 
will request secretarial and administrative support at Room No. 1805, MSO 
Building, telephone 867-5628/5611 . 
... 
2. Requests will be made to Mr. Dave Allen, the Administrative Officer in control of 
administrative and secretarial support, and in his absence, his designated representative. 
The requests will consist of notes, drafts, special instructions, tapes, letters and 
reports. Stenographic and dictograph capability will also be provided. 
3. The administrative officer will provide an estimate regarding completion time and will 
make whatever reasonable adjustments are necessary to meet deadlines. 
4. The administrative officer will notify the requester upon completion of the work. 
5. Other services that will be made available include arrangements for office space, 
furniture, office supplies, telephones, reproduction, graphic, mail and messenger 
services. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
MARCH 3, 1967 
Administrative Procedure No.5. Revision C 
TITLE: 	 Testing in Support of Apollo 204 Review 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure i& applicnble to all elements of the AS-204 Review Board which require 
testing and/or analysis of sub-systems, components. and sample materials removed from 
Spacecraft 012 in support of the AS-204 investigation. This procedure applies to Apollo 
204 material and components leaving the KSC area and testing which is required on-site. 
This procedure applies to Category A and B material as defined in Administrative Pro­
cedure No. 11. 
POLICY: 	 1. Task panel chairmen are responsible for initiating requests for testing required in 
their areas. The requests will be submitted in accordance with procedures as outlined 
•in the procedure section below. 
2. All proposed Spacecraft 012 hardware testing will be approved by the Apollo 204 
Board Chairman The Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman will decide on a caSt~ by <.:ase 
basis if a SIC 012 hardware test is to be performed at other sites such as a vendor plant. 
on-site at KSC. or both. 
3.. Wherever possible. two independent agencies will be required to perform analysis on 
sample materials. Whenever the quantity of material is insufficient to allow two tests, 
a single test may be conducted at KSC provided the test is witnessed by a representative 
of an independent agency. Examples of independent agencies available are: 
a. 	 U. S. Bureau of Mines 
b. 	 Air Force Materials Laboratory, 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 

c. 	 NASA facilities other than Kennedy Space Center 
4. Examp!es d sample materials which may require independent testing and/or analysis 
are protective equipment. fuel, lubricants. metals, non-metals. electrical components, 
fabrics. and gases. 
PROCEDURE: 	 Apollo 204 material procedure is shown in Attachment I 
/S/ 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 201 Review Board 
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TESTING IN SUPPORT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW 

ATTACHMENT 1 

MARCH 2, 1967 

PROCEDURE: 	 1. This procedure establishes the SIC 012 Equipment S< leening Committee and delin­
eates the Committee's authority. This procedure also estahlishes the system to be 
utilized in acquiring Board approval for the testing and analysis of all SIC 012 Category 
A&B equipment for both off-site and KSC testing. 
2. The Screening Committee shall consist of the following personnel: 
T. Sasseen Chairman (KSC) 
D. Mayhew (MSC) 
D. Levine (NAA) 
3. The committee is responsible for reviewing equipment removed from SIC 012 in the 
sub-system areas as listed in Appendix A and classifying such equipment as category 
A or B as defined in AS 204 Administrative Procedure No. II. For the purpose of this 
procedure, equipment which has evidence of external damage and could be the cause of 
the fire is specified as category A. Equipment which has evidence of minor fire damage 
and obviously does not appear to be the fire origin is specified as category B. 
4. The result of this screening activity will be the preparation of an equipment screen­
ing authorization form (appendix B)and a Material Release Record (MRR) by the appro­
priate subsystems engineer (as listed in appendix A) for committee approval. The MRR's 
will be submitted to the Review Board for ratification on a periodic basis. 
5. That equipment classified as Category B shall be sent to bondt"d storage after 
external photographs have been taken. 
6. That equipment classified as Category A shall be subjected to the follpwing actions: 
a. colored photos of burned or damaged area 
b. X-ray penetration of damaged area 
c. removal of external appendage if it will permit better visual examination 
d. recommend return of equipment to manufacturer by submittal of an Apollo Space­
craft Hardware Utilization Request (ASHUR) 
7. It should be emphasized that all hardware that has identified data glitches from the 
OCP 0021 shall be fully investigated. In addition. items of equipment that had pertinent 
open discrepant items shall also require full investigation. 
8. All hardware will remain in the bonded storage at the Pyrotechnic Installation Bldg. 
(PIB) unless specific instructions have been provided by an approved Apollo Spacecraft 
Hardware Utilization Request (ASHUR) authorizing off site testing for hardware being 
returned to the prime contractor, subcontractor, vendor, or other test agency. Testing 
accomplished on site (KSC) will continue to utilize a TPS in accordance with Adminis­
trative Procedure Number 18. 
D·15-19 
9. An ASHUR may be initiated by an Apollo 204 Panel Member but must have concur­
rency by the cognizant NAA & NASA subsystems engineer and must be approved by the 
Chairman of Panel 18 or his designated representative. Final approval by the Apollo 
204 Review Board is required. 
10. The ASHUR shall specify test requirements necessary to thoroughly analyze the 
system or component under investigation. The preparation of the test procedure shall 
be the responsibility of the prime contractor, subcontractor, or vendor in conjunction 
with the NASA and NAA subsystem engineer. All test procedures shall require an 
acceptance test, as was originally performed, to be conducted. Government and NAA 
inspectors are required to witness all testing of category A equipment at the vendor fa­
cility with an agent of the Board who is designated to supervise and witness all off-site 
testing. If the acceptance testing results show no change from previously recorded data, 
all testing will be discontinued, the data package updated, the results documented on 
the ASHUR answer sheet and the hardware, with all paperwork, returned to bonded 
storage at KSC. 
II. In the event an anomaly is discovered, a failure analysis shall be conducted to 
determine exact cause of anomaly and positively explain that it is a result of fire 
rather than cause. In accomplishing this: 
a. Justify, if possible, continuation of the acceptance testing; 
b. If the acceptance testing cannot be continued, satisfy requirement to (1) stop 
and test and (2) return, with the properly updated documentation, to bonded storage 
at KSC. 
If, during the process of investigation, the test procedure requires modification, the 
NASA and NAA subsystems engineers jointly have the authority to change this procedure 
provided the test requirements, as specified on the ASHUR, are still maintaine:l. Any 
test or procedural change which alters the ASHUR test requirements must be submitted, 
by a revision to the original ASHUR, to the Apollo 204 Board for approval. 
12. After completion of requested tests, test reports, as follows, are to be prepared by 
the test agency and signed by that agency, the cognizant NAA subsystem engineer and 
the NASA monitor: 
a. One report is to cover test and inspection findings associated with the origin 
and propagation of the fire, the physical and functional conditIOn of the equipment, 
and any unusual condition which may relate to one of the anomalies, discovered on 
SIC 012. Twenty (20) copies plus the original of this report are to be transmitted 
to the Apollo 204 Review Board by the NASA monitor within ten (10) days after the 
item is received by the supplier, subcontractor or independent test agency. 
b. The second report is to cover other findings such as design, quality and fire 
survivability information. Two copies of this report are to be sent to each 
cognizant NASA and NAA Subsystem Engineer and three copies are to be sent to the 
Panel 9 Chairman. The original will be sent to the Panel 17 Chairman. 
0·15·20 

---------------- ---
13. 	 ResponsibiHties: 
a. 	 Originator 
(l) Based on an approved MRR, complete ASHUR form in accordance with 
Appendix C. 
(2) 	 Obtain signatures of the appropriate NASA and NAA subsystems engineers. 
(3) 	 Forward to Panel 18 for approval. 
b. 	 Panel 18 
(l) 	 Approve or disapprove each ASHUR 
(2) Submit ASHUR to the Apollo 204 Review Board via the Panel Coordinating 
Committee for approval. 
(3) Maintain the Master file, status, and assure implementation of the require­
ments as specified on the ASHUR. 
(4) Forward Board approved ASHUR to the Action Control Center for transmittal 
to the prime contractor, subcontractor. or vendor. 
(5) Receive appropriate test data, reports, and related documentation and make 
available to the Apollo 204 Review Board as required. 
c. 	Action Control Center 
(I) Assure that the business and contractual interfaces between the government, 
prime contractor, subcontractor. and vendor are compatible. 
(2) 	 Assume responsibility for shipment logistics. 
(3) 	 Supervise the packaging. 
(4) Assure, in conjunction with the Apollo 204 Board and Panel 18, that the cou­
riers accompany the shipment in accordance with Appendix G. 
(5) 	 Assure that an ASHUR accompanies the hardware. 
(6) 	 Assure that a DO 1149 is executed. 
(7) Assure that test data, reports (Appendix 0) and related documentation is 
submitted to Panel 18 in a timely manner. 
(8) A log will be maintained for documenting each item shipped and for provid­
ing evidence that the shipped component was received by the supplier. 
d. 	 Couriers 

(See Appendix G) 
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e. Subsystems Engineers 
(I) Approve/disapprove all ASHUR's under his cognizance. 
(2) Reviews his hardware and screen into Category A or B. 
(3) Proposes and submits MRR to Screening Committee for approval. 
(4) Maintain status of all activities concerning hardware authorized for testing. 
14. Special attention to careful handling of all SIC 012 parts will be provided in the 
following manner: 
a. Parts will not be moved from one area to another within KSC without being 
accompanied by a NAA or NASA courier. 
b. A parts tag will be attached to each component and the reverse side of the tag 
will be stamped. "Apollo 204 Review Board Material." Each component will be 
"D" stamped. 
c. NAA/NASA Quality personnel will witness all packaging operations to insure 
good packaging and handling practices. Where special attention to packaging is 
required. NAA Engineering will be requested to provide special instructions. 
d. Prior to shipping, each package or container will be sealed and stamped by 
both NAA and NASA Inspection with words "NOT TO BE OPENED WITHOUT 
CONTRACTOR AND GOVERNMENT AGENCY INSPECTION WITNESS." All 
material shall also be accompanied by a representative (witness) appointed by 
the Board unless otherwise specified by the Board. A NAA or ACED or NASA 
Quality Control courier may be assigned to accompany each shipment to its des­
tination. 
e. The Local Government Inspection Agency shall provide continuous (24 hour) 
inspection coverage while the hardware is being tested and/or analyzed. 
f. Prior to shipping, NAA and NASA will notify the appropriate contractor and 
government agency Qualify Assurance representative at the destination of antici­
pated arrival of the parts. 
g. Each shipment will contain a copy of the updated acceptance Data Package, 
ASHUR, and DD-1I49 (shipping document). The courier accompanying the parts 
will hand-carry a copy of the DD·1149 for signature by the delegated contractor's 
representative upon receipt of the component. 
h. The properly negotiated DD·1149 master will be returned to the MSC Action 
center by the courier. 
i. Whenever possible. NASA aircraft or commercial aircraft will be chartered 
or reserved for shipment of these items to assure expeditious and safe handling. 
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SUBSYSTEM ENGINEERS 

Steering 
Communication 
Instrumentation 
Guidance & Navigation 
Stabilization & Control 
Environmental Control 
Electrical Power System 
Controls & Displays 
Sequential 
Reaction Control System 
Structures & Mechanical 
(Incl. LES) 
Secondary Propulsion System 
Earth Landing 
Crew Equipment 
Experiments 
Pyrotechnics 
SLA/Service Module 
(Panel 21) 
APPENDIX A 
MSC 
D. Mayhew 
L. Luse 
F. Rotramme I 
R. Gardner 
R. Burt 
F. Samonski 
R. Munford 
C. Creech 
D.Grimm 
G. Johnson 
R. Taueber 
P. Glynn 
N. Townsend 
R. West 
F. McAllister 
C. Vaughn 
W. Simmons 
W. Petynia 
KSC NAA 
T. Sasseen D. Levine 
T. Broughton G. Covington. III 
W. Glusing G. Covington, III 
J. Tadich ACED 
J. Stilley C. Conrad 
R. Hunnings M. Stelzreide 
M. Guidry L. Updegraff 
NONE C. Fischer 
M. Guidry R. Hartley 
R. Butterworth J. Montgomery 
H. Shoaf P. Hanifin 
R. Butterworth D. Levine 
H. Shoaf R. Hartley 
J. Thomas J. Montgomery 
J. Thomas G. Covington. III 
E. Timmons R. Hartley 
D. Carothers B. Haight 
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~.PP:::r~o I X B 
f.QUIPt-.ENT SCREENING AUTHORIZATlOtJ 
SUf:SYSTEM ____""SC..SI....-________ 
ITEN 
PIN xxxxxxxxp; 
SiN xxxx 
.lJSTlFICATlO;; Fua CATEGO:W e CLASSIf'lCATIOr. 
Reference TPS's XXX-XX·XX 
NASA KSC SUaSYSTEI" ilASA MSC SU3SYSTEM NAA SUBSYSTEM 
T. SASSEEN D. I1!WHF.~.J D. LEVINE 
FIRE PANEL ~IAB 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF ASHUR 
A. 	 ASHUR (MSC fORM 114&) 
Numbers correspond to the numbers shown on each block. 
I. 	 Spaclcraft Number. Insert the spacecraft number to which the request
applies (i.e., CSM 012 or 014). 
2. 	 SYstem(s) Affected. Indicate the spacecraft system(s) affected. 
3. ASHUR Numbsr. Identification number of the ASHUR will be filled in by Panel 18. 
The ASHUR shall be identified by a series of numbers which reflect spacecraft number. 
Those ASHUR's initiated on Spacecraft 012, Mission 204 shall be numbered consecutively 
from 012500 to 012999 or Spacecraft 014, i.e., 014500 to 014999. 
4. 	 eurpo:iI~. Specify the purpose of the ASHUR, Le., one of the following: 
a. 	 To investigate a suspect anomaly or malfunction. 
b. To insure that function or operation of the system or component was 
adequate for the mission. 
c. To initiate a test andlor analysis of a system or component in support of 
Apollo 204 Review Board investigation. 
d. 	 Other - specify. 
5. Justification. This space will be utilized for the concurrency, by signature, 
of the NASA Subsystem Engineer, the NAA Subsystem Engineer, and Panel #18. 
6. pescrlption. The Initiator of the ASHUR shall describe the test requirements, 
Inspect lon, ana I ys Is, and d I spos i t ion in deta i I. Sufficient deta iI shou Id be ind kated 
to convey exactly what is required. The description shall include, but not be limlted 
to, the follOWing, where applicable: 
a. 	 Specify conditions. 
b. 	 Instrumentation requirements, Including both spacecraft and GSE. 
c. 	 Environmental requirements. 
d. 	 Type or types of data required, i.e., magnetic tapes, strip charts, etc. 
e. 	 Input parameters to be varied and to what deqree. 
f. 	 Parameters to be measured. 
g. 	 Specify time reference if applicable. 
h. 	 Events to be simulated. 
i. Special test procedures or instructions (or supplemental instructions as 
requi red) • 
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2 
7. 10 Be Accompl ished By. Indicate which contractor or sp~cial facility is to 
accompl ish this test. Indicate where the test is to be accomplished or the disposition 
location. If a failure analysis is to be conducted, indicate where this is to be 
accomplished. If it is a location other than those listed specifically. check "Other" 
block and indicate by name on line provided to the right. It is recognized that some 
facilities are better equipped for disassembly and/or failure analysis than others. 
Each case must be assessed as it occurs as to where the analysis will be performed and 
the recommendations must be based on a thorough assessment of the best possible combina~ 
tion of disassembly and analysis capabil ities. Ihe spacecraft contractor and the vendor 
of the failed component should be consulted prior to determining the locations for the 
various phases of failure analysis. Regardless of where each phase of the failure 
analysis is performed, it is required that NASA. contractor, and the vendor be 
represen ted. 
8. Name of the individual assigned as the point of contact at the facil ity where 

the work is conducted. J. C. Campbell, PIB. ext. 3515. 3779; will be MSC/KSC contact. 

9. Disposition of hardware after requested action has been completed. 
10. Requested By. Insert signature of individual preparing the ASHUR and panel 
number. 
11. Not appl icable for purposes of this procedure. 
12. or 13. Signature of KSC/MSC action control authority is required. 
14. Iype of Action. Check the block which describes the type of action requested. 
There will be only one block checked for each ASHUR initiated. The testing block 
should have "Project X" typed by it. 
15. Sheet __ of __ • Indicate the sheet number and total number of sheets. 
B. ASHUR Continuatjon Sheet (MSC Form 1146A) 
Numbers correspond to numbers shown on sample continuation sheet. 
I. Spacecraft Number - same as paragraph A.I. 
2. System's) Affected - same as paragraph A.2. 
3. ASHUR Nymber ~ same as paragraph A.3. 
4. NAA IPS Number - Appropriate N8A IPS number(s) assigned to hardware designated, 
if appropr late. 
5. Not appl icable. 
G. Photograph Number - Applicable NASA photograph numbers, if known. 
7. Descriptiqn - Continuation of information detailed in the description of the 
ASHUR, MSC Form 1148, if required (see paragraph A.G.). In addition, the ASHUR continua­
tion sheet shall be used to document the summary results of the tests, inspection, or 
analysis. These results shall be documented as soon as they are known and shall constitute 
a summary of the results. If the results are final, a statement shall be made to that 
effect. i.e., "This ASHUR is considered closed." Care should be taken to assure this has 
been done prior to being submitted to Action Cont~ol. For example, if the intent of the 
ASHUR is to disposition hardware, the continuation sheet should reflect the action taken 
with reference to applicable shipping documents. Action Control will be responsible for 
assuring that all ASHUR's are answered and closed out, interfacing with the Integration 
Panel 18 and the Disassembly Panel 4, and the Board, as necessary. 
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; 
n, liignpturt. of ,'SHUR Contpct • Signaturp. of person whos" Mm~ ,~ppcars In Block a 
on l\5HUR. HSC ~orm 11 11:1, This sp:lec .,ill be u!ted ttl uocuII'cnt the contractor or teH 
administrator !tlgnaturc. In th'tt case, it will br> signed and dated by the contact 
at the facility wh(:r(; tht; in",:~;tl:l?tiC)n "las conduct::ti. Thl,> si!lnatur~ is not a valida­
t Ion of the tcs t resu 1ts, bit i'i an i I'd I ell t t.'>n of th" sourcr' of the i nforma t Ion and is 
accurAte documentation of th.: iniorm.')t Inn obtained via the ASHUR system, 
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6. Any area of 11 Lculty _dose during functional check 
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sh"lll be t!iin. •7. Upon comp lon of a sts and failure analysis, the 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
APPENDIX 0 
CONTRACTOR REPORT FORMAT RECOMMENDED FOR 
sic 012 REVIEW 
SUBJECT: Type of work, 	 location, systems and job No. 
RELATED DOCUMENTATION: 	 Include known failure reports, dis­
crepancy reports, deviations, etc., 
drawing numbers, pertinent specs,
and technical information. 
WITNESSES: 
1.0 	 Foreword 
1.1 	 Identify requestor, requestor organization, state 
general problem and when submitted. 
1.2 	 State analysis or evaluation requested. Detail in 
steps if required. 
1.3 	 Briefly cite known failure history and/or previous 
tests performed. 
1.4 	 Other pertinent items. 
2.0 	 Configuration Verification (Part Numbers, Drawing 
Numbers, Specification Numbers). 
Investigation Procedures (Dealing with device itself) 
Evaluation Procedures (Dealing with related materials) 
Analytical Procedures (Dealing with chemical analysis) 
Describe field examinations, samples taken, equ1p­
ment employed, consultations with< <outside personnel 
and other activities. Each distinct action shall 
be defined in a separate paragraph. 
3.0 	 Analytical Test and Results 
Describe results and relations between the various 
analytical tests. Correlation between chemical/physical
findings and problem being considered should be clar­
ified. 
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-ATTACHMENT 1 
Report Format (Continued Page 2) 
4.0 Conclusions 
Concise statements in a natural order based on investi­
gative 	and analytical procedures. If conclusions are 
assumptive in nature. so state and give reasoning for 
assumptions. In all cases provide a specific conclusion. 
5.0 Recommendations 
Should be applicable. constructive in nature and work­
able. Applicability to other Apollo hardware should 
be identified. 
Signaturt!s: Investigator: (Not above 
first level 
of Super­
vision For 
Board Inter­
rogation when 
necessary) . 
Concurrence: (Knowledgable
of All Steps
in Investiga­
tion) • 
Approval: 
Witnesses: 
~r;overnment 
Agency) 
~Contractor) 
NOTE: 	 APPENDICES AND PHOTOS SHOULD BE REFERENCED IN TEXT AND 
RELATED TO NARRATIVE TEXT. 
-------, 
" 
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APPENDIX E 
NATIONAL AEROMAUTICS AMO SPACE ADMINISTRATIOM 
APOLLO :104 REVIEW IOARD 
IN REPLY "EFER: TO 
COURIER INSTRUCTIONS 
The courier is appointed by the Apollo 204 ~eview Board to accompany 

the shipment of a specified piece of hardware to Its predetermined des­

tination as outlined in the Administrative Procedure 5 and revisions 

thereto. 

The courier will report to the MSC Action Office at the PIB where he 
will be briefed by the KSC ASflUR Action Control, J. C. Campbell, PIB 
Room lOOA, phone 867-3515 or 3779. 
The courier will receive the package or container in the presence of 

the KSC Hardware Control Officer and the designated NASA Quality Con­

trol Representat ive. 

The courier will sign for the package(s) and/or container(s) received 

on the DO 1149 and will receive an ASHUR, MSC Form 1148. approved by 

the MSC Hardware Control Officer. 

The courier will maintain positive control of the package(s) and/or 
container(s) entrusted to him. Special precaution must be taken If 

unchartered commercial transportation is utilized. 

The courier will notify MSC Action Center of his arrival by telephone 

AC 305. phone 867-7163. 3779. or 3515. 

The courier will witness the opening of the package(s) and/or contalner(s) 
in the presence of the receiving agencies and the Government Agency 
Inspection (Quality Control) Representative. 
The courier will insure that the DO 1149 master is properly negotiated 

and returned to the MSC Action Center, KSC, Room 2130. 

The courier will deliver a copy of the updated Acceptance Data Package 
to the Government Agency Inspection (Quality Control) Representative. 
The courier will notify the Government Agency Inspection (Quality 

Control) Representative at the destination to telephone the Action 

Center, KSC, KSOB, telephone 867-7163. to verify the final disposition 

stated on the ASHUR before compliance. 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 3, 1967 
Administrative Procedure No.6 
TITLE: 	 Establish'ment of the .'\(!visory/Group to the Apollo 204 Review Board 
SCOPE: 	 This proc edure is an impi ementation of the Deputy Administratur'" memorandum of 
February 3, 1967. 
POLICY: 	 I. The Apollo 204 Review Board was !:'stablished by the Deputy Administrator, NASA, 
on January 28,1967, pursuant to NASA Management Instruction 8621.1. By memorandum 
dated February 3, 196";'. the Deputy Administrator amplified and documented verb 1 in­
structions ghen to the Chairman of. the Review Board as follows: 
a. The Chairman shall establish such procedures for the organization and operation 
of the Board as he find., most effective. Such procedures shall be part of the Board's 
records. 
b. Board members shall he appointed or removed by the Deputy Administrator after 
consultation with the Chairman as n!:'cessary for the Board's effective action. 
c. The Chairman may establish procedures to assure the execution of the Chairman'S 
responsibil ity in his absence. 
d. The Chairman shall appoint or designate such representatives, consultants, ex­
pens, liaison officers, observers or other officials as required to support the activi­
ties of the Board. The Chairman shall df'fine their duties and responsibilities as 
part of the Board's records. 
e. The Chairman shall keep the Deputy Administrator advised periodically con· 
cerning the organization and operations of the Board and its associated officials. 
f. The Chairman shall assure that the Counsel to the Board rlevelops and maintains 
memoranda records co\ering po.:>sihlp area~ of litigation. 
2. Pursuant to paragraph I.d., the Chairman has established an Advisory Group. the 
membership of which is set forth in Attac hment A. The duties and responsibilities of 
'" the members are: 
Representative. An individual representing a major element of NASA or other Govern· 
ment agency having programs and activities associated with the Apollo program who 
participates in general meetings of the Board. 
Consultant - An 	individual who serves as an advisor to the Apollo 204 Review Roard. 
It is the responsibi lity uf the consultant to give his views or opmiolls on probkms or 
questions presented by the Boarrl or Panels. Consultants will, as appropriate, re· 
commend to the Board or cognizant Panels, courses of investigative action to be under­
taken in the field of their competence. 
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Liaison - An individual representing an activity having a recognized interest in the 
Apollo 204 Review who attends general meetings of the Board for the purpose of 
familiarizing himself with the current status of the Apollo 204 Review. Liaison 
personnel are empowered to coordinate with Panel Chairmen or Board Members, as 
appropriate, in areas of interest to acquire data that is of interest to the activity 
represented by the liaison individual. 
Panel Chairman - An individual designated by the Board to serve as a manager to 
direct and coordinate the activities of the Panel to which appointed in accordance 
with the statement of work prescribed for the Panel by the Board. The Panel Chair­
man reports directly to the appropriate Board monitor. Panel Chairmen will report 
to the Board, when required, on the progress of work and obtain Board approval of 
work plans. 
Observer - An individual who attends general meetings of the Board for the purpose 
of familiarizing himself with the current status of the Apollo 204 review, particularly 
in the area of his expertise and responsibility. Observers are empowered to enter 
restricted areas, upon approval, in order to be able to assist the Board or Panels; 
they shall also be prepared to submit to the Board, either orally or in writing, such 
reports and recommendations as the Board may require. 
Secretariat ~ Provides administrative, secretarial, clerical and other suppurting 
services to the Board and Advisory Groups. 
3. The Board and Advisory Group will conduct business, as a body, in the fol­
lowing manner: 
a. A general meeting is a meeting of the Board, Advisory Group and other per­
sons requested to attend for the purpose of conducting the business of the 
Board, establishing the record, presentations of panels and subcommittees, and 
such other business as is necessary. 
The Mission Briefing Room (MSO Building) is the place where the general 
meetings of the Board are held. 
. . 	 . 
b. An Executive session of the Board is a meeting limited to Board members, 
Counsel, and to individuals requested by the Board to attend. These sessions 
are held for the purpose of determining policy, formulating courses of action, 
deliberatioo on matters restricted to Board members, decisions as to the findings 
of fact, determinations, recommendations and other essential matters to be in­
cluded in the Final Report to the Administrator . 
.. 
Executive sessions will normally be held in Room 1814, MSOB, and at such other 
locations as the Board may designate. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
D-15-35 

Representatives 
Gen. C. H. Bolender 
Mr. C. Mathews 
Mr. R. A. Petrone 
Dr. J. Shea 
Lt. Col: W. Baxter 
Consultants 
Dr. Frank A. Long 
Mr. J. Yardley 
Mr. G. W. Jeffs 
Alternate: 
Mr. R. L. Benner 
Mr. Irving Pinkel 
Mr. Thomas G.Horeff 
Dr. H. Carhart 
Mr. John S. Leak 
Liaison 
Mr. Duncan Collins 
Attachment A 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
Admin. Procedure No.6 
February 3, 1967 
ADVISORY GROUP 
OMSF, represents Apollo Program Director 
OMSF, Director, Saturn! Apollo Applications 
Director, Launch Operations, KSC 
MSC, Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
USAF, Chief, Range Safety Office, Air Force Eastern Test Range 
Vice President for Research and Advanced Studies, Cornell University 
Gemini Program Technical Director, McDonnell Company 
Chief Engineer, Apollo Program, North American Aviation, Inc. 
Assistant Chief Engineer. Apollo Program, North American Aviation, Inc 
Chief. Fluid Systems Components. Lewis Research Center 
Program Manager, Propulsion Engineering and Safety Division. Aircraft 
Development Service, Federal Aviation Agency 
Chief, Fuels Branch. Chemistry Division, Naval Research Laboratory 
Chief, Technical Services Section. Engineering Division, Bureau of Safety, 
Civil Aeronautics Board 
Special Advisor, Secretary of the Air Force, SL Program 
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Panel Chairmen 
Panel No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5
• 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
• 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Attachment A 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
Admin. Procedure No.6 
February 3, 1967 
Panel Title Chairman 
SIC and GSE Configuration J. Goree, MSC 
Test Environments W. Hoyler, MSC 
Sequence of Events D. Arabian, MSC 
Disassembly Ac tivities S. Simpkinson ,MSC 
Origin and Propogation of Fire F. Bailey, MSC 
Historical Data J. T. Adams, MSC 
rest Procedures Review D . Nichols, KSC 
Materials Review W. Bland, MSC 
Design Reviews R. Williams, MSC 
Analysis of Fracture Areas P. Glynn, MSC 
Medical Analysis G. Kelly, MSC 
Witness Statements N. Vaughn, !vISC 
Ground Emergency Provisions Review G. Page, KSC 
Security of Operations C. Buckley, KSC 
Board Administrative Procedures E. Mathews, KSC 
Special Tests G. Stoops, MSC 
Final Board Report Lt. Col. K. H. 
Hinchman, USAF 
Integration Analysis A. Mardel, MSC 
Safety of Investigation Operations J. Atkins, KSC 
In Flight Fire Emergency Provisions Review Capt. J. Lovell, MSC 
Service Module Disposition C;. A. Chauvin. KSC 
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Attachment ,\ 
Apollo 201 Review Board 
Admin. Procedure No.6 
February 3. 1967 
Observers 
All Astronauts. MSC 
Maj. P. A. Butler. USAF 
Dr. Kurt H, Debus, KSC 
Mr. P. C. Donnelly, KSC 
Lt. Col. W. Dugan. USAF 
Mr. J. King, KSC 
Mr. H. E. McCoy, KSC 
Mr. R. E. Moser, KSC 
Dr. George Mueller, OMSF 
Mr. W. P. Murphy. KSC 
Gen. S. C. Phillips. OMSF 
Mr. G. M. Preston, KSC 
Gen. J. G. Shinkle, KSC 
Mr. A. F. Siepert, KSC 
Mr. W. Williams, KSC 
Secretaria t 
•Ernest Swieda Executive Secretary 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 13, 1967 
Administrative Procedure Number 7, Revision A 
SUBJECT: 	 Handli~; of Sensitive and Non - Sensitive Information and Material Under the 
Jurisdiction of the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
PURPOSE: 	 Information and Material Sensitivity Controls fa Apollo 204 Review Board. 
POLlCY: 	 I. All infamation, data, hardware, etc., related to the Review is considered sensitive 
until one of the following has made an analysis of the information or material and made 
a determination that it is not sensitive: Chairman of the Board, Board Members 
(within the areas fa which the member is acting as monita) and Panel Chairmen 
(in the areas in which they are cognizant) . 
2. Until analysis and contrary determination, unclassified sensitive material related 
the Apollo 204 Review Board will be treated as if it were classified CONFIDENTIAL. 
3. Apollo 204 Review Board material classified as SECRET a CONFIDENTIAL by 
the Apollo or Saturn Security Classification Guide must be first handled accading to 
NASA Security Directives and then according to Board policies. 
4. All Apollo 204 Review Board information, material, etc., whether classified or 
unclassified, sensitive a non - sensitive, will be released (a) only to persons autho­
rized access fa official Board purposes, or (b) following the Board's decision that 
the material is no longer needed for Board purposes, at which time the material will 
revert to its namal status. 
DEFINITIONS: 	 J. Sensitive Material: Classified or unclassified infamation a material necessary to 
the Board, which reflects pertinent data concerning the Apollo 204 accident. 
2. Persons Authaized Access to Board Information and Material. 
a. Sensitive - Classified: Access will be granted to those appropriately cleared 
and essential Government and contracta personnel who have been authaized by 
the Review Board Procedures. 
b. Non - Sensitive - Unclassified: As in a. above, except these personnel need not 
be cleared. 
3. Secure Area: An area where sensitive, classified a unclassified, materid; is 
housed or stored in approved containers a is under continuous control by cognizant, 
cleared personnel will be categaized as a Secure Area. 
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PROCEDURE: 1. Storage 
a. Sensitive· All unclassified or classified sensitive Board information or material 
will be stored in a "Secure Area." 
b. Non· Sensitive: All unclassified, non· sensitive Board information or material 
may be stored in the manner normal for official Government material, or as estab· 
Iished by other Board Procedures. 
2. Access to and Removal of Sensitive Information 
Material. Access to sensitive material and removal of sensitive material from a Secure 
Area will be in accordance with administrative procedures approved by the Chairman of 
the Board. 
3. Regrading. Sensitive information or material will be regraded from sensitive to non· 
sensitive only by the authority of those persons indicated in paragraph I, 
Policy. Sensitive information or material will be regraded to CONFIDENTIAL or 
SECRET only by the authority of the Chairman of the Board. 
4. Marking of Information or Material 
a. Non - Sensitive. All non· sensitive Board information or material will be unmarked, 
unless classified and marked, originally. 
b. Sensitive. 
(l) General· All sensitive Board information or material, when removed from a 
Secure Area, will be identified by use of the Apollo 204 Review Board Material 
Cover Sheet or stamp as follows: 
APOLLO 204 
REVIEW BOARD 
MATERIAL 
Note: 	 The former cover sheet marked "For the Use of Apollo 204 Board 
Investigation Only" may be used until the supply is p.xhausted. 
(<:!) Printed or Written Information - All materiai of this type related t.-, Review 
Board ac tivities which is susceptible to the secure fash,ning of a cover sheet 
need olliy be identified by the cover sheet in 3a above. \1aterial not suscep­
tible to secure cover sheet fastening should be plainly and conspicuously 
stamped once on each page. 
(3) Photographs, Films, Microfilms. 
(a) Nesatives - The envelope will be marked. 
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(b) Slides and Transparencies' The margin will be stamped. 
(c) Still Prints· If the quality of the prints will not be reduced, they will be 
stamped on the lower front of the print. Otherwise, they will be stamped on 
the back. 
(d) Polaroid Prints· As in (c) above. 
(e) Microfilm Mounted on IBM Cards - Stamped on front of card. 
(f) Motion Picture Film· Reels and reel containers will be individually 
stamped. Take· up reels will be stamped. unless film is immediately trans· 
ferred to the original reel following projection. 
(4) Magnetic Tapes· The cabinets in which tapes are stored will have cover 
sheets affixed prominently on the exterior. As tapes are removed for use, the 
shipping container and the reel will be mllrked 6n the labels with the stamp. 
(5) Hardware· Parts Tag (KSC Form 4·8 (7/65)) if attached to the hardware 
will be stamped appropriately on reserve side. Hardware without parts tag will 
be otherwise tagged and the tag stamped appropriately. 
Note: 	 Extreme care must be utilized in properly identifying and marking 
sensitive information or material lest it fall into the non· sensitive 
category by ;nerely mutting marking. 
5. Transmitting Apollo 204 Review Board Information and Material. 
a. Sensitive 
(1) External - Apollo 204 Review Board information and material must be trans· 
mitted by registered or certified U.S. mail. If hand - carried. it will be securely 
packaged, and cleared couriers will be used. 
(2) Internal - Local mail delivery will require the use of cleared couriers and 
sealed containers. 
Note: 	 Classified· sensitive material will be handled as indicated in Paragraph 
3, Policy, P<.lragraph 7, Procedure, and NASA Security Directives. 
.. b. Non - Sensitive. This information and material may be transmitted in the manner 
normal for official Government material, unless otherwise specified by Board 
policies or the sender, or unless classified, when NASA Security Directives pertain. 
Note: 	 This material must be forwarded only to those persons indicated in Para· 
graph 2, Definitions, until released by the Board. 
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6. Reproduction of Apollo 204 Review Board Information an;! \1aterial. 
a. Sensitive - In this category, it may be reproduced only by authority of Board 
authorized personnel in areas approved for classified reproduction or on apparatus 
specifically approved for Board use. 
b. Non- Sensitive - If'in this category, it may be reproduced only by authority of 
Board authorized personnel in the manner normal for unclassified reproduction. 
unless otherwise specified by Board policy or the holdel. 
7. Board Class ified Information and Material Records System. 
a. All classified material received by or generated by [he Board will be recorded 
within a system established for the Board by the kul ~;UA Security Office. 
b. All classified material will immediately be reported to the Chairman, Security 
of Operations Panel or h'is designees who will take steps to assure its proper re­
cording and subsequent handling. 
8. Destruction of Apollo 204 Review Board Information or Material. 
a. All Sensitive or Non - Sensitive Unclassified Board information or material 
(Including typewriter tapes, carbon paper, notes. etc.) which requires destruction 
will be destroyed in devices currently approved for classified destruction, unless 
released by the Board, at which time normal waste procedures may be used. 
b. All classified Board information or material will be de!'troyed by normal classi­
fied destruction procedures, but only after being processed through the Board Clas­
sified Infa:madon and Material Record System for clearance of records. 
/S/ 	Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
-,. 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 8,1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 8 
TITLE: 
SCOPE: 
POLICY: 
.. 
Photo Support Service for the Apollo 204 Review Board 
This procedure covers the manner by which photo support is requested, prints are de­
livered, and negatives and prints are stored in a "Central Film Library" for use by 
the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
1. Only Apollo 204 Review Board members and Task Panel members can authorize a 
request for photo service. For the purpose of this procedure "photo service" means 
the taking of pictures, developing film and printing photographs. 
2. All photo suppOrt requirements will be fulfilled by the KSC Photographic Branch, 
RH - 2, unless specifically authorized by the Review Board . 
Unless specifically instructed, four sets of tolor prints will be made during the initial 
process ing. 
For reproduction of existing photos, one set will be made unless specified. 
3. A Central Film Library is available at MSO Building, Room 1114, 867-2631. 2632, 
where existing prints are available for review by authorized personnel. 
Prints are arranged in books by spacecraft grid areas, identified on library drawing, by 
date and time sequence sO' that any particular spacecraft area may be reviewed in de­
tail desired. 
Reproduction from existing negatives may be requested at that library. 
All prints released from the Central Film Library will be logged out to the requesting 
Review Board Member or Task Panel Chairman who will be responsible for maintaining 
proper internal handling and control. 
Before initiating any request for the taking of new pictures, the originator should con­
tact the Photo Library to assure himself that his areas of interest have not been photo­
graphed previously. 
All Task Panel Chairmen are requested to furnish the library with a list of their per­
sonnel who will require access for reviewing photographs. 
4. Requests for taking pictures should be the requirements of a TPS. 
An authorized photographer is available at the spacecraft site for taking pictures on 
request from authorized personnel as required by the TPS being worked. 
261-1100-67-12 0·15-43 
For areas where photographers are not continuously available. telephone KSC Photo 
Operations at 867 - 6240, stating that the requirement is for the Apollo 204 Review 
Board and the location where a photographer is required. 
5. Before taking any pictures, the photographer must be furnished with tbe name of 
the requesting Board or Panel member, Task Panel Number, whpther Spacecraft 012 
or Spacecraft 014. the description of each view. the date and time the piLture is made. 
and the TPS number and step number for proper photo identification on his "photo 
caption log" . 
All prints and negative jackets are to be identified as Apollo 204 Review Board 
Material in accordance with Administrative Procedure NO.7. 
All prints and negative jackets will be captioned on the back giving the appli(,ahle 
spacecraft. view description. TPS number and step number, the date and time at which 
the picture was made. the cognizant Board member or Task Panel number. and will be 
serialized with photographic work ader number. film pack number, and frame number. 
Negatives will he released only to the Photo Branch, RH -2, for reproduction unless 
specifically requested by the Review Board. 
PROCEDURE: 1. Requests for taking new pictures: 
a. The requirement for pictures is established by the TPS. 
The requirement should be indicated on the TPS and any particular step requiring 
a picture should include the Task Panel number, or a merri>ef's name as a minimum 
information. 
b. Information fa the photographer's photo caption log may be given verbally but 
is required. 
c. The responsible on site person should give verbal instruction to the photo­
grapher regarding particular views required and the time sequence involved to 
satisfy the requirements of the TPS. 
2. Delivery of Photo Material: 
a. After the required pictures have been taken, KSC Photographic Branch, RH -2, 
personnel will carry the film to their photo labs fa processing in order of arrival 
by film pack number. 
b. Four sets of color prints will be made. 
c. After processing, the Photographic Branch ••lH· 2, will prepare the phot0 
material in a sealed envelope identifying the package as Apollo 2M Review Board 
Material. 
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d. The Photographic Branch will then contact the Apo1l0204 Review Board 
Central Film Library at the MSO Building. Room 1114. telephone 867·2631. 
2632. and request that the authorized Photo Courier pick up the package and 
carry it to the Central Film Library for proper disposition. 
e. The library will contact the Photo Courier at 867 - 5628; delivery to be made 
to the Central Film Library. 
f. After arrival at the Central Film Library, disposition will be as follows: 
(l) One set of prints will be logged out and carried to the requesting Review 
Board Members or Task Panel Chairman's mail box in the MSO Building. 
(2) One set of prints will be sent to Mr. J. Lobb. PK· 2, MSC. Houston. 
(3) One set of prints will be filed at the Central Film Library numerically by 
ne~ative number and will be available for release to authorized personnel. 
.. 
(4) One set of prints will be permanently filed by spacecraft grid area and 
subject description into appropriately identified books which will be available 
for review in the library by authorized personnel. 
(5) All negatives will be filed numerically by negative number at the library 
for future reproduction use. 
3. Requests for Reproduction of Prints: 
a. When it is determined that additional copies of existing prints are required. the 
file copy may be released. 
b. If a file copy will not meet the requirement, the librarian will prepare a work 
order listing the negative numbers. whether color is required, size of print. quantity 
of prints. and the name of the authorized person. 
NOTE: Since there may be a considerable number of different prints available 
for a particular spacecraft zone. careful selection of the individual 
prints from the library file will provide faster service and be les" .:ostly. 
c. The librarian will prepare the required negatives and a copy of the work order 
in a sealed envelope marked "Apollo 204 ltevie\" Board Material". 
.. d. The librarian will then contact the Photo Courier at 867·5628 and request that 
the package be carried to the Photographic Branch who will fulfill the request. 
e. After processing, the Photo Branch will prepare the packa~e and have deiivery 
made to the Central Film Library as previously described. 
f. The librarian will distributethe prints to the appropriate Review Board members 
or Task Panel Chairman'S mail box and will file the negatives. 
/S/ Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 3, 1967 
Administrative Procedure NO.9 
TITLE: 	 Transcribing Apollo 204 Review Board Proceedings. 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers the recording, transcription, review and distribution of Apollo 
204 Review Board Procedures for record in the Review Board Meeting Room, MSOB. 
POLICY: 	 The proceedings for record of the Apollo 204 Review Board shall be recorded and 
provided in written form for Review Board use. 
PROCEDURES: 1. Upon statement by the Chairman of the Apollo 204 Review Board that the Board 
actions, testimony, findings. etc .• will be stated for record, communications person­
nel will cue the 1/4 inch magnetic tape voice recorder. The resulting tape is de­
signa ted the Master Tape. 
2. The recorded material will be reproduced. one copy only. onto 4 - inch IBM tape 
by the communications personnel. 
3. The Master Tape and the 4 - inch IBM tape will be delivered to the Secretarial 
Support Room, ~Room No. 1805) MSOB by the communications personnel. 
4. The 4 - inch IBM tape will be logged by Secretarial Support personnel with a ref· 
erence to the Master Tape. 
5. The ind ividual 4 - inch IBM tapes will be transcribed by the Secretarial Pool into 
a series of first drafts. 
6. The first drafts and the Master Tape will be delivered by the Secretarial Pool to 
the selected technical personnel for review and correction, ahd returned to the 
Secretarial Pool. 
7. The Master Tape will be delivered to Task Panel 17, Final Board Report Panel, 
Room 1806, MSOB, for storage. 
8. The Secretarial Pool will prepare a second draft of the combined corrected 
transcripts for one day·s proceedings and will distribute them to the Apollo 204 
Review Board Members and the Board CounseL 
9. After the lapse of 24 hours from receipt by the Board MenDers and Counsel all 
comme nts/corrections which may be received by the Secretariat from the Board mem­
bers will be incorporated into a final copy for record by the Sectetariat. 
10. The final copy will be reproduced and copies placed in appropriate covers for the 
Board Members and Counsel. The original will be delivered to Task Panel No. 17, 
Final Board Report Panel, for filing. 
/S/ 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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FEBRUARY 21, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 10, Revision A 
TITLE: 	 Control of Data and Documents 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers the control of all documentation and data relative to AS· 204 
Space Vehicle and associated GSE data. 
POLICY: 	 1. Original copies of all data to include specifications, inspection data, test pro· 
cedures, test data, drawings relative to all parts. subsystems. and modules in Space 
Vehicle AS· 204 and associated GSE prior to 0600 January 27, 1967, shall be impound· 
ed. Access to these data or copies of this data shall not be further restricted than that 
necessary for normal program control. 
2. Original copies of all data to include inspection data, test procedures, test data, 
tapes, etc., relative to the AS'204 space vehicle and associated GSE after 0600 
January 27, 1967. no matter where recorded, as well asduplicates of such data shall 
be impounded. Access to such data as well as duplicates of such data will be re· 
stricted to authorized personnel as included in Attachment I or their designees as 
specified in writing. 
3. For purposes of this instruction, impounding means assuring security of such data 
from alteration or destruction. 
4. No release of such information to public sources shall be made without specific 
approval of the Review Board Chairman. 
PROCEDURE: 	 }. Data will be impounded in areas as follows: 
a. Room 3344, MSO Building (Review Room 3343) 
b. Rooms 2720· 2}, MSO Building 
c. SCO Tape Library, Room 4410. MSO Building 
d. Flight Crew 	System Lab, Room 3724. MSO Building 
e. Complex ~7A AGCS • (Launch Vehicle Data) 
f. Room 240, Central Instrumentation Facility (CIF) 
2. A NASA Security Guard will be posted at the entrance of each impounded area as 
noted above. except Room 4410, and Room 240, CIF, on a 24· hour basis and shall 
allow authorized personnel as indicated in Attachment 1 or their designees in writing 
to have access to impounded area. (Procedures for Room 4410 and Room 240, CIF. 
are provided in paragraphs 4 and 6 below, respectively.) 
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3. Control of documentation and data contained in Room 3344, MSO Building, will be 
as follows: 
a. Room 3343 will be used for review of documents contained in 3344. 
b. Access to 3344 shall be restricted to people actually assigned to Spacecraft 
012 impounded record cQntrol. A list of these personnel will be forwarded from 
the Task Panel No.6 Chairman to NASA Security. 
c. Access to Room 3343 shall be as specified in paragraph 2 above. 
d. Removal of original documents from Room 3344 is not authorized without prior 
approval from the Apollo 204 Review Board (Mr. Geer or his alternate) except to 
Room 3343 for review. Reproduction of documents located in Room 3344 is autho­
rized for persons having access but shall be accomplished by personnel located in 
Room 3344. 
4. Control of documentation and data as contained in Room 4410 will be as follows: 
a. Data tapes for Spacecraft 012 shall be stored in locked/sealed cabinets. No 
cabinet containing Spacecraft 012 tapes may be opened unless NASA Quality Con· 
trol personnel are present when the seal is broken. 
b. Original data tapes for Spacecraft 012 may only be withdrawn from the SCO Data 
Handling Facility to make a duplicate copy. 
c. At the time that the original request is received, Data Handling personnel shall 
first check to make sure that a duplicate copy has not previously been made before 
releasing the original copy of data tapes. 
d. Original and duplicate copies of Spacecraft 012 tape may be withdrawn from SCO 
Data Handling Facility only when authorized by an AVO signed by J. H. Lane or 
J. H. Weisner, H. N. French, D. E. Perreton, D. E. New, or F. R. Schilling. 
5. Control of Documentation and Data contained in Rooms 2720, 2721, 3724 of the MSO 

Building, and Complex 37, P ad A, will be as follows: 

a. Removal of original documents is not authorized without prior approval from the 

Apollo 204 Review Board (Mr. Geer or his alternate). 

b. Access shall be as specified in paragraph 2 above. In addition. it is anticipated 
that Launch Vehicle Operations will require access to the Complex 37. Pad A. data. An 
LVO access list will be forwarded to NASA KSC Security by the NASA Launch Veh~de 
Test Conductor's office (853, 9917) which is designated as the cognizant Launch Ve· 
hicle Operations Office. 
6. Control of documentation and data located in Room 240 of the CIF will be as follows: 
a. The control of tapes and data in this room. which pertains to AS· 204. is the re· 
sponsibility of the KSC Data Office (Mr. Jelen). 
b. The KSC Data Office wiIl not reproduce data pertaining to AS· 204 unless auth· 
orized by the Launch Vehicle Test Conductor's Office (Mr. J. Kelly or his alter· 
nate), andlor the Spacecraft Test Conductor's Office (Mr. J. H. Lane or his alter· 
nate) . 
151 	 Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
'" 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 11, 1967 
Administrative Procedure No. 11 
TITLE: 

SCOPE: 

POLICY: 

Categorization and Control of AS - 204 Material Required to Support the AS - 204 
Review Board 
This procedure defines the various categories of material associated with the 
AS -204 incident and establishes controls for the reclassification andlor release 
of such material by the board. Material as used in this procedure includes com­
ponents and sample material relJloved from SIC 012; spacecraft GSE, launch ve­
hicle and its associate GSE; support equipment and facilities. 
1. The following direction relative to the release of impounded material from 
Apollo 204 Review Board control has been established by the Board as quoted 
from the Board action summary list. All material released by actions of the Board 
previous to 11 Feb. 1966, have been placed into Category C. 
GSE, STE AND FACILITY EQUIPMENT ON LAUNCH Cm1PLEX 34 
Equipment of this type not utilized for checkout or servicing on Spacecraft 012 and 
the AS - 204 launch vehicle on Pad 34 should be released for normal operation. 
All equipment of this type utilized prior-to plugs in and removed prior to plugs - in 
which is still in complex area should be statused in terms of configuration and re­
leased for further use. 
All equipment of this type used during plugs - in or later will require board approval. 
GSE, STE AND FACILITY EQUIPMENT OUTSIDE OF LAUNCH COMPLEX 34 
All equipment of this type utilized in buildup prior to arrival at Launch Complex 34 
of SIC 012 should be released for further use. 
All servicing equipment of this type utilized prior to arrival of SIC 012 at LlC 34 
should be checked for configuration status and fluids sampled for future records. 
Equipment then should be released for usage. 
2. All material associated with the AS -204 incident will be classified as follows: 
..Category A - Material which may have a significant influence or bearing on the re­
suIts or findings of the Apollo 204 Review Board. This material is considered 
highly relevant and is to be maintained under rigid control. 
Category B - All material other than Category A which is considered relevant to 
the Apollo 204 Review Board investigation. 
Category C - Material released from Board jurisdiction. 
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PROCEDURE: 
'" 
3. All catega:y A material will be maintained under the control of the Apollo 204 
Review Board through the Panel Coordination Committee and the appropriate Panel 
Chairmen. All wa:k accomplished on Category A will be by the use of the Test 
Preparation Sheet (TPS) (Reference Apollo 204 Administrative Procedure 18). 
4. Category B material will bedocumented as to the configuration at the time of the 
inc ident and maintained under the control of the cognizant program or line organization. 
5. The determination of the category and re lease of any material currently under 
impoundment in support of the AS· 204 investigation is a responsibility of the Apollo 
204 Review Board. The attached form, Apollo 204 Review Board Material Release 
Record (MRR), is to be used by organizations desiring to release or reclassify any 
material presently under impoundment by the Apollo 204 Review Board. Instructions 
pertaining to this form are covered in the procedures section below. 
6. Catega:y A material which must be sent off· site for testing, analysis or other 
reasons to satisfy requirements of the review, will be accompanied by a representa­
tive (witness) designated by the Board unless otherwise specified by the Board. Ap­
propriate quality control and contractor personnel may also accompany the Board's 
representative. In addition, at the discretion of the Board, Category A material which 
will be tested on-site will be accompanied by a Hoard-appointed representative. 
Category B material sent off - site need not be accompanied by a Board - appointed re· 
presentative. 
7. All Category A material which requires testing and/a: analysis either on- site or 
at a location other than KSC will be processed in accordance with Apollo 204 Review 
Board Administrative Procedure 5b. 
1. Completion of the MRR - The MRR will be completed asfollows: 
Item No.• To be filled in by the Panel Coordination Committee of the Apollo 204 
Review Board 
Description· Include a brief description of the item to be reclassified by the Board. 
Relevance to Accident· Includ e justification for reclassification action to include 
why the reclassification of the equipment will not affect the final board findings. 
Constraint Prior to Release - To he filled in by the Panel Coordination Committee. 
Current Category· If equipment has not been released from the Board by some 
previous action the current catega:y is "A". 
Desired Category· Include desired category based on definitions of categories as 
specified in Paragraph 2 above. 
Board Approval· To be filled in by the Board. 
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2. Flow of the MRR 
a. The MRR will be filled in by the individual or organization desiring to reclas· 

sify or release equipment currently under impoundment. The fams can be obtained 

from the DLO Test Supervisor's Office (Room 2121, MSOR - Phone 867· 6230) or 

Apollo Review Board Administrative Procedures Office (Room 1842, MSOB • Phone 

867·6706). 

b. For material located in all areas except the Pyrotechnic Installation Building 

(PIB) area, the completed form will be submitted lothe Di rector of Launch Opera· 

tions (DLO) Test Supervisor's office. For material located in the PIB area, the 

completed forms will be forwarded to a Panel 4 member. 

c. The DLO Test Supervisa or the Panel 4 Chairman as appropriate will submit 

the form to the Panel Coordination Committee for review and presentation to the 

Board. 

d. The Board decision will be relayed through the DLO Test Supervisor's office 

or the Panel 4 Chairman as appropriate to the affected individual or organization. 

.. 
/5/ 	Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
.. 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 3, 1967 
Administrative Procedufe No. 12 
TITLE: 	 Access to Apollo 204 Review Board Office 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers access control to the Apollo 204 Review Board Office, Room 
1814, MSO Building, KSC, for the period of time that this space is assigned to the 
Review Board. 
POLICY: 	 1. Access to the Apollo 204 Review Board Office, Room 1814, MSO Building, shall 
be limited to the following personnel: 
a. Personnel wearing the special Apollo 204 Review Board badges issued in ac· 
cordance with Administrative Procedure No. I (Access to the Apollo 204 Review 
Board Meeting Room). 
b. Other personnel approved by occupants of the Apollo 204 Review Board Office, 
exclusive of secretaries. 
2. Access will be controlled on a full· time basis by a sec urity guard. 
PROCEDURES: 	I. Persoonel will clear through the security guard prior to entering Room 1814, MSO 
Building. 
a. Personnel displaying an Apollo 204 Review Board badge with green or yellow 
stripes may enter and leave Room 1814 as required. 
b. Non· badged personnel desiring to visit occupants of Room 1814 will indicate 
the name of the occupant to the security guard. Contact will be made with the 
occupant's office and if approved, the security guard will permit access. Logging 
in and out is not required. 
c. Secretarial support personnel will be permitted access into Room 1814 per secre­
tarial access list. Changes to the secretarial access list may be made by Mr. Dave 
Allen or his designated representative. 
../S/ 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 13, Rev. A. 
TITLE: Preparation of Apollo 204 Review Board Meeting Agenda 
l. Not later than 8:00 p.m. each day, all items desired to be propos~d by Board members 
for inclusion on the following day's agenda should be given in writing to the Secretariat, 
Attn: Ernest Swieda, MSO Building, Room 1814, telephone 867-6693. 
2. The Secretariat will obtain approval or modification from the Board Chairman or his 
approved representative for this purpose and have the published list of agenda items 
prior to the next scheduled meeting. 
3. In the event there is a modification to or deletion of any item. the Secretariat will so 
advise the concerned Board member as soon as possible. 
4. Distribution to the Board members and other appropriate personnel will be accom­
plished on an expedited basis. 
5. Items not on the published agenda will not be discussed at the Board meeting without 
approval of the Board Chairman. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd 1. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 3, 1967 
Administrative Procedure Number 14 
TITLE: Access to Spacecraft 012 
The Panel Coordination Sub Committee will establish coordination of and priority for 
all tasks requiring access to the spacecraft. The access to the interior of the space­
craft will be controlled by Colonel Borman or a designated representative. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson • 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 3, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 15 
TITLE: 	 Official File for Apollo 204 Review Board 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers the accumulation and filing of all documents required for the 
official Apollo 204 Review Board file. 
POLICY: 	 1. One copy of all Task Panel and Review Board-generated data shall be provided to 
Task Panel ~o. 17 (Final Report Panel), except as noted in paragraph 2 below. 
2. The negatives and prints of all photographs made as a part of Review Board or Task 
Panel activities shall be provided to the Apollo 204 Review Board f'ilm Library for 
disposition in accordance with Administrative Procedure ~o. 8, "Control of Film" 
PROCEDURES: 	I. Each Task Panel Chairman will establish a system of controlling all documents 
generated by his panel in the performance of its functions. (Documents include, but 
are not limited to, letters, memoranda, reports. plans, procedures. test prep.uation 
sheets, logs, statemen ts, and transcripts.) 
2. The Apollo 204 Review Board Secretariat will establish a system of controlling all 
documents generated by the Apollo 204 Review Board. (Documents include, but are 
not limited to, letters, memoranda, and transcripts of Board proceedings.) 
3. The original of all data resulting from paragraphs I and 2 above, will be provided 
to the receptionist, Task Panel No. I i, Room 1806, MSO Building, by each Task Panel 
Chairman or representative and the Review Board Secretariat as soon as available. 
4. The Chairman, Task Panel No. 17, will establish a system of controlling and filing 
all documents received from other panels and the Review Board Secretariat. The system 
will permit identification of that material which will be included in the final report and 
that material which is supporting or reference data. 
5. Negatives and prints of all photographs made as part of Review Board or Task Panel 
activities will be controlled in accordance with Administrative Procedure No.8, 
"Control of Film". Negatives will be catalogued and filed by the Apollo 204 Review 
Board Film Library in Room 1114, ~tSO Building. Prints will be provided (0 Task 
Panel No. 17 upon written request of the Chairman. Upon completion of the Review 
Board investigation all negatives will be turned over to Task Panel No. 17 for inclusion 
in the official file. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVI EW BOARD 
FEBRUARY 3, 1967 
Administrative Procedure No. 16 
TITLE: Coordination Policy for Interviewing Witnesses 
A statement, substantially as follows, will be addressed to each individual called 
before the Panel for Task No. 12 to be interviewed or questioned further: 
We appreciate your coming here lo assist us further in this investigation 
in. order that the Board may arrive at certain decisions affecting the Apollo 
Program. The answers you may provide may be a clue to other matters that 
this Board should look into. 
.. 
Before we start the questioning, we want you to understand that your appear­
ance is on a voluntary basis and that any statements you make will be kept in 
strict confidence. 
If you are able to answer a question, please do so with language you use with 
family and friends. It is not necessary to be formal. 
If you are unable to answer a question, do not hesitate to say so. 
Now, we may proceed. 
Where the witness called is df'emed by the Panel to have furnished important information 
in his original statement, Counsel to the Board and cognizant technical personnel in 
areas to be covered by the intep';' 'V will be advised beforehand. 
Doubtful cases will be resolved hy the Chairman, Task 12 Panel, after consultation with 
cognizant technical personnel and concurrence by Counsel. 
/S/ 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
0-15-58 

APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 8, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 17 
TITLE: 	 Response to Offers of Assistance or Recommendation 
POLlCY: 	 Offers of assistance or recommendation submitted as a result of the Apollo 204 Review 
will be answered by the Chauman, Apollo 204 Review Board. 
PROCEDURES: 1. All messages (letters, telegrams, and telecon notes) received by the Apollo 204 
Review Board membcr", Task Panel members, other associated personnel, or the 
Secretarial Support Office (Room 1805, MSO Building) which are identified as sugges­
tions or offers of help pertaining to the task of the Apollo 204 Review Board shall be 
forwarded to Task Panel No, 15, Room 1842, MSO Building. Task Panel No. 15 will 
• 
log all incoming messages and review them for content . 
2. Task Panel No. 15 will prepare replies to all messages for the signature of the 
Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board, unless they have been properly acknowledged 
by other organizations. Official NASA Apollo 204 Review Board letterhead will be 
used. 
3. Copies of those messages, which. in the opinion of Task Panel No. 15. appear to 
be relevant to the activities of one or more task panels will be sent to those panels 
for consideration. In certain cases, comments or other action may be requested. If 
acceptance of an offer of assistance or if more information is desired, Task Panel 
No. 15 will be contacted so that arrangements can be made. 
/SI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
MARCH 9, 1967 
Administrative Procedure No. 18, Revision C 
TITLE: 

SCOPE: 

POLICY: 

Use and Control of Test Preparation Sheets (TPS) 
This procedure co\'er~ the plan and control by which A5·204 spacecraft hardware will be 
removed, inspected, analyzed or otherwise modified. 
L All work, including inspections, on the AS· 204 spacecraft hardware and on the space­
craft GSE that is on or was connected to the spacecraft from the Plugs In Overall Test 
(0006) until after the incident is to be authorized by Test Preparation Sheets (TPSj, 
2, TPS's written to perform work under the control of the Medical Analysis Panel 
(Panel No, 11) involving equipment located in Room 106 of the PIB will require only the • 
approval signature of a member of the Medical Analysis Panel. 
3. TPS's written to perform work under the control of the Disassembly Activities Panel 
(Panel No.4) will be prepared and signed by the applicable NAA SY'ltems Engineer and 
will be approved by the applicable NASA-KSC·SCO and NASA·MSC Systems Engineers. 
In addition. approval signatures must be obtained from the appropriate KSC·MAB En~i· 
neer, a member of the Origin and Propagation of Fire Panel, a member of the Integration 
Analysis Panel who will assure that any additional coordination required. such as 
materials engineers, is accomplished before affixing his signature and a member of the 
Panel Coordination Committee. Any TPS to be worked at the 012 spacecraft will also 
be signed by a member of the Disassembly Activities Panel. Any of these listed 
signatures, except that of the TPS writer, may be obtained per telephone conversation. 
4. TPS's written to perform work under the control of the Service Module Disposition 
Panel (P anel No 21) ,will be handled as in Paragraph 3 except that the signature of a 
member of the Service Module Disposition Panel is required in lieu of a member of the 
Disassembly Activities Panel. 
5. Prior to preparation of TPS·s. work plans must be presented to the Apollo 204 
Review Board through the Panel Coordination Committee for approval. 
6, When a TPS is required to be modified in order to allow continuance of wQrk activity. 
a TPS mod sheet is required. The TPS mod sheet will be signpd by both the Systems 
Engineers monitoring the work. These engineers will be responsible for proper coordi­
nation before signing the mod sheet. (Ret para. 3h. under procedure.) 
7. Work. examination, testing, or analysis that is to be performed at KSC of equip­

ment removed from the spacecraft must be authorized by a subsequent TPS which is 

to begin with a statement that authorizes removal of the equipment from the bonded 

storage area, if required. Testing or analysis that is to bl' performed at sites other 

than KSC must be authorized and accomplished in accordance with Administrative 

Procedure No.5. 

8. All equipment or material removed from the spacecraft must be dQcumented on a Parts 
Installation and Removal Record (PIRR). 
9. All equipment or material removed from the spacecraft must be tal!:ged with a parts 

tag. 
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10. No task will be initiated until those individuals assigned to accomplish the task 
are thoroughly briefed by the responsible engineer. No disassembly task will be per­
formed on SIC 012 until the same task has been performed on SIC 014 by the same 
individual, unless specified on the TPS as "not applicable to SIC 014." 
II. Proofing tasks on. SIC 014 will be worked to a SIC 012 TPS. These need have 
only one NAA and one NASA Systems Engineer signature for this task. Work will be 
authorized by and bought off on a SIC 014 TPS which will state to work the SIC 012 
TPS on SIC 014. This TPS will be signed by one NAA and one NASA Systems Engi­
neer. Either one of the above will sign mod sheets. Any of these listed signatures, 
except that of the writer. may be obtained per telephone conver~ation. 
12. Access to the spacecraft area will be tightly controlled in accordance with appli­
cable administrative procedures. 
I~. The original of all TPS' s will be provided upon completion to Panel No. 17. 
14. The Apollo Pre-Flight Operations Procedures Manual (APOP) is the reference 
document to be used during all work activity on the spacecraft. When differences 
exist between this procedure and the APOP, this procedure is the ruling document. 
PROCEDURE: 1. Flow of the TPS (includes all TPS's except those worked by Panel No. II) 
a. The request for an intended action or work plan will be forwarded to the panel 
coordination committee which will be responsible for obtaining Board approval. 
b. After approval by the Chairman of the Apollo 204 Review Board, the request 
will be forwarded to the Integration Analysis Panel who will integrate the work into 
the overall SIC OI 2 effort. 
c. The Integration Analysis Panel will direct NAA Engineering to prepare the 
TPS for the task. The TPS will be signed by the responsible NASA andlor NAA 
Engineers andlor panel and committee members. as appropriate. 
d. A TPS number will be obtained by the originator from the Apollo Tech Data 
Services. Room ~197, MSO Building, telephone 867·5~65. 
e. Original will be taken to Room 1432 for reproduction and distribution. Twenty 
(20) copies will be taken to Room 21 ~O prior to the 8:00 a.m. daily meeting. 
f. Service Engineering will deliver the buy off copy to the appropriate work area. 
Modification sheets added to the original TPS will be called into the Apollo Tech 
Data Services by NAA QC for their records. 
g. After the completion of the task, NAA Quality Control will hand carry the 
original completed bought off copy to Room ~~44. 
h. QC in Room 3~44 will reproduce the completed TPS, place one on file and hand 
carry 20 copies to Room 2130 prior to 8:00 a.m. daily meeting. 
i. Then QC will hand carry the "as worked" buy off copy TPS's to Task Panel 
No. 17 in Room 1806. 
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2. Work Support (except as performed by Panel No. 11) 
a. Operations Engineering: 
(l) The actual removal, disassembly, and analysis work within the local KSC 

area will be executed through the normal NASA and NAA pad and industrial area 

organizations. 

(2) It is required that NASA KSC-SCO and NA.\ Operations Engineers be on 

duty at the spacecraft on the shift and work-week basis specified by the Apollo 

204 Review Board. 

(3) The Operations Engineers have the responsibility to schedule the daily 

spacecraft activity in detail. They also have the authority to stop work on the 

spacecraft when deemed necessary. 

(4) The Operations Engineers are responsible to maintain a spacecraft log, • 
which documents- all activity on the spa'cecraft on an hourly basis. A copy of 

the log is to be provided to the DA Panel and is to be updated on a daily basis. 

b. Systems Engineering: 
It is required that NASA and NAA Systems Engineering be on duty for all work 

on their particular system when the work is authorized by a SIC 012 investigation 

or component analysis TPS. Any deviation to this requirement either must be 

documented on the appropriate TPS prior to submittal for authorizing signature or 

authorized by the Chairman of the Disassembly Activity Panel, or his designated 

representative. 

3. TPS Preparation: 
TPS's will be prepared as follows: (Note: Only paragraphs a, b, and h apply to 
Panel No. 11 work.) 
a. A specific and complete statement of the "reason for work" is required on each 

TPS. 

b. The TPS's are to consist of step-by-step work items written in a detailed manner 

that will leave no question as to what is specifically required to be done. 

c. No wire bundle electrical connectors are to he disconnected without specific 

call-out by WIB connector number on the TPS. 

d. All work on the spacecraft is to be accomplished by NAA technicians unless 

otherwise indicated on the TPS. 

e. All work is to be witnessed by NASA KSC-SCO and NAA inspection. In addition, 

it is the responsibility of the Integration Analysis Panel to make sure that the TPS 

includes the necessary requirements for official observers when required. Upon com­

pletion of each TPS work item, the item is to be stamped by NASA/NAA Inspection 

indicating completion. 
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f. It is required that TPS's which authorize rem(wal of equipment from the space­
craft while at Complex 34 conclude with the following statement as the last item 
of work: "Transport equipment to the Pyro Installation Building (PIB) for display 
or retention in bonded storage." 
g. Upon completion of work authorized by a TPS, it is required that a summary 
statement be made on the last TPS mod sheet by the NASA/NAA Systems 
Engineer(s). The summary statement is to include all items of a significant 
nature that were observed during the work activity indicating where follow-up 
action is needed. 
h. When a mod sheet is prepared, a specific and complete statement of the reason 
for the mod sheet is required on each TPS. Also, the TPS mod sheet must autho­
rize work that is within the intent of the original TPS. 
i. Separate investigation (IV), Material Analysis (MA), Component Analysis (CA) 
TAIR books will be established and all TPS's associated with spacecraft work, 
including GSE, will be retained in these TAIR books. 
4. Parts Installation and Removal Record (PIRR) (Except Panel No. 11) 
The information noted on the PIRR consists of a part number (if available or appli­
cable); a description of the equipment or material; and the time and date of removal. 
The parts installation and removal record will be prepared and used as noted in the 
APOP with Quality Control required to buy off all entries. 
5. Parts Tag: 
As stated in paragraph 8 of the policy section above, all material removed from the 
spacecraft must be tagged with a parts tag (KSC Form 4-8) as follows: 
a. The parts tag will be stamped in accordance with Apollo 204 Review Board 
Administrative Procedure #7. 
b. The tag is to be attached to the hardware in such a manner that will not affect 
the condition of the equipment. 
c. The tag is to be attached to the container or bag into which the material is 
placed. 
d. The parts tag is to accompany the equipment or material at all times. 
e. It is required that prior to removal of spacecraft hardware, spacecraft system 
components, disconnect of spacecraft electrical connectors, and disconnect of 
spacecraft plumbing lines, a short length of silver-gray tape be attached across 
the mating line between the hardware to be removed and the adjacent hardware 
remaining in the spacecraft. An indexing line is to be then marked on the tape 
with a black ball-point pen at right angles to, and across, the hardware mating 
line. A number correlating to the spacecraft hardware removal form entry is also 
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to be written on each end of the tape. In order to avoid destruction of valuable 
evidence, it may be necessary to deviate from this procedure. In these cases, a 
mod sheet shaH be prepared which states the reasons the procedure cannot or 
should not be followed. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 7, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 19, Revision A 
TITLE: 

SCOPE: 

POLlCY: 

Establishment of the Panel Coordination Committee 
This procedure covers the purpose and activities of the Panel Coordination Committee 
and is applicable to all elements of the Apollo 204 Review Board including Board and 
Panel members. 
1. The Panel Coordination committee is hereby established. The committee shall con­
sist of the following: 
Mr. John J. Williams, Chairman 

Col. Frank Borman, Member 

Mr. Charles W. Mathews, Member 

Dr. Maxime A. Faget. Member. 

Mr. George Jeffs, Member 

Mr. John F. Yardley, Member 

Mr. R. L. Benner, Member 

Mr. John Hodge, Member 

Mr. Ted Sasseen, Member 

2. The purpose of this committee is to coordinate the actions of the constituted panels 
and bring to the attention of the Apollo 204 Review Board those actions requiring spe­
cific approval of the Board. 
3. All needs for coordination of activities and requirements that the various constituted 
panels and other activities cannot satisfy or resolve by direct action between those in­
volved should be brought to the immediate attention of the coordination committee. 
4. All requirements to implement activity that comes under the direct control of the 
Board (such as photograph examination,or disassembly of SIC 012 or the use or dispo­
sition of impounded items) will likewise be brought to the attention of the Panel Coord· 
ination Committee. 
5. A panel coordination review session will be held daily at 5 p.m. in room 2130 MSOB 
unless otherwise specified. All Panel Chairmen are required to attend. Daily Reports 
are required to be submitted by the Panel Chairman at that time. A daily meeting will 
also be held at 9 a.m. in room 2130. Selected Panel Chairmen will attend by request. 
6. Matters which require attention of the Panel Coordination Committee should be 
addressed to the Panel Coordination Committee, room 2130, MSOB/867-6447. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 24, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 20, Revision A 
TITLE: 	 Establishment of Apollo 204 Review Board Panels 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure officially documents the Apollo 204 Panels and covers the purpose and 
activities of such panels. This procedure is applicable to all elements of the Apollo 
204 Review Board. Working panels were established at the beginning of the AS· 204 
Review Board investigation and have been in continuous operation. This procedure re· 
vises previous documentation relative to these panels. 
POLICY: 	 1. Panels will be utilized by the Apollo 204 Review Board to perform specialized 
tasks as identified by the Board. Each panel will have a Chairman appointed and ap· 
proved by the Review Board and a Board Monitor to whom the Panel Chairman is re· 
sponsible. The official list of panels is contained in Attachment I. 
2. The panels will provide reports of their activities as required by the Review Board 
or the Panel Coordination Committee. 
RESPONSIBILITIES/ACTIONS: 
I. The Apollo 204 Review Board will appoint a Chairman and a Board Monitor for each 
of the twenty~one (21) Task Panels. New panels may be constituted by action of the 
Review Board to perform additional tasks. Attachment 1 contains the official list. 
2. Each Panel Chairman will serve as a manager to direct and coordinate the activ· 
ities of the Panel within the statement of work prescribed for that Panel as included in 
attachment I. 
3. Each panel chairman will report directly to the appropriate Board Monitor and wi1l 
report to the Board, when required, on the progress of work. He will obtain Board ap· 
proval of'work whenever required by other applicable Board Admi nistrative Procedures. 
4. Each Panel Chairman is responsible for recommending membership on the Panel 
which must be approved by the cognizant Board Monitor including any changes thereto. 
The Board Monitor will initial his approval on the list contained in attachment 1. 
5. Each Panel Chairman is responsible to designate an alternate in case of tempa:ary 
absence. This alternate must be approved by the respective Board Monitor for each 
Panel. 
6. Panel reports of findings and determinations will be required of 
all panels. These reports will be signed by the Panel Chairmen only and submitted to 
the Board through' the appropriate Board Monitors. Board Monitors will insure that 
minority positions relative to panel reports are brought to the attention of the Board. 
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Apollo 204 Review Board 
Admin. Procedure No. 20 
February 24. 1967 
7. All final Panel reports submitted to the Board will be in the prescribed format as 
included in attachment 2. Reports from Panel #11 will have limited distribution as 
determined by the Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
Enclosure 
l. Apollo 204 Review Board Panels 
2. Outline for Panel Reports 
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ATTACHMENT 1 

APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

ADMIN. PROCEDURE NO. 20 

FEBRUARY 18, 1967 

APOLLO 204 

REVIEW BOARD 

PANELS 
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PANEL SUMMARY 
NO. TITLE CIlAIRMAN BOARD MONITOR 
1 SIC and GSE Configuration J. Goree, MSC J. Williams, KSC 
2 Test Environments W. Hoyler, MSC G. White, NASA Hqs 
3 Sequenc e of Events D. Arabian, MSC M. Faget, MSC 
4 Disassembly Activities S. Simpkinson, MSC Col. F. Borman, MSC 
5 Origin &: Propagation of Fire F. Bailey, MSC Dr. Van DoJah 
6 Historical Data J. T. Adams, MSC G. White, NASA Hqs 
7 Test Procedures Review D. Nichols, KSC J. Williams, KSC 
• 
8 Materials Review W. Bland, MSC M. Faget, MSC 
9 Design Reviews R. Williams, MSC G. White, NASA Hqs 
.. 
10 Analysis of Fracture Areas P. Glynn, MSC B. Geer, NASA LaRC 
11 Medical Analysis G. Kelly, MSC F. Thompson, NASA 
LaRC 
G. Malley, Counsel 
12 Witness Statements N. Vaughn, MSC Col. C. Strang, USAF 
G. Malley, Counsel 
13 Ground Emergency Provisions 
Review G. Page, KSC CoJ. F. Borman, MSC 
14 Security of Operations C. Buckley, KSC Col. C. Strang, llSAF 
15 Board Administrative Procedures A.Griffin, KSC B. Geer. NASA LaRC 
16 Special Tests G. Stoops, MSC M. Faget, MSC 
17 Final Board Report Lt. Col. K. H. Hinchman, Col. C. Strang, USAF 
USAF 
18 Integration Analysis A. Mardel, MSC M. Faget, MSC 
19 Safety of. Investigation Operations J. Atkins B. Geer, NASA LaRC 
20 In Flight Fire Emergency 
Provisions Review Capt. J. Lovell CoJ. Borman, MSC 
21 Service Module Disposition W. Petynia J. Williams, KSC 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOAR.D 
PANEL 
Task No. 1 
.;;;;....-­
Task Title SIC &: aSE Configura tion 
• 
Task Description: 
..Establifh and document phYfical configuration of spacecraft and 
aSE immediately prior to and during fire incident including equipment
configuration, switch posItions, and non-flight items In cockpit. By
devIatIon, document confIguratIon differences wIth respect to expected
launch confIguratIon and confi~urations used In previous testIng,
(Altitude chamber, for example), af pertInent to this problem. TO 
a lower level of detail, document configurational difference between 
the spacecraft and other spacecraft af pertinent to this problem. 
Room 2301 Phone 65'18 
Panel Members: 
• Chairman R. Murad, NASA Hqs ~~~~~--------
C. Rouse, KSC 
Cognizant Board Member: J. Williams )j.W 
0-15-70 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
T lisk No. __--:;.?__ 
Task Title____~T~€~s~t~E~n~v~ir~o~num~eun~t£s________________________ 
.. 
Task Description: 
Provide hi~tory of all teft environmentf encountered by this 
!:pacecraft on a major a~sembl.y total a~~embly ba!:i!: which are 
germain to validation of ~Yftem~ from fire hazard !:tandpolnt. 
Include appropriate quallfication tefting of fYftems and sub­
fystems. Particular emphp.sif !:hould be placed on qualification 
tests in pure 02 with regard to pre!:sures, temperature, time of 
exposure,and simulation of equipment malfunction. Indicate any 
deficiencies in thIs test program related to the subject problem. 
Also, include comparison with previous testf of appropriate flight, 
houfe, or boilerplate spacecraft. Any problemf encountered related 
to fIre hazard shall be documented. 
Room 3431 Phone 5217 
Panel Members: 
W. HOllera NBC , Chairman F. Key. MSFC 
A. Toelicen, NAA-D 
H. Dunham! NBC/GE 
C. Nolen, MSC/GE 
,flvCognizant Board Member: G. Whlte 
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APOLLO 204 Ill::VIEW HOARD 
PANl::L 
Tas k No. _-...l3'--__ 
Task Title Sequence of Event!' (anamoly da ta review) 
• 
Task Description: 
Analyze data obtained immediately prior to and during the 

fire incident including digital, analog, voice communications, 

photography, etc. Dat~ should di!'play !'ignificant events as they

occurred with precise time teg. Time hl!'tories of all continuous 

or !'em-continuou!' recorded parameter!', correlation of parameter

variations pnd event!' shall be recorded as well a!' interpretation 

of the result!' of said anplY!'i!'. Where pertinent, normal expected

variations shall be compared with those actually obtained. 

Phone 62'70Room 2721 
Panel Members: 
_D_,_A-=..r_a_b_i_a_n.;:.,_M-S_C___, Chairman 
A. Tischler, NAA-D 
H. Creighton, KSC 
W. Eckmeier, NAA-KSC 
W. Jewel, KSC 
/l~,--rCognizant Board Member/'_:J J1MlO.........Fl!:<all.iggJe~t_______ 
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__ ________________________ 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. ____,~~_____ 

Task Title___Dis_a_s_s_e_m_b_ly~A_c_t_i_v_i_t_ie_s ._________________ 

Task Description: 
Develop plans and procedures for progressive disassembly of spacecraft 
for purposes of inspection and failure analysis. Disassembly should be con­
figured to proceed on a step-by-step basis, in a manner to obtain ,maxlmum 
amount of information prior to disturbing evidence. Contents of testing re­
quirements shall also be considered, Disassembly plans should consider both 
the cockpit and the area outside the pressure hull. Means for cataloglnq 
documentary information within spacecraft and for display of removed Items 
shall be a part of these plans and procedures. 
Room 1293 Phone 5497 
Panel Members: 
S. Simpkinson, HSC • Chairman D. Gr1111l1, me 
P. Han Ifin, NAA-D H. Shoaf' 
J. Hoore, NAA-KSC P. Oraf' 
S. Beddingfield, KSC R. Reed 
R. Covel 
Cognizant Board Member: F. Borman ." 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task NO. __5.......__ 

Task Title__O;;..r;..';..t9:..;.'.;.;n_.;;..n.;.;d:......;.P.;..r.:;;op!;.;.;;.t9r.,;;.;..;;l.;..lo;;..D.;.....;;o;.;.f....:....F.;..'r:....:e:......:.._______________ 
Task Description: 
Conduct inspections, chemical analyses, spectrographic analysis of spacecraft, 
parts or rubble or use any other useful techniques to establish point of fire 
origin, direction and rate of propagation. temperature gradients and extremes. 
The nature of the fire, the type of materials consumed, the degree of combustion 
shall be determined, 
Room 3229 Phone 7438 
Panel Members: 
_J_,_F_,_B_a_i_le_y_,_"'_S_C____, Chairman J. Yardley. HAC 
I. Pinkel, LeRC H. Carhart, NRL 
T. Horeff, FAA 
J. Leak. CAB 
J. Craig, MSC A. Kru'pnick 
Cogniz ant Board Member :_--"p... Van Do l... h... ...OM .... ....~"r............................ a.... , ...JB ......._ ·~2 
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_____ 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. _____ 

Task Title____H~i~s~t~o_r_ic~a~I~D~a~t_a________________________________________________ 

Task Description: 
Assemble. review, and summarize historical data on spacecraft and associated 
systems as pertinent to the fire incident. Data to be analyzed shall include 
records such as included in spacecraft log, failure reports, other quality engin­
eering and inspection documents. Make interpretation on data as tu applicability 
to subject problem. 
Room 1237 Phone 3384 
Panel Members: 
T.J. Adams. MSC Chairman J. Hansel, NAA-KSC 
D. Buffington, NAA-KSC 
J. Dickinson, KSC 
Cognizant Board Member:,___G_._W_h_i_t_e-..;hc..':!::...:...y _ 
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APOLLO 204 nEVIE\\ BOAHD 
PANEL 
Task r-:o. 
Task Title__T_e_s_t_P_r_o_c_e_d_u_r_e_s__R_e_v_ie_w_________________________________________ 
•Task Description: 
Document test proc~dures actually employed during day of Incident. Indicate 
deviations between planned procedures and those actually used. Determine from 
review potential changes that might alleviate fire hazard conditions or that 
might provide for improved reaction or corrective conditions. Re~ew these changes 
with respect to applicability to other test sites or test conditions. 
Room 2141 
Panel Members: 
D. Nichols, KSC , Chairman F. Bryan, KSC 
-------~----------
K. Cuzzupoli, NAA-D R. Swanson, NAA-D 
H. Cahill, NAA-KSC 
W. Petynla, HSC H. Luetjen 
x: g:i~J~"m~D' 
.. ~'/I &.v- C. Brooks, MSFC Cogniz ant Board Member :__ am"5,,-:_'f'9j-'9~'-------.!,",--.lIWu.I..LI..LI.1.1.. 
V 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. __M_~___ 

Task Title, ____ M_a_te_r_ia_l_s__R_e_v_i_ew_______________________________________________ 

Task Description: 
Assemble and summarize data and analysis related to flammability of spacecraft 
materials. Results of other programs as well as Apollo shall be considered. Re­
quirements for additional testing shall be recommended. Review Apollo test condi­
tions for adequacy. Make recommendations for material or configuration changes 
to alleviate fire hazard. Perform analysis as appropriate to determine overa', 
energy balance, correlations with temperature and pressure build-up, etc. 
Room '800 Phone 51.j.84 
Panel Members: 
W...-. ...;B:.,.'_a...;n_d,.!.,_I1:...S:...C_________• Chairman R. Olsen, NAA-D 
A. Busch, KSC E. Welhart, MAC 
Archer, NAA-KSC W. Riehl, MSFC 
A. Stakl1s, MBC 
~y.r 
Cogniz ant Board Member~._/__;f._._~_aa..:~g:...ee_tt_____________ 
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APOLLO ~04 HEVII:;\V BOi\HD 
PANEL 
Task No. :!
---'--­
Design Reviews Task Title 
Task Description: 
Conduct critical design reviews of systems or subsystems that may be potential 
ignition sources within cockpit or which might provide a combustible condition 
in either normal or failed conditions. Areas such as glycol plumbing configuration, 
electrical wiring and its protection, physical and electrical, other potential 
ignition sources such as motors, relays, and corona discharge. Other areas of 
review include egress augmentation and basic cabin atmosphere concept (I vs, 2 gas). 
Document where applicable pros and cons of design decisions made. Summarize rec­
ommended changes for corrective action, 
Room 3301 Phone :270 
Panel Members: 
R. Williams, MSC , Chairman A. Cohen. MSC ~~~~~~~-----
J, McCarthy, NAA-D Fred Sanders 
J. Janokaltis, KSC 
R. Pyle, NAA-KSC 
G. White, NASA Hq j,¥'Cognizant Board Member: 
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APOJ .LO 204 REV i EW BOARD 
PANEl. 
Ta:;k :-';u. __	.:.;.;.__ 
Analysis of Fracture AreasTask Title 
Task Description: 
Inspect spacecraft for structural failures resulting from fire. Analyze 
these failures from standpoint of local pressure - temperature levels,directlon 
of gas flow, etc. 
ROOIIl 2308 Phone 7870 
Panel Members: 
P. Glynn, HSC , Chairman N. Koenig, NASA - KSC 
L. Korb, NAA-D 
R. Johnson, HSC 
D. Root, NAA-D 
J -;------------­
Cognizant Board Member:_-"G"'e"'e....r .,".....<'-'.~-,·""_,/"----­..  .... 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No~ 11 
T ask Title Medical Analysis 
Task Description: 
Medical Analysis. A summary of medical facts together with appropriate 
medicar-analysis which would be of interest to the investigation. Examples 
would be cause of death, pathological evidence of overpressure, and any 
other areas that might be of technical value in determining the cause of 
accident or in establishing corrective action. 
Roan 3849 
Panel Members: 
G. Kelly, MSC • Chairman P. Hoffman. USAF ------~~----------
A. Harter, KSC E. Ferguson, Jr., USAF 
N. Pincock, KSC T. Spann 
R. Thompson. PAA .,,~riSh 
Cognizant Board Member :__ ----<V'--_'-=Dr=..:..'_Th=omp=;:.:s:..:o:.:n~7fVL':-J'<"'· _ 
G. Halley. ~unsel 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task NO._-'1::::2.......__ 

Task Title Witness Statements 

Task Description: 
An orderly process to collect all data from witnesses (includes eye 
witnesses as well as concole monitors). This includes a determination 
of who to interview, arranging for competent people to conduct the inter­
. 	views, recording data, and collecting it into a form suitable tor publica­
tion as an appendix to the formal report. Included also in this task is an 
analysis of' the pertinent sequence of events as reported by the bulk of' the 
witnesses together with a summary of that testimony which is contradictory 
to the main data. 
Room 3229 
Panel Members: 
Lt. Col. Rawers, USAFN. Vaughn, MBC • Chairman 
--------~---------
J. O' Ixmnell, KSC 	 R. BlackWood, NASA Hq•. 
C. McNamara, NM-KSC 
C. Netherton, KSC 
Col. C. Strang, USAFCognizant Board Member: 
G. Kalley, Counsel 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No, ___1...3__ 

Task Title Ground &Iergency Provisions Review' 

Task Description: 
This task involves an orderly review of planned ground emergency procedures 
relative to their adequacy, as well as a review to determine that emergency 
procedures, in fact, exist for all appropriate activities. This review 
should concentrate on activity at the launch Site, and should include recommendations 
to the board for changes in existing procedures and for the creation of new 
emergency procedures if deemed necessary. 
Room 21.21 Phone 6230 
Panel Members: 
_G_._P_ag_e_,_KS_C_____, Chairman H. Russell, NASA Hq. 
G. Smith, NAA-D 
W. Cunningbam 
R. Sayers 
MOO 
MSC 
J. Cbappee, MSC L. Barnett R. Rochester 
KSC 
NAA-GSE 
K. Wishon, NAA-KSC M. Carlson KSC-LVO 
H•. Luetjen 
Cognizant Board Member:_~Fu.~Bo:lo!rman"'_=___f6_____ 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. __l_4__ 

Task Title Security of Operations 

-------~--~-------------------------------
Task Description: 
This group shall review existing security practices for adequacy. This 
includes such things as aCcess control, personnel sign in requirements, 
buddy systems, background investigation requirements, etc. They shall also 
make responsible recommendations to the board on changes to existing 
practices. 
Room 1239 Phone 2350 
Panel Members: 
__C_._B_u_c_kle_..;;y..:., KSC R. Gaines Lewis______• Chairman 
H. Maines NASA Hq. Vice-Chairman W. Romer KSC 
S. Ellis, MSFC Col.W • Dugan 
C. Buckel, MBC 
Col. C. Strang, USAF tf'MCognizant Board Member: 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. 
Task Title 
15 
Board Administrative Procedures 
Task Description: 
This group shall establish and documert a.dIninistrative procedures for 
the board to use. This includes activity such as procedures for the control 
of spacecraft work, logging and filing o~ exhibits, maintenance of log of 
board activities, scbedulingof meetings, preparation of agenda for board 
meetings, arrangements for secretarial services, reporduction of material, 
etc. 
Room 1842 Phone 6706 
Panel Members: 
A. Griffin, KBC • Chairman w. Moody--~~~~~-------
P. Reed, NAA-KBCG. Huffines, MSC 
Cognizant Board Member:___Gee.. z_@:;:.v:;;-:,_'........r ......... _ ___ 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. 16 
Task Title Special Tests 
Task Description: 
This task involves the coordination of desired tests generated by other 
groups into an overall integrated test plan. For example flammability test­
ing will probably be done at several locations. TIl1s group will assure proper 
ccordination of this activity. Major tests such as mockups of actual con­
figuration, boiler plate destructive combustion tests, eta. would be considered 
by this group, and appropriate action recommendations would be made to the 
board. Test results would be collected, reviewed, and edited in a form suitable 
for inclusion in the final report. 
Phone 5371 
Panel Members: 
G. stoops, MaC • Chairman 
J. Jeter, KBC 
E. GUM, NAA 
J. Saunders, NASA Hq. 
.... j!i..!M.,o:;::':Cognizant Board Member:._-'I'-/'I_--"'MP: .... ...r......_____ 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No, 17 
Task Title Final Board Report 
T ask Description: 
This activity involves the organization of the report, the delegation of 
responsibility to other assigned task groups, the review and editing of submitted 
material, and the final preparation of the report. 
Room 1806 Phone 6505 
Panel Members: 
Lt. Col. K.H. Hinchmap Chairman 
J. Ross 
R. Smith 
.Cognl'zant Board Member:__.l<.\,j......""""'"""'WIS__~"-'·'-~I-'-·.:.;,'-­Col. Str!i!.IJS u:1l::l 
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ApnL1,0 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. 18 
Task Title Integration Analysis 
Task Description: 
This task involves the review of inputs from all task groups, the correlation 
of all pertinent information, feedback for further study, and the final technical 
inte~~tion of the evidence. 
Room 2130 Phone 6722 
Panel Members: 
__.!.!A.:.,• ...:Ma.c=r,-,d",e::!l::.J.,--,-,M",S;.:;:C~__• C hai rman S. Jones MSC 
D. Levine, NAA-D H. Taylor MSC 
R. Pyle NAA-MSC D. Moyhew MSC 
C. Mars, KSC A. COhen MSC 
Cognizant Board Member:~ ~~ J. Lobb E. Walters MSC MSC 
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APOLLO 204 REV lEW BO/\ RD 
PANEL 
Task No. 19 
Task Title Safety of Investigation Operations 
Task Description: 
This group is charged with the responsibility of reviewing all optCrb.tions 
performed during the investigation to assure that all personnel safety require­
ments are adequately maintained. 
Room 1427 Phone 7390 
Panel Members: 
John Atkins, KSC • Chairman Lt. Col. Jim Rawers, AFETR 
D. Karl, PAA Pad Safety 
Ralph Walker, Bendix System SAfety 

John McGough, KSC Operations Safety 

Cognizant Boarrl M('mber:____ __B_._Ge_e_r_.:....~=__0::;.·_v_' _ 
D-1S-88 
__ __________ 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
PANEL 
Task No. ___20~_ 

Task Tit1e__I_n_-_F_l_i.::g_ht_F_1_r_e_Emer.::g~e_n...:Cy=-P_r_o_v_i_S_1_o_n_s_R_e_vi_e_w _ 

Task Description: 
This task involves an orderly review of planned in-flight fire emergency procedures 
and other provisions relative to their adequacy, as well as a review to determine 
that emergency procedures, in fact, exist for all appropriate activities, This 
review should include recommendations to the board for changes in existing 
procedures and other provisions and for the creation of new emergency provisions 
if deemed necessary, 
Room 3431 Phone 6666 
Panel Members: 
_C_a..:p_t_,_J_,_L_O_v_e_l_l__M_SC___• Chairman T, Loe 
Lt. Col. R. Evans MSC N. Shyken 
J, Swigert, Jr.R, Warren 
R. Glover 
Cognizant Board Member: F. Borman ~ 
0-15-89 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW B( },\HI> 
PANEl. 
Task No. 21 
Task Title Service Module Disposition 
Task Description: 
This task involves the planning and execution of necessary 
SM activity beginning at the time of Board approval for eM de­
mate, This task will be performed mainly by appropriate Apollo 
line organizational elements in accordance with a Board approval 
plan which identifies the Board requirements for documentation 
and control of this activity. 
Panel Members: 
w. W. Petyn1a, MSC ,Chairman 
------------~-----
R. D. Carothers, KSC 
B Haight, NASA-JiBe 
Cogn i zant Board Membe r :_---'J"-!..-'"-W.;:!i-=l-=l-=i"'a:..::m::;:s"--.;'h'i7­.....· _L_~_._ 
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Attachment 2 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
Admin. Procedure No. 20 
February 18. 1967 
OUTLINE FOR PANEL REPORTS 
This review, as in all accident investigations, will determine a primary or most probable cause 
of the mishap. Once the primary, or most probable cause has been determined, a recommendation as to 
corrective action(s) to prevent a recurrence is then agreed upon. Each task panel pursues its course 
of action and submits a report through the Board Monitor to the Review Board with one (1) copy. This 
report, while it might not relate to the determined primary cause, could be data that exposes contribut· 
ing causes to this accident. Each panel. be it test environments, historical data. test procedures re· 
view or any other panel has a most important function within the structure of the Apollo 204 Review 
Board. In addition to determining what caused the accident, a good review board determines what ex· 
isting designs. technical data, test procedures, etc., did not contribute to the mishap. In other words. 
a validation process runs concurrently with the accident investigation as a beneficial by· product. It
... 
is conceivable that these task panel reports will be referred to in the future for information as to sys· 
tems operations and/or reliability during adverse conditions. 
Certain task panel reports will provide the basis for the "Narrative" of the accident. as well 
as the input to the Board for the "Investigation and Analysis" portion of the final report. 
The desired format of the task panel reports is attached. 
261-1100-67-15 0·15·91 
FORMAT FOR TASK PANEL REPORT 

Part Vll • Apollo 204 Review Board 
Task Panel Report 
Section A. 	 This is the work statement assigned the panel by the Review Board. (Charter of task to be 
accomplished) 
Section B. Proceedings (How assigned work statement was accomplished) 
Section C. 	 Findings and Determinations 
Findings and determinations should not only be addressed to the proximate cause(s) of 
the accident. They should also cover any condition discovered which could have caused 
the accident or which, in any way, could improve the mi ssion of the Apollo Program. 
I. 	 Finding: 
No overall evaluation ..........(Fact). 

Determination: 

It is concluded that ........... (Assumption; logical conclusion; considered 
opinion, etc.) 
2. 	 Finding: 

Determination: 

Section D. 	 Supporting Data 
This section will include identified photographs, if appropriate, test results, diagrams, 
consultant statements, recitals, copies of data. etc. 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 19, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 21 
TITLE: 	 Access Control to Service Module Disassembly Area 
SCOPE: This procedure covers access control to the Service Module Disassembly Area 
(herein after called Controlled Areas) located in High Bay of the MSOB. This 
procedure is effective from the time of entry of the Service Module mto the Con· 
trolled Areas until release by the Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman. 
POLICY: 	 I. In order not to restrict other concurrent operations taking place ip the High 
Bay of the MSOB, the Controlled Areas will move as the vehicle is p'rocessed 
through the High Bay. The 3 Controlled Areas will be as follows: (see attach­
ment). 
a. 	 CONTROLLED AREA NO. I: Integrated Stand No. I (Duration of control 
will be approximately 2 days). 
h. 	 CONTROLLED AREA NO.2: H14-124 Stand (Duration of control will be 
approximately 1 day). 
c. 	 CONTROLLED AREA NO.3: H14·134 Stand (Vehicle will remain on this 
stand until release by Apollo 204 Review Board Chairman). . 
2. Limited access to the Controlled Areas shall be maintained on a full time basis 
(24 hours per day) by a security monitor. 
3. A log of all personnel not on the access list that are permitted entry into,the 
Controlled Areas will be maintained by the security monitor. 
4. Persons authorized to sign in visitors and/or add to the access list are nbted 
by appropriate asterisk(s) on the list. 
PROCEDURE: 	 1. Personnel will clear through Jhe security monitor prior to entering the Controlled 
Area. No special badging will be provided. 
2. Personnel will enter and leave the Controlled Areas as shown in the attached 
sketch. 
/5/ Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 20.4 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 23, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 22 
TITLE: 	 Control of Audio Magnetic Tapes 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure covers the control of all voice transmission recordings relative to 
spacecraft 012 during the Plugs Out Test on January 27, 1967 .. 
POLICY; 	 L All original and duplicate voice recordings on 1/4" magnetic tape relative to 
SIC 012 after 06,OO.january 27,1967 shall be included in this procedure. 
2, Access to these voice tapes as well as duplicates shall be restricted to 
Board Members, Panel Chairmen or their designees as specified in writing. 
3. All tapes will be located in a controlled central tape library. Playback of these 
tapes will be in accordance with the procedure as specifiecibelow. 
PROCEDURE: 	 1. All original and duplicate voice tapes will be impounded in Room 2721B, MSOB, 
Phone: 867-6270. 
2. Original tapes will be playeQ back olllyto make a duplicate. 
3. Playbacks will be from a duplicate only. 
4. A duplicate can be made from an original only when authorized: in writing by a 
.. Board member. 
5. All originals and duplicates will be maint~ined in a central tape library located 
in Room 2721 B where recorders will beavailable for authorized personnel. 
.6. Mr. G. Huffines or his alternate is the central tape library manager and is respon­
sible.fcx maintaining the tapes in a locked safe and for ensuring that only authorized 
personnel have access to the tapes. He. will schedule and coorc:Jinate playbacks to 
assure efficient use of tapes and rec;orders. Hour~ of the library will normally be 
daily from 8 am to 1630 p.m. Arran~eJllents for use of the library at times other than 
normal duty hours can be made by contacting the manager. 
7. Original tapes containing the time interval 23:25 Z - 23:35Z wHi be duplicated 
in two parts with this ti~ interval or any part thereof being on a separate tape. This 
time interval requires written AS204 R~view Bpard approval to be played back. 
8. Any original may be duplicated at the requ~st ~f an authorized person, but the 
duplicate wilfbe retained in the central tape library. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

FEBRUARY 25, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 23 
TITLE: 	 Disposition and Storage of Physical Evidence 
SCOPE: 	 This procedute covers the disposition and storage of Command Module 012 foIlowiBg 
the completion of the on site investigation by the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
POLICY: 	 Except for further testing of components deemed necessary by the ApOllo 204 Review 
Board, the physical evidence, comprised of the Cbmmand Module of Spacecraft 012 
together with its various compoI'ents and systems installed therein at the time of the 
accident occurring on January 27, 1967, shall be placed in the custody of the John F. 
Kennedy Space Center. When approved by the Board, the systems requiring no further 
tests shall be reinstalled, as practicable, in the spacecraft. The spacecraft. together 
with all items, systems and components showing evidence of damage caused by the 
incident of January 27; 1967, shall be placed in a weather tight. secured container 
with appropriate locks and seals. Access to the locks a'nd seals shall be controlled 
by an individual delegated custodial responsibility for the evidence by the Boar~. 
PROCEDURE: 	 L In the event it becomes necessary or desirable to reexamine any system or com­
ponent within the spacecraft, or the spacecraft itself, Board approval for such access 
shall be obtained, and in accordance with such reasonable precautions as may be ne­
cessary to preserve the evidentiary nature of the module, the Custodian shall permit· 
such access. 
2. In the event it becomes necessary to remove from the module any item. system or 
component for further testing, a receipt shall be tendered to the custodian of the 
module, together with a reference to the test to be performed, and the place of perfor· 
mance. As a necessary part of any further testing procedures, the condition of the 
item, system or component shall be noted; the exact nature of the test to be performed 
shall be described; the time, date and place of testing shall b~ listed; the results of 
the test shall be documented and the item, system or component shall be returned to 
the module custOdian. Upon receipt of the item, system or component, with documen· 
tation in accordance with this procedure. the item. system or component shall be re· 
installed. as practicable, in the module, and the documentary results of the test shall 
be forwarded by the module custodian to the Board's depOsitory at Langley Research 
Center, Hampton. Virginia; Attention: Apollo 204 Records Custodian. 
3. Bonded and sealed storage of the module and its items, systems and components 
shall be continued for aperiod of 10 years, unless sooner ordered released from 
storage by the Board. At the end of a 10 year period of time, providing no further use 
of the module then appears, the module, its items, systems and components shall be 
disposed of in accordance with the instructions of the Board. 
0-15-96 

4. During aU times the module and its related equipment is in sealed and bonded stor­
age, efforts shall be maintained to prevent its examination by curiosity seekers and 
others not having a bona fide interest in the module and its equiprrent. Final dispo­
sition of the module shall be· in accordance with such procedures as to prevent its ex· 
ploitation as a commercial exhibit, or its use as a curiosity. 
lSI Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

MARCH 10, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 24 .. 
TITLE: 	 Environmental Control System (ECS) Investigation 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure is applicable to all elements of the AS 204 Review Board and 
authorizes and imtiates an investigation of the Spacecraft 012 Command Module 
ECS. The ECS will be tested, disassembled, and analyzed to the fullest extent 
to determine: 
a. PoSsible fire initiators 
b. Possible fire propagators 
c. Suitability and safety of design and fabricated hardware for use in 
SIC applications. 
POllCY: 	 1. This task will be conducted utilizing existing AS 204 Review Board Procedures. 
2. A Board designated agent is berein appointed and is to be supported as required 
by the SIC Prime Contractor, the pertinent Subcontractors, KSC· Materials Analysis 
Branch and appropriate quality and support elements. 
S. After approval of pertinent general test plans, the designated Board Agent is re· 
sponsible for the generation. control, and implementation of the detailed plans and 
activities. 
PROCEDURE: 	 1. This procedure establisbes the SIC 012 ECS Investigation Committee and de· 
lineates the Committee's authority. 
2. The ECS Investigation Committee will consist of: 
a. D. Hampton, Chairman (Board Designated Agent) 
b. Robert A. Bruce (Alternate Board Designated Agent) 
c. E. Wright. KSC • ECS 
d. D. Evans. KSC • MAB 
e. W. Hunter, NAA • Downey 
f. E. Griffith, NAA - F. F. 
g. D. Nell. Air Research 
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3. The Board designated Agent will act as Chairman of this Committee and is 
granted the same authority and privileges as has been defined for Panel Chair· 
man in the existing Administrative Procedures. 
4. Each member of this Committee may, at his discretion, call a temporary hold 
to the operation. An immediate appraisal will be provided with all attempts made 
to reach a mutually agreeable solution. If such cannot be achieved, work will not 
progress beyond the point of no return until the Board designated Agent has ob· 
tained resolution from higher authority. 
5. MAB will act as staff advisors in the Investigation and conduct specialized 
investigations as required. 
6. Air Research will provide engineering advice, planning Procedures, testing 
and disassembly as required on Air Research supplied subassemblies and com· 
ponents. 
7. North American Aviation will provide those normal services such as system 
level engineering, TPS gener'!-tion, GSE preparation, testing, QC inspection, etc. 
REPORTING: 1. Periodic progress reports will be made at pertinent intervals. 
2. A final integrated report will be published upon completion of the effort. 
lSI 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 

MARCH 13, 1967 

Administrative Procedure No. 25 
TITLE: 	 Continuation of Testillg ill Support of Apollo 204 Review after recess of Board 
SCOPE: 	 This procedure is applicable to all elements of the Apollo 204 Spacecraft Program 
Office, Kennedy Space Center, and Manned Spacecraft Center that require testing 
and analysis of subsystems, components, and materials of Spacecraft 012 command 
module in support of the Apollo 204 investigation. This procedure becomes ef· 
fective when the Apollo 204 Review Board completes its on - site investigatioll and 
recesses. 
POLlCY; 	 The policy and procedures set forth in Administrative Procedures 5, II. and 23, 
not inconsistent herewith, are applicable. Unless otherwise approved, only non­
destructive testing is permissable. 
PROCEDURE: 	 L When a requirement exists for testing, the custodial agent shall be infa:med 
thereof. 
2. Laborata:y tests and analyses in support of the investigation of the Board will 
be continued by the appropriate Panel or Panels after recess of the Board, and the 
results of such tests shall be incorpa:ated serially in Appendix G of the Final Re­
port of the Board and appropriate distribution made. 
/S/ 	Dr. Floyd L. Thompson 
Chairman 
Apollo 204 Review Board 
0·15·100 
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REPOllT OF PANEL 16 
SPECIAL TEST 
TO 
FINAL REPORT OF 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
0-16-1 


SPECIAL TESTS 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Special Tests Panel, 16. The task assigned for accom· 
plishment by Panel 16 was prescribed as follows: . . 
This task involves the coordination of desired tests generated by other groups into an overall 
integrated test plan. For example flammability testing will probably be done at Several locations. 
This group will assure proper coordination of this activity. Major tests such as mockups of actual 
configuration, boilerplate destructive combustion tests, etc., would be eonsideredby this group. 
Test results would be collected, reviewed, and edited in a form suitable for inclusion in the final 
report. 
B. PANEk ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Special Tests Panel: 
.' Mr. G. J. Stoops, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr.]. D. Jeter, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. J. F. Saunders, Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), NASA 
Mr. M. E. Gunn, North American Aviation, Inc., KSC 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Dr. Maxime Faget, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA,"Board Memb~r, was assigned to 
monitor the Special Tests Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. INVESTIGATION APPROACH: 
a. The request for special tests were generated by Members of the Board, Panel Chairmen, or Panel 
members. It was the responsibility of Panel 16 to review these requests to assure that: 
(1) Test duplication did not exist 
(2) The test was relevant to the AS·204 Review. 
(3) The test would contribute significant and meaningful technical results. 
b. The Special Test Panel was also responsible for: 
(1) Securing appropriate hardware or materials to accomplish the test. 
(2) Proposing the test facility and/or agencyto perform the test. 
(3) Scheduling the test. 
(4) Securing the appropriate approval to implement the test. 
(5) Assuring that test data and reports were submitted by the test agency and delivered to the 
requester. 
(6) Maintaining a test status. 
(7) Publishing a periodic test summary and status. 
c. Panel 16 served as a separate Panel from January 31, 1967, through February 23, 1967. The 
Panel was dissolved on February 23, 1967, and merged with Panel 18. This merger was accom· 
plished to better support the Apollo 204 Review. The work statement of Panel 16 remained virtually 
unchanged and at that time continued as a responsibility of Panel 18. 
2. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES: 
a. The accomplishment of the assigned task required that Panel 16 establish a system to receive, 
maintain status of, and implement special testing. A Request for Special Test (RST) form was 
devised and issued to all Panel Chairmen on February 13, 1967. The purpose of this form was to 
permit the requestor of a special test to do so with minimum effort and maximum speed. The RST 
form also displays the test approval signature, the test location, and the originator. 
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b. Panel 16's test files were set up using Spe6al Tesf Number (STN) as the file index and tracking 
number. The RST and the STN are synonymous. All correspondence, data, reports and other 
incidental information was filed by this number. 
c. The Special Test Panel reviewed each test request to establish hardware/material requirements 
· and to determine the test agency or facility who could best accomplish the test. Panel responsibility 
· also required that the procurement or shipment of hardware necessary to perform the test be accom­
plished. ,The Special Test Panel fulfilled this responsibility through the use of appropriate contractual 
. channels. 

'd. Panel 16 presented the test request with the recommendation of approval or disapproval to Inte­

grationAnalysis Panel,18. This recommendation included the proposed test facility, the availability 

of hardware, and the priority of the test relative to other AS-204 Review testing being done in the 

same facility. 

e. Test approvals were acquired from either the Review Board or Panel 18. Board approval was 
required on all tests which utilized Spacecraft 012 hardware or spares or "one of a kind" hardware 
whose use required control. This assured its availability for AS-204 Review Board usage. Board 
approval was secured through Panel 18 and the Panel Coordinating Committee. All other testing 
was approved by Panc::l 18 prior to implementation. 
f. Implementation of the test was accomplished by either a Test Preparation Sheet (TPS) or an 
Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Request (ASHUR). The latter is described in Apollo 204 
Administrative Procedure Number 5C (Appendix D-15). The TPS was used for defining the test 
requirements and procedures for all Kennedy Sp'lce Center (KSC) and Manned Spacecraft Center 
(MSC) testing. The ASHUR defined the test requirements and was used for all Spacecraft 012 
hardware testing accomplished at any location other than KSC. 
g. Test data and reports resulting from special tests were submitted to Panel 16.. Panel 16 distrib­
uted the test results to the originator lor his technical evaluation and subsequent inclusion in his 
final report. Panel 16 was not responsible for performing a technical evaluation of the test data. 
However, it was responsible for assuring that the data and reports were submitted by the test 
organization immediately following completion of the test. A summary of pertinent test' evaluations 
resulting from Special Tests is included in the Panel 18 final report. 
h. Panel 16 test files were closed out individually as the tests were completed. Test reports and data 
were distributed to the test originator. The total file, including originals and working paper, was 
officially transmitted to Panel 17 for filing. 
i. The first test summary was published on February 4, 1967. Starting on February 14, 1967, the 
status summary was published each Tuesday and Thursday and has continued through the Apollo 
204 Review. The Special Test Summary was distributed to each Panel Chairman and the members 
of the Panel Coordinating Committee. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
· This section is not applicable to Panel 16. Technical evaluations of tests were performed and re­
ported by other Panels. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
Enclosure Description 
16-1 Special Test Statistical Summary 

16-2 .. Special Test Synopsis 
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SPECIAL TEST SUMMARY 
MARCH 14, 1967 
SPECIAL TEST REQUESTS 
DISAPPROVED 
IN PROCESSING 
APPROVED 
(TOTAL) 
11 
1 
38 
50 
IN TEST (TOTAL) 
KSC 
MSC 
OTHER 
9 
1 
11 
COMPLETED TESTING (TOTAL) 
RESULTS NOT RECEIVED 
RESULTS RECEIVED 
RESULTS IN PANEL REVIEW 
CLOSED OUT 
8 
12 
7 
20 
27 
ENCLOSURE 16- 1 
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SPECIAL TEST SYNOPSIS 

STN 	 TEST TITLE TEST PURPOSE 
1. 	 TV SIMULATION Substantiate visual resolution expected from a TV 
monitor system. Test completed on Spacecraft 008 
per TPS V16·002·068. Evaluation by Panel 18. 
2. 	 CLEANING FLUID SQUEEZE Assure that bottle contents had no causitive relation· 
BOTTLE ANALYSIS ship to the accident. Analysis per TPS SIC 012·MA· 
003. Evaluation by Panel 18. 
3. COBRA CABLE - SPARK 	 Determine if connecting or disconnecting cobra cable 
IGNITION SOURCE could causc spark or ignition. TPS SIC 012·MA·016 
complete. TPS SIC 012-MA·018 waiting parts. Eval· 
uation by Panel 8. 
·' 
4. NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION Required as a visual reference to support investigation. 
MOCK·UP NUMBER 2 SHIPMENT Arrived February 8, 1967 - No evaluation required. 
5. ONE·HALF SCALE MOC
SHIPMENT 
K·UP Required to Depict SIC 012 Cabin Interior. Arrived 
February 8, 1967. No evaluation required. 
6. SIC 014 SHIPMENT Spacecraft 014 required as a practice and procedure 
verification vehicle for SIC 012 disassembly activities 
. Arrived February 1, 1967. No evaluation required. 
7. EMERGENCY EGRESS TEST Determine force required to break hatch seal at 
various cabin pressures. Test disapproved because of 
hatch redesign. No evaluation required. 
8. SPECIAL HANDLING 
PROCEDURE· SIC 012 
Develop procedure to assure proper handling, testing, 
and disposition of SIC 012 hardware. Administrative 
Procedure 5B released February 8, 1967; revised to 
5C on March 3, 1967. 
9. SPACE SUIT TEST Determine response of demand regulator to various 
movements of a suited ,crew member. Completed on 
MSC Portable Life Support System (PLSS) console 
per TPS EC44·0120 and TPS EC44·0121. Evaluation 
by Panel 3. 
10. BECKMAN OXYGEN 
ANALYZER· GAS ANALYSIS 
Determine whether any clue to the cause of the fire 
could be found in the gas analyzers· Completed in 
KSC Materials Analysis Branch (MAB) per TPS 
SIC 012·S/C 007 . Evaluation by Panel 18. 
11. OXYGEN FLOW RATE 
SENSOR TEST 
Attempt to simulate SIC 012 oxygen flow rate data 
by subjecting a spare transducer to varying loads· 
TPS SIC 012-CM-CA 028. Evaluation by Panel 3. 
12. ANALYTICAL STUDY O
FLAMMABILITY OF 
MATERIAL IN OXYGE
F 
N 
Provide a basis for a comprehensive. fire control pro· 
gram in the spacecraft. Four week study contract 
awarded to Atlantic Research on February 16, 1967. 
Evaluation by Panel 8. 
ENCLOSURE 16-2 
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Determine ability of LiOH canister used during OCP 
FO-K -0021-1 to meet qualification of flight hardware­
Test Disapproved. Information available to verify that 
canister did not qualify as flight hardware. 
Determine if connector would arc when dropped onto 
a metal surface with power applied. Completed on 
SIC OOS per TPS V16-001-073. Evaluation by Panel 
IS. 
Determine the. composltlOn of the gases generated 
from the combustion of a LiOH canister. Test re­
quirements incorporated into Special Test No. 50. 
Dctcrmill(~ f(:a~:lioll of powered gas chromatograph 
connector to water/glycol vapor and liquid - to be 
accomplished in KSC-MAB per TPS SIC 012-CM­
MA-016. Evaluation by Panel IS. 
Attempt to determine spacecraft configuration and } 
operations which could produce conditions found in 
SIC 012 data - accomplished on SIC OOS per TPS 
V16-006-064. Evaluation by Panel 3. 
Attempt to simulate SIC 012 communications anom­
alies by performing multiple keying operations on 
SIC 008. Test cancelled because of questionable 
value of information that would be obtained. 
Symbolically simulate the accident by providing smoke 
and fire glow as described by witnesses. Test dis­
approved as providing no meaningful information 
beyond that obtained in the first TV test. 
Verify adequacy of procedures used to clean connect­
ors on SIC 012 exposed to water/glycol. Combined 
with special test No. 33 because of similarity. To be 
accomplished in KSC-MAB. Evaluation by Panel 8. 
Attempt to duplicate high suit flow rates and possible 
suit hose disconnect seen in SIC 012 data - accom­
plished at MSC on breadboard per TPS STB·A·167. 
Evaluation by Panel 3. 
Attempt to simulate electrical anomalies indicated on 
SIC 012 data at the time of the accident - accom· 
plished on SIC 008 per TPS V16-001-073. Evaluation 
by Panel 3. 
Determine if energized connector rubbing over Velcro 
treated with glycol and methyl-ethyl-ketone (MEK) 
would cause ignition. Test disapproved as not pro­
viding meaningful information. 
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13. 	 QUALIFICATION-TYPE 
TEST ON LITHIUM 
HYDROXIDE (LiOH) 
CANISTER 
14. 	 GAS CHROMATOGRAPH 
CABLE ARCING TEST 
15. 	 DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS 
OF LiOH CANISTER 
16. 	 GAS CHROMATOGRAPH 
CABLE: WATER/GLYCOL 
17. 	 CHROMATOGRAPH AND 
ALTERNATING CURRENT 
(AC) BUS SWITCHING 
TEST 
IS. 	 MULTIPLE KEYING TEST 
19. 	 SMOKE AND FIRE GLOW 
SIMULATION ON TELE­
VISION MONITOR 
20. 	 VERIFY PROCEDURES USED 
TO CLEAN CONNECTORS 
EXPOSED TO WATER/GLYCOL 
21. 	 FLOW MEASUREMENT IN 
SUIT LOOP UNDER VARYING 
CONDITIONS 
22. 	 SPACECRAFT ELECTRICAL 
TESTS 
23. 	 GAS CHROMATOGRAPH 
CONNECTOR: TREATED 
VELCRO ARCING TEST 
TEST 

24. 

25. 
26. 
ZT. 
J 
J. 28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
~ 
32. 
33. 
ELECTROSTATIC TEST­
SPACE SUIT 
SIC 012 ATMOSPHERE ­
RELATIVE HUMIDITY 
VENT VALVE OPERATION 
GAS CHROMATOGRAPH 
CABLE PROCUREMENT 
SUIT FLOW TESTS 
ANALYSIS OF SIC 012 
GAS CHROMATOGRAPH 
CABLE 
ANALYSIS OF LIQUID 
FROM QUAD ENGINE 
ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 
OF GAS MELON 
FLAME RATE OF ETHYLENE 
GLyCOL/WATER MIXTURES 
WATER/GLYCOL EFFECTS 
Determine electrostatic charge that can be developed 
by a suited crewman in spacecraft atmospheres. Part 
1 - TPS Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA) 152 com­
plete - Part 2 - TPS SIC 014-CM 038 pending 
spacecraft availability. Evaluation by Panel 8. 
Calculations of SIC 012 atmosphere relative hu­
midity entered in Special Test Log because of its 
potential use. Technical evaluation not required. 
Determine maximum cabin pressure at which vent 
valve fails to operate. Test disapproved because vent 
valve was not designed for use in over-pressure con­
ditions. 
Procuremcnl aClion to assure availability of spare gas 
chromatograph eahk'll for lest usage. Cables recC'iverl 
February 25, 1967. 
Obtain additional information for evaluation of SIC 
012 suit flow data test constrained by lack of a 
properly configured spacecraft. To be performed at 
MSC. Evaluation by Panel 3. 
Determine damage to and involvement of gas chrom­
atograph cable in cause of accident - analysis in 
progress in KSC-MAB per TPS SIC 012,CM-IV088. 
MAB report MAB-238-67. Evaluation by Panel 18. 
Analyze liquid from Quad B, Engine No.3 to deter­
mine composition and source - analyzed in KSC-MAB 
per TPS SIC 012-SM-MA 001, MAB Report Num­
tier MAB-232-67. Evaluation by Panel 18. 
Attempt to gain further information on contents of 
melon sampler used to analyze suit gases on January 
27, 1967 analysis performed in KSC-MAB per TPS 
SIC 012·S/C 017, MAB Report Number MAB 259­
67. Evaluation by Panel 18. 
Determine concentrations of ethylene glycol/water 
mixtures which could have supported combustion 
on SIC 012. Accomplished in KSC-MAB. Evalu­
tion by Panel 8. 
Determine if procedure used to clean connectors 
exposed to water/glycol on SIC 012 was adequate, 
and effects upon connectors of exposure to water / 
glycol - to be performed in KSC-MAB. Evaluation 
by Panel 8. 
D-16-9 
34. 	 INERTIAL MEASUREMENT 
UNIT (IMU) TEMPERATURE 
CONTROL TEST 
35. 	 PROCUREMENT OF ENVIRON­
MENT CONTROL UNIT (ECU) 
CABLE ASSEMBLIES 
36. 	 LiOH CANISTER TEST 
37. 	 SOOT COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
38. 	 ANALYZE DEPOSIT 
ON COMMAND PILOT FOOT 
PAN 
39. 	 ELECTRICAL SHORT TEST 
40. 	 COLDPLATE LEAK CHECK 
41. 	 SPECIAL ECUWITH LIOH 
CANISTERS 
42. 	 CABIN RELIEF VALVE AND 
VENT LINE FLOW 
43. 	 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE 
(bp) vs COUPLING DATA UNIT 
(CDU) GIMBAL ANGLES 
. Determine changes in IMU Heater and Blower current 
as a function of Bus voltage changes, for correla­
. tion with·S/C 012 data - Test cancelled. 
Supply twenty-five (25) cable assemblies to support 
Special Test No. 33. Twenty-three (23) assemblies 
available March 10, 1967; three weeks lead time 
on remaining two. Evaluation not required.· 
Measure temperature and flow characteristicsofLiOR 
canister same as those used on SiC 012 during OCP 
FO-K-0021-1. 
Test Requirements incorporated into Special Test 
No. 50. Evaluation to be made as part of that test. 
Comparative analysis of soot from near cabin relief } 
valve inlet and from steam duct to verify cabin relief 
valve operation. To be analyzed in KSC-MAB per 
TPS SIC 012-CM-MA-00S. Evaluation by Panel 10. ~ 
Analyze .deposit on Command Pilot's foot pan to 
determine its composition and aid in determining 
its origin. 
Performed in KSC·MAB per TPS SIC 012·CM·MA· 
007, MAB Report Number MAB 311-67. Evaluation 
by Panel IS. 
Provide data to support investigation of alternating 
current (AC) anomaly noted on SIC 012 prior to 
the accident. Accomplished on SIC OOS per TPS 
V·16-001-083. Evaluation by Panel 3. 
Isolate sources of waterlglycol leakagewJIich may 
have contributed to the accident. Included in plan 
of action for Board Action Item 0107. Evaluation 
by Panel 18. 
Obtain accurate thermal and chemical performance 
data on LiOR canister under conditions nearly 
identical to SIC 012-Requirements incorporated into 
Special Test No. 50. To be evaluated as part of 
that test. 
Determine flow characteristics through vent line with 
vent valve in abort entry mode for correlation with 
SIC 012 data - accomplished on Mockup SMD-2B. 
Evaluation by Panel lO. 
Obtain plot of CDU Gimbal Angles at various 
cabin pressures for comparison with SIC 012 data· 
accomplished on SIC 008 per TPS V16-00l-089. 
Evaluation by Panel lO. 
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44. CHROMATOGRAPH CABLE 
TEST 
45. WEIGH LiOH CANISTERS 
46. ELECTRICAL SHORT TEST 
47. AC BUS 2 SHORT ON PHASE A 
... 
48. OCTOPUS CABLE TEST· 
SIC 008 
49. ELECTRICAL SHORT TEST 
50. LiOH CARTRIDGE TEST 
..... 
Reproduce copper flow found on SIC 012 Chroma· 
tograph Cable following accident. Performed in KSC· 
MAB per TPS SIC 012-CM·MA·011. MAB Report 
Number MAB 297-67. Evaluation by Panel 18. 
Determine extent to which canisters ,had reacted with 
the surrounding atmosphere during storage. Incorpora· 
ted into Special Test No. 50. To be evaluated as part 
of that test. 
Conduct electrical shorting tests on a vehicle configured 
similar to SIC 012 to obtain information relative to 
cause of ignition. Request withdrawn by originator. 
Provide additional data to support investigation of 
SIC 012 AC anomaly prior to the accident. Per· 
formed on SIC 008 per TPS VI6-001-093. Eval· 
uation by Panel 3. 
Acquire positive data to determine if MDAS would 
evidence anomalies due to short duration grounding 
of direct current (DC) Main Bus B. Authorized per 
ASHUR 012-501 . accomplished on SIC 008 per 
TPS VI6-001-093. Evaluation by Panel 3. 
Determine effects of hard shorts on various gage wire 
circuits within the DC systems. Test to be accom· 
plished March 15, 1967, on SIC 008 at MSC. Eval· 
uation by Panel 3. 
Combination of requirements of Special Tests 15, 36, 
41, and 45. To be accomplished in KSC·MAB. Eval· 
uation by Panels 2,5,8, 11, and 18 . 
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A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 

Th~ Apollo 204 Review Board established the Final Board Report Panel, 17. The task assignf I 
for accomplishment by Panel 17 was prescribed as follows: 
Thil! actiyit,y involves the organization of the report, the . delegation of responsibility to other 
assigned task groups, the review and editing of submitted. material, and the final preparation of 
the Report. 
B.PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1 .. MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by thefollowing members of the Final Report Panel:' 
Lt. Col. K. H. Hinchman, U. S. Air Force,Chairman 
Mr. R. D. Smith, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. J. G. Ross, Langley Research Center (LaRC), NASA 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
f 	 Colonel Charles F. Strang, U. S.Air Force, Board Member, was assigned to monitor' the Final 
Report Panel. 
, .~ 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
.In response to the direction of the Apollo 204 Review Board, the Panel derived detailed objectives. 
These objectives ,were: preparation of the Apollo 204 Review Board Final Repon; review of Panel 
reports; and·t}:le establishment and maintenance of an Apollo 204 Review Board General File. 
1. FINAL REPORT PREPARATION: 
The Apollo 204 Review Board immediately recognized the Final Report would serve important 
functions. These functions included: the detailed documentary of the investigation process; the presen· 
tation of the rationale which supports the findings and recommendations; and the presentation of vali­
dating data used to eliminate specific systems and procedures as possible causative factors. With these 
functions in mind, the Final Report Panel was designeq to document findings, determinations, and 
recommendations for submission to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). 
To accomplish this objective effectively, it was initially determined .that .the Fiual; Report panel 
would establish a system to insure that every Board proceeding, statement, text, analysis, disassembly 
action, etc., was documented. Original copies (wherever possible) of each supporting document were 
obtained by the Panel. Those identified for enclosure in the Final Report we..-e then reviewed, edited, 
and assembled. The Final Report would lose its readability and effectiveness if every document created 
lo 	 during the review was included in the report proper. Therefore, only those documents, photographs 
and test results considered pertinent to the findings of the Review Board are contained within the 
covers of the Report. All other references are retained in the General File. Enclosure 17·1 is the outline 
II,' 	
used in the preparation of the Final Report. 
2. PANEL REPORT PREPARATION - APPENDIX D TO THE FINAL REPORT: 
Enclosure 17-2 illustrates the procedures employed in the preparation of the Final Panel Reports. 
Panel Chairmen consulted Panel 17 to obtain detailed requirements for Final Panel Report preparation. 
Format, enclosures, findings and determinations were discussed, and recommended improvements de­
fined. Each draft of the Panel Reports was edited by Panel 17 and simultaneously, technical reviews 
were made. Copies were prepared and distributed to Board Members, Counsels to the Board and 
cognizant Panel Chairmen for individual study. The Apollo 204 Review Board, through meetings with 
the Panel Chairmen, reviewed the completeness, coordinated the contents with other Panels, and judged 
the acceptability of the reports. Panel Chairmen advised Panel 15 of their photographic selections for 
Sheet 1 of 2) 
0"17·3 
inclusion in the Final Panel Report. Services for the preparation and reproduction of text, charts, 
drawings, photographs. and binding of the Final Report were· obtained by the Final Report Panel, 17. 
3. GENERAL FILE: 
The Apollo 204 Review Board General Files were established in accordance with Review Board 
Administrative Procedure 15. The Final Report is dependent upon this file for much of the supporting 
documentation. Data relative to fire propagation, materials, systems operation at high temperatures, 
system and component testing and validation, etc., are some of the by-products of the review and 
are available in the file. The composition and functiom of the Review Board, as well as task assign­
ments of the Panels, are also available therein. The file system is designed to insure that every item 
entered in the file is reviewed, logged, indexed and cataloged. Major classification is by Panel with spe­
cific reference data pertaining to the Panel Report ftled in the front of each Panel's file. Test Pre­
paration Sheets (TPS), prepared for each test, disassembly task, investigation technique, etc., are identi­
fied by the spacecraft system to which they apply and are croSs indexed by TPS number. 
All Review Board General Sessions were recorded on tapes designated "original" (Review Board 
Administrative Procedure 9) and are in the General File. These. tapes were then used in transcribing 
minutes of General Sessions. Verbatim transcripts of these sessions are incorporated in Appendix A along 
with minutes of the Executive Sessions. Edited copies of original tapes were made and designated "mas­
ter". The editing process removed extraneous information and periods of silence. Other items in the 
General File include photographs, diagrams. T.V. tapes aria motion picture films. 
'c 
<:-: 
In accordance with the direction of the Administrator, NASA, February 27, 1967,the Final Report 
and -General File will be maintained by the Director, Langley Research Center, Langley Station,· Vir­
ginia, for the National Aeronautics and 'Space Administration, to provide a sOurce of information to 
inquiries and for research projects of the future. 
r D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
Not applicable. 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
Enclosures 
17-1 
17"2 
Final Report Outline 
Task Panel Report Flow Chart 
"! 
\11 
(Sheet 2 of 2) 
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FINAL REPORT OUTLINE 
Letter of Transmittal to Administrator, NASA 
Preface 
Table of Contents 
Part 1 . Purpolle and Authority 
a. Narrative of Board History 
b. NMI 8621.1 and memoranda of January 28 and February 3, 1967. 
c. Dr. Seaman's letters on appointment of Dr. Van Dolah; letters on deletion of Dr. Long and 
Mr. Jeffs. 
Part 2 . Biographical background on each board membtt and Counsel to the Board. 
Part 3 • Board: 
a. Organization Letter from Board Chairman on appointments of Representatives, Consultants, 
Liaison to the Board and Task Panels .. 
b. Procedures . Explanation of how Board functions, i.e.. daily General and Executive Sessions, 
Task Panel participation. decisions and requests for Panel accomplishments enacted in Executive 
Session. ' 
c. Summary of Activities· Record of Board proceedings. 
d. Spacecraft and data custodial responsibilities 
e. Interim Reports from Deputy :\dmin;'nrator. "'AS" to the Administrator. XASA 
Part 4 - History of Accident 
a. Background of Spacecraft 012 together with dacnption of test objectives and sequences up to 
start of T·I0 hold. 
b. Time line from T·10 hold through medical determination of death (summarize events as they 
occurred). 
Part 5 . Investigation and Analysis - a detailed descriptive narrative of the investigation which provides 
an analysis of the causes or probable causes. 
Part 6 . Findings. Determinations, Recommendations 
Appendices: 
a. Board Minutes. 
b. Witness statements (with releases). 
c. Apollo Operations Handbook. dated 12 Xovember 1966. 
d. Panel Reports. 
c. Organization and ~Ianagement. 
f. Schedule of Physical Evidence. 
g. Addenda and Corrigenda. 
Board Files not part of report: 
General File: 
1. Witness statements not relevant. 
2. PhotOgraphs not used in report. 
3. Supplementary analysis and data used in preparation of Report. 
4. Working papers. 
5. Voice and medical records (filed at MSC) . 

.I>. Correspondence from General Public 

7. ~ti.scellaneous papers. 
ENCLOSURE 11-1 
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